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strategy  in  the  transformation  of  a  textile  chemical  company’s  financial  success,  led  to 
research  on  the  potential  of  “sustainability”  as  a  new  strategic  lens  to  improve  value 
creation  in  small  to  medium  sized  enterprises  (SMEs).  Sustainability  was  offered  as  a 
useful  strategic  lens  to  aid  in  transforming  SMEs  to  produce  greater  value  in  a  world 
defined  as  “hot,  flat  and  crowded”,  meaning,  a  world  where  population  pressures  on 




·  Pursue  background  research  on  sustainable  development  and  the  concepts  for 
creation of sustainable enterprise 





·  Report  the  results  of  three  action  research  cases  where  a  sustainability  lens  and 
transformational  framework  were  inserted  as  major  influences  on  strategy 
development over a five­plus year period 
·  Summarize findings and develop suggestions for ongoing research 




Furthermore,  there  are  many  regions  of  the  world  where  networks  of  SMEs  have  been 
found to create markets and unexpected synergies. Exploring these examples exposes the 
complexity of network formation and the architecture and behavior of such networks, but 
also  produced  some  new  understandings  as  examples  of  networking  behavior  from  the 
Internet  were  contrasted  with  the  performance  of  SME  networks.  It  was  found  that 
networks of SMEs could form and dissolve rapidly; the term “ad hoc” network was coined 
to describe such behaviors. It was also observed that ad hoc networks could be extremely 
detrimental  to  the  global  physical  and  fiscal  environments  if  their  behaviors  were  not 
tempered by a realization of the need for sustainability and its associated behaviors. 
The globalization of markets seems to have forced SMEs to choose between hyper­efficient 
behaviors,  which  create  brittle,  mono­focused  low­price  driven  networks  and  have  few 
environmental  or  social  conscience  boundaries,  versus  more  resilient,  socially, 
environmentally and  financially­bounded networks  that  tend  to be  regional  or  local. The 






A  transformative  framework  was  developed  based  on  the  work  of  leading  theorists  on 
sustainable  enterprise  to  encourage  development  of  hybrid  strategies  and  actions.  This 
action research framework is outlined and consists of a series of educational and diagnostic 
exercises  with  the  chosen  firms,  based  on  extensive  dialogues  with  the 
owners/entrepreneurs of the firms. The anticipated results sought to balance the inputs and 
outputs of the corporation through inclusion of heretofore ignored stakeholders that creates 












were  adequately  transformed  as  a  result  of  sustainable  lens  insertion  and  new  strategy 
implementation.  They  continue  to  survive  and  thrive  after  5  plus  years  of  strategic 
intervention.  The  textile  chemical  company  did  not  survive  due  to  inadequate 
understanding  and  actions  related  to  “creative  destruction”  of  the  incumbent  business 
model,  however,  even  in  failure,  this  case  provides  support  for  the  idea  that  sustainable 
strategies can provide unique competitive advantages 
The  finding of  the  research  indicates  that  sustainability  is  a useful  foundation  for  formal 
strategy­planning  processes  for  SMEs.  It  forces  consideration  of  internal  and  external 
factors and provides a new communication channel for communication and inclusion with 
new  stakeholders.  A  sustainability  lens  provides  for  a broader  definition  of  success  that 
transcends  but  is  inclusive  of  economic  profitability  and  provides  stability  and  control 
(resilience)  within  operations  of  SMES  and  networks  of  SMEs.  The  key  concept  of 
enterprise  creating  abundance  for  as many  stakeholders  as  possible  and  thus  expanding 









‘Groene  chemie’  was  een  strategie  in  de  omvorming  van  een  chemisch  textielbedrijf 
waarmee de auteur eind vorige eeuw ervaring opdeed en successen boekte. Daaruit vloeide 
onderzoek  voort  naar de mogelijkheden  van  ‘duurzaamheid’  als  een  nieuwe  strategische 
benadering  voor  waardecreatie  in  kleine  en  middelgrote  ondernemingen  (MKB).  Deze 
benadering zou het MKB kunnen helpen meer waarde voort te brengen in een wereld die 
‘hot,  flat  and  crowded’  was.  Het  gaat  om  een  wereld  waarin  de  toenemende 
bevolkingsdruk  en  de  gevolgen  daarvan  voor  het  beslag  op  natuurlijke  hulpbronnen, 







kunnen  spelen  in  het  strategisch  beleid  en  succesvolle  bedrijfsstrategieën  voor 
ondernemingen in het MKB, 
·  Onderzoek naar de rol van ondernemingen in het MKB in de wereldeconomie, 
·  Verkenning  van  de  rol  van  ondernemingen  in  het MKB  in  netwerken,  de  theorie 
van het gedrag van deze ondernemingen in netwerken, en de theorie van het gedrag 
van alsmede hun presteren binnen de grenzen van duurzame ontwikkeling, 
·  Verslag  van  de  resultaten  van  drie  cases  waarin  duurzaamheid  en  een  raamwerk 
voor  transformatie  werden  ingezet  als  belangrijke  beïnvloedingen  van 
strategieontwikkeling gedurende een periode van meer dan vijf jaar, 
·  Samenvatting van de bevindingen, met onderzoeksaanbevelingen. 
De  onderzoeksvragen  richtten  zich  op  de  bepalende  kenmerken  van  duurzame 
ondernemingen,  de manier waarop  deze  in  het MKB ontwikkeld  konden worden,  en  de 
gevolgen van het  inzetten van een duurzaamheidsbenadering in de strategie bepaling van 
drie ondernemingen in het MKB. 
In veel  gebieden  in deze wereld zijn netwerken  van ondernemingen  in  het MKB  in  staat 
gebleken markten  te  creëren,  en  onverwachte  synergie­effecten.  Het verkennen  van deze 
voorbeelden  laat  de  complexiteit  zien  van  de  vorming  van  netwerken,  en  van  de 
architectuur  en  het  gedrag  van  zulke  netwerken.  Dat  leidde  tot  nieuwe  inzichten  uit  de 





De  globalisering  lijkt  ondernemingen  in  het  MKB  gedwongen  te  hebben  tot  een  keus 
tussen  twee gedragsalternatieven: hyperefficiënt gedrag, dat broze netwerken  voortbrengt 
waarin ondernemingen uitsluitend gericht zijn op lage kosten, terwijl ze weinig milieu­ of 
sociale  grenzen  zien;  versus meer  veerkrachtige, sociaal, mileu­ en  financieel begrensde 
netwerken op een meer regionale of  locale schaal. De belangrijkste vraag is of netwerken 
in  het  MKB  een  hybride  structuur  kunnen  ontwikkelen  waarin  voldoende  efficiency
Samuel B. Moore, Erasmus University 
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hybride  strategieën  en  acties.  Dit  raamwerk  voor  actieonderzoek  bestaat  uit  en  serie 
educatieve en diagnostische oefeningen met de betrokken ondernemers en ondernemingen. 
De  oefeningen  zijn  gebaseerd  op  langdurige  gesprekken met  directeur/eigenaren  van  de 
ondernemingen. De opzet was dat de resultaten  van de  toepassing van  het  raamwerk een 
balans  zouden  laten  zien  tussen  de  inputs  en  outputs  van  de  onderneming  ­  door  de 
betrokkenheid  van  tot  dan  toe  genegeerde  stakeholders  ―  op  een  manier  die  nieuwe 
klanten  zou  opleveren.  De  resultaten  werden  geanalyseerd  door  de  waarden  in  kaart  te 
brengen  van  nieuwe, duurzame  investeringen. De auteur gebruikte  het  raamwerk bij drie 
ondernemingen  in  het MKB  als  een  instrument  om de  eigenaars  en  managers  van  deze 
bedrijven te helpen een alternatief te vinden voor hun falende strategieën. De cases in het 
actieonderzoek betreffen de volgende ondernemingen: 
·  Burlington Chemical Company,  Inc. het  chemisch  textielbedrijf  van de auteur, dat  in 
moeilijkheden verkeerde door de globalisering in de textielindustrie. 
·  Reedy  Fork  Dairy  Farm,  een  familiebedrijf  in  North  Carolina  in  de  VS;  dit  bedrijf 
kampte met enorme fluctuaties in de melkprijzen. 
·  TS Designs,  Inc.,  een  textieldrukbedrijf  dat ook  in  problemen was gekomen door de 
globalisering van de textielmarkt. 
De resultaten van het actieonderzoek waren in het algemeen succesvol. Twee van de drie 






De  resultaten  van  het  actieonderzoek  laten  zien  dat  duurzaamheid  een  bruikbare 
onderbouwing  kan  leveren  voor  processen  van  strategieformulering  in  het  MKB.  De 
ontwikkelde methode leidt ertoe dat interne en externe factoren in beschouwing genomen 
worden,  en  levert  een  nieuw  communicatiekanaal  naar  nieuwe  stakeholders.  Een 
duurzaamheidsbenadering  geeft  een  bredere  definitie  van  succes,  waarin  begrepen 




geeft  zicht  op  nieuw  onderzoek  naar  het  gedrag  van  netwerken  in  het MKB  en  andere 
netwerken, zoals die op het internet. Vervolgonderzoek zou zich verder moeten richten op 
de effecten  van duurzame ondernemingsstrategieën op de veerkracht  van ondernemingen 
en  netwerken  in  het  MKB,  en  misschien  zelfs  het  ontstaan  van  nieuwe  netwerk 
bedrijfsstructuren in het MKB.
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Sustainable  enterprise  as  a  paradigm  is  becoming  a  vital  component  of  competitive  strategic 
planning at all  levels of society and enterprise (Drucker 1993; Hawken 1993; Hampden­Turner 
and Trompenaars 1997; Wilber 1998; Wheatley 1999; Ziman 2000; Wilson 2002; Senge 2004). 
In  particular,  as  the  sustainability  paradigm has  become more  integrated  in  the  new  fabrics  of 
commerce,  business  strategists  are  purporting  that  a  focus  on  “sustainability”  or  “sustainable 
development” (World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987) provides business 
advantages  as  determined  by  the  vitality,  abundance  and  prosperity  of  the  enterprise’s 
stakeholders. 1 The hope of sustainable enterprise is to use the vitality of entrepreneurs and capital 
markets, which are accustomed to rapid market changes, to speed transition to greater abundance 
and efficiency  in production and consumption before  the planet becomes exhausted  (Anderson 
1998). 
As  will  be  discussed  in  later  sections,  it  is  especially  important  for  small  to  medium  sized 
enterprises  (SMEs)  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co­operation  and  Development  Environment 
Directorate  1989)  to  be  fully  engaged  in  these  efforts  because  SMEs  represent  over  80%  of 
global enterprise. As the number of smaller firms continues to increase globally, their cumulative 
ecological  and  social  footprints  will  become  increasingly  significant  (Ács  and  Yeung  1999). 
Increasing numbers of people working in these firms verses larger firms may indicate a growing 





The  future  social,  economic  and  environmental  impacts  of  SMEs  and  especially  networks  of 
SMEs are  specifically  addressed  in a article published by  the author  in  the Journal of Cleaner 
Production (Manring and Moore 2009). The results of this research these impacts may be either 
positive  or  negative,  and  it  is  important  to  explore  the  risks  and  rewards  of  intentionally 
incorporating  particular  sustainable  enterprise  principles  and  strategies  as  part  of  a  coherent 
business  strategy  for small firms because their number are increasing. Equally  important  in the 
research is  the need to document whether adopting such strategies helps firms create value and 














The  author’s powerful  experience  of  developing  and  applying  a  sustainability  lens  to  envision 




the  two other  firms described  in  this dissertation, both of which were  failing and seeking  new 
paths forward out of deteriorating incumbent markets. 
The sustainability lens the author used in this research rests on two key principles: 
·  All business decisions  include the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) principles,  that  is, human, 
economic, and environmental bottom lines (Elkington 1994; Elkington 1998) as a critical 
basis for their vision, strategy development and actions. 
·  Instead of  looking at  their firms  in isolation, SMEs view themselves as members of  the 
network  of  life  or  “web  of  life”  (Capra  1996)  within  whatever  they  consider  their 
community  to be. This means  incorporating environmental,  civil  society, and economic 
development stakeholders as serious members in their networks. 
This  sustainability  lens,  as  I  shall  refer  to  it,  offers  new  clarity  to  the  concept  of  sustainable 
development as resilient, adaptive, intentionally cultivated, stakeholder networks linked by “free 
enterprise,  rightly  understood” 4  (Capra  1982;  Hawken  1993;  Smith  and  Cannan  1994;  Capra 
2002; Smith and Haakonssen 2002; Hart 2005) and focused on TBL strategies. The hope is that 
this  form of SME and SME­network development may provide a  new paradigm  for achieving 
and  maintaining  social  and  economic  vitality  along  with  the  environmental  sustainability 
originally  emphasized  in  the  Brundtland  report(World  Commission  on  Environment  and 
Development.  1987).  In  this  view,  sustainable  enterprise  becomes  an  idealized  goal  for  a 
corporate  organization  that  strives  to  balance  TBL  value­creation  and,  by  doing  so,  creates 
abundance and vitality in the marketplace by expanding opportunities for all stakeholders. This 





for  SMEs  began  in  1980  before  the  formal,  environment­centered  metaphors  of  “sustainable 
development” were conceived by the Brundtland commission in 1987. As a junior Vice President 




























due  in  large  part  to  increased  sales  of  dyes  and  high  performance  specialty  chemicals  that 
resolved critical environmental challenges described by Ausley and Moore (Ausley and Moore 
2004). Broadly positive to multiple stakeholders, these experiences resolving production­related 
environmental  challenges  were  published  in  the  Journal  of  Cleaner  Production  (Ausley  and 
Moore 2004). 
The  importance  of  understanding  stakeholder  networks  evolved  as  a  concept  for  me  as  the 
research cases produced  for  this dissertation unfolded. Within  the  three action  research cases  I 
found  the  richer  and  more  complex  the  stakeholder  relationships  managed  by  the  firm,  the 
greater  the  opportunity  for  value  creation.  For  example,  specifically  in  the Reedy  Fork Dairy 
case, we were able to map the farm inputs and then the map the value of the outputs of the dairy 
farm  in  two  circumstances.  The  first  was where  “milk”  was  viewed  by  the  stakeholders  as  a 
commodity. Later  in the case,  it was mapped after  the farm was converted to produce “organic 
milk”. In both situations, the inputs required to run the farm and produce the “milk” were very 
complex.  However,  when  the  dairy  was  selling  commodity  milk,  there  was  only  the  selling 
“price”  as  a  single  determinate  of  value.  However,  after  the  organic  transition,  the  value 
proposition  for  organic milk  was  much  broader  and  interconnected,  because  the  stakeholders 
were purchasing and valued the type and complexity of the inputs. 
Figure 1­1 Increases in “Value Space” or “Opportunity Space” as Depicted by Dr. Stuart Hart 
Increase is created by inclusion of environmental and social stakeholders as the area above a triangle created by 
the three pillars of sustainable development: economics, environment and social responsibility. 
Defining  value  as managing  complexity  for  customers  creates  “good will”  and  the more  good 
will  one  can  create with  a  product or  service,  the  higher  the  value of  the  product.  Stuart Hart 
graphically  describes  these  opportunities  in  Figure  1.1,  where  the  single  opportunity  space 
created  from  a  one  dimensional  value  proposition  of  “lowest  price”  is  compared  with  the 





little differentiation between the entrepreneur and the company  itself  in  the eyes of  the market, 
employees  or  the  shareholders  (Blackford  2003).  Consequently,  in  such  SMEs,  developing  a 
strategic  transformation process  that  intentionally  incites  the  radical changes  necessary  to  link 
social  and  environmental  equity  to  increased  profitability,  required  the  researcher  have  and 
deepen a personal and professional relationship with the entrepreneurs involved. 
In BCC’s case, to obtain approval for sustainability changes the author had to develop methods 
to  enlighten  the  company’s  stakeholders  (family  and  investors)  to  the  value of  those  changes. 
The  organizational  changes  induced  by  successfully  integrating  social,  economic  and 




as  the  textile  industry  collapsed  under  the weight  of NAFTA  trade policies  and  the  firm was 
forced  to  try  and  recreate  itself  in  new  markets  where  there  were  no  historical  network 
connections  (Johnson 2003). As BCC  tried  to  leverage  its  “green”  technologies  outside  of  the 
textile industry, it became apparent how valuable the textile market network was to the success 
of  the  firm. BCC discovered  that  the  network  relationships  developed over  50  years  of  active 















merits  of  competing  paradigms  often  talk  right  through  each  other,  using  the  same  words  to 
discuss  different  realities,  so  too  do  businessmen  discussing  the  concept  of  “sustainable 
enterprise.” (Christensen 1997) 
As  long  as  we  lack  a  paradigm  that  effectively  and  positively  aligns  social,  economic  and 
environmental  health  to  value  creation,  it  will  be  virtually  impossible  to  resolve  the  tensions 
5  “Creative  destruction”  is  a  term  that  evolved  from  the  economist  Joseph  Schumpeter  who  believed  that  capitalism  had  to 
destroy many  incumbent  business  and  technologies  to  allow  investment  and  growth  in new  ones.  The  rapid  evolution  of  the 




between  the  goals  of  traditional  environment­centered  sustainability  and  the  goals  of 
economically­successful,  value­creating  business. As  long  as we  cannot  envision  and  research 
within  a  paradigm  that  includes  sustainability  and  economically  successful  enterprise,  then 
enterprise and sustainability will always be in conflict (Montalvo 2002). 
The  second  catalyst  for  the  conception  of  sustainable  development  produced  by  “rightly 
understood”  free  enterprise  comes  from  the  apparent  lack  of “fitness”  exhibited  by  traditional 




acute”  (Kuhn  1962,  p.  23.).  Consequently,  the  evolution  of  a  new  paradigm  of  sustainable 
enterprise for business (Hart 1997) is being simultaneously driven by the disastrous route of late 
20 th  century  neo­liberal  capitalism  (Costanza, Graumlich  et  al.  2007),  and  the  socio­economic 
potential of rightly understood, enterprise networks. 
Of  course, while  narratives  of  successful  enterprises  that  link  sustainable  practices  to  vitality, 
abundance and prosperity provide  the  vision and  the motivation  for change  (especially  if  such 
successes also translate into creation of a growing market for goods so produced, see (Sen 2000), 
metaphors  alone  cannot  provide  sufficient material  confirmation  of  the  value  of  sustainability 
strategies.  So,  while  some  resolutions  of  tensions  produced  by  the  emerging  sustainable 
enterprise paradigm are occurring,  in this author’s opinion, more examples of clear, measurable 
results  produced  by  real  world  enterprises  practicing  triple­bottom­line,  stakeholder  network 
“sustainability” are needed. 
If there were cases where a well­substantiated paradigm for sustainable enterprise produced new 
approaches  to markets  and  consumers  to  resolve  the  tension  between  current  practice  and  the 
specter  of  social,  economic  and/or  environmental  collapse,  this would be  a  valuable  resource. 
Therefore,  the  goal  of  this  research  is  to  better  understand  how  “sustainability”  could  be 
understood  by  small  firms,  and  how  to  insert  a  sustainability  lens  into  the  strategy  planning 
process for several firms and record the results. There remain, however, lingering questions as to 
how  and  why  the  idea  of  sustainable  enterprise  evolved  as  it  did  during  the  end  of  the  20 th 
century and just how important this concept should be for SMEs. 
1.4  Why Sustainability Strategies for SMEs Now? 
To  normalize  this  paradigm  of  “sustainability”  one  must  first  explain  how  history,  science, 
economics,  and  social  research  align  to  create  the  concept  of  the  “triple  bottom  line”  as  an 
effective  enterprise  strategy  that  insists  on  balancing  economy,  ecology,  and  society  towards 
durable  and  dynamic  societal  sustainability  (NAC  2003).  For  example,  in  the  behavioral 
archetypes  described  in  Limits  to  Growth  (Meadows  1974)  or  The  Tragedy  of  the  Commons 
(Harden 1968), it is population growth and consumption that eventually overwhelm the benefits 
of  non­sustainable  economic development  (Senge  1990).  Since  this  vision  retains  the  sense of 
inherent  conflict  between  economic  growth  and  sustainable  development,  a  paradigm  that 
resolves these tensions must provide a new narrative. 
Never  before  has  society  and  developing  markets  had  available  the  low  cost  technological 
resources,  global  information  networks,  and  materials  of  the  21 st  century  (Thurow  1999),
Samuel B. Moore, Erasmus University 
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(Friedman  2000;  Roome  2001).  So,  while  there  were  “limits  to  growth”  using  20 th  century 
technologies  and  processes,  the  resources  produced  by  21 st  century  technology  provide  great 
opportunity  for  entrepreneurial,  “sustainable  enterprise”  leaders  and  people  of  social  and 








and  negative,  and certainly disruptive  to  the  status quo. They  have  removed policy barriers  to 
global  trade, opened new marketplaces to competition (Friedman 2005), spread the availability 
of  low  cost  labor  and  created  trading  communities  (Freeman 2005). But,  they  have  also  been 
destructive  to  local  and  regional  markets,  spurring  discussion  of  “technology  enabled 
globalization”  as  a  disruptive,  Schumpeterian  economic  force  (Schumpeter  1942;  Christensen 
1997; Metcalfe 1998; Hart 2005). 
The competition among  firms for workers, materials, energy, and customers is  fierce under  the 
new conditions of globalization (Christensen 1997; Hart 1997; Friedman 2000). The entrance of 
foreign  firms  (large  or  small)  into  what  were  once  closed  regional  or  national  markets  can 





roadmap  for  a  successful  enterprise  in  an  ecologically  healthy,  resource­limited  future  with 
burgeoning  demand?  Socio­ecological  models  that  interrelate  historical,  social,  economic, 
environmental and global trends (Costanza, Graumlich et al. 2007) are producing more reliable 
projections of the impacts of human development activities on planetary ecologies. These models 




































Therefore,  humanity  and  capitalism  faces  a  dilemma  that  demands  resolution:  to  redefine 
development  and  capitalism  to  become  “sustainable”  in  a  fuller  world  with  shrinking  natural 
capital.  This  is why,  in  the  author’s  view,  a  sustainable  enterprise  lens  is  critical  for  strategy 
planning in smaller firms. 
1.5  The Research Questions 
This dissertation’s  primary objective  is  to better explicate  the  value of using a “sustainability 
lens” to incorporate the principles of sustainable enterprise into the strategic plans for small to 
medium sized businesses. Since SMEs comprise over 80% of all global enterprise, it is important 
to  understand  the  potential  results  of  adopting  such  strategy  in  “real  world”  circumstances, 
which  are  discontinuous,  disruptive  and  highly  competitive,  and  to  develop  frameworks  to 
incorporate such strategies into SMEs if positive results emerge. 

















process  rather  than  a  preordained  one  (Hampden­Turner  and  Trompenaars  1997).  The 
opportunity  to  work  with  the  firms  described  in  these  cases  was  a  result  of  opportunity, 






implications  of  sustainable  SME  transformation  strategies  that  evolved  after  1995  were  also 
published in the same journal (Manring and Moore 2004) (Manring and Moore 2009). 
As a direct result of the author’s business and personal relationships with the firms TS Designs 
Inc  and  Reedy  Fork  Dairy,  the  opportunity  for  Action  Research  projects  evolved  beyond 
Burlington Chemical,  but  had  very  similar  transformational  goals.  These  projects  began  as  a 
result  of  those  personal  and  professional  relationships,  but  only  continued  because  positive 
results were achieved. 
The Action Research project with TS Designs began around 1993 and  the project with Reedy 
Fork Dairy  began  in  2001.  The  projects matured  at  different  times,  closing with Reedy  Fork 
Dairy in 2007, and continues with TS Designs through 2009. 
As  a  chemist  trained  in  the methods  of  empirical  research,  learning  the  tools  and  practice  of 
becoming  an  Action  Researcher  in  the  messy  “real  world”  has  been  full  of  challenges,  both 
professional and personal. Balancing objectivity and measuring the results of the change process, 
while coaching colleagues through the journey towards a more sustainable enterprise, has been a 
most  difficult  challenge.  However,  both  are  integral  parts  of  any  Action  Research 
project(Argyris, Putnam et al. 1985). 
Action Research is defined under the umbrella of Action Inquiry or Action Science, which is the 














The  insights  that  the  researcher  discovered  from  these  two  roles  as  an  engaged  insider  and 




activities  of  these  firms,  and  in  depth  interviews  and  formal  educational  presentations  were 
conducted over many years with the owners and key managers of each firm. There was a high 
level  of  trust  and  honest  exchange of  ideas  that  developed  from  this  close  relationship, which 
















As  discussed  earlier,  developing  an  intentional  strategic  process  to  incite  the  radical  changes 
necessary  in a  traditional American SME, linking social and environmental equity to increased 
profitability,  required  the  Action  Researcher  to  have  and  deepen  a  personal  and  professional 
relationship with the entrepreneurs involved. Here the role of the Action Researcher promoting a 
change  initiative must be as both a  change agent and an advocate  for  the owners. The ethical 
position being touted, in this case, sustainable transformation, cannot be seen by the entrepreneur 




Finding  a  critical  eye  that  enables  a  cyclical  Action  Research  process  (Tripp  2003)  with  the 
following  attributes:  planning,  acting,  observing,  recounting,  reflecting  and  documenting  the 
process  and  results,  requires  a  professional  discipline  that  severely  juxtaposes  all  the 
participant’s  personal  and  professional  realities.  While  the  nature  of  Action  Research  is  by 
definition empirical, Action Research is, nevertheless, a giant leap from laboratory science since 







While  passion  and  excitement  were  abundant,  objectivity  and  a  disciplined  adherence  to  the 
process design were difficult to maintain. 6 
These projects became very personal for the researcher and the entrepreneurs because sustainable 
transformation  is  a  very  personal matter  for  the  leaders  of  SME  firms.  The  business  case  for 





part of  all  three  of  these  projects was  the  process  of  connecting  the  vision  and  the  passion  of 





research  experiences  have  been  deeply  personal  for  all  the  stakeholders  on  many  levels.  The 
management teams of TS Designs and Burlington Chemical became friends of the author as well 
as  honored  colleagues.  The  Teague  Family  of  Reedy  Fork  Dairy  became  like  a  part  of  the 
author’s  own  family.  This  personal  connection  is  certainly  one  of  the  challenges  of  Action 
Research recognized in the literature (Argyris, Putnam et al. 1985). This seems especially true in 
SMEs,  where  the  businesses  are  intertwined  with  the  identity  and  lives  of  the  owner­ 
entrepreneurs.  (Argyris,  Putnam  et  al.  1985) Therefore,  these  cases  read more  like  narratives, 
rather  than  the  traditional  third­person  voice  business  cases  found  in many  journals. There  is, 

















models  that  evolved  between  the Action Researcher  and  the managers  of  SMEs,  are  personal 
(Blackford 2003) and take very  large amounts of  time and personal energy (Granovetter 1984; 
Langley  1999).  Therefore,  if  mistakes  or  a mishandling  of  the  role  of  the  Action  Researcher 
occurs during a project, not only are there business related consequences, the consequences are 
also  personal  for  the  researcher  and  the managers  of  the  firms.  The  relationship  between  the 
researcher and  the enterprise  is a  two edged sword and has  great  similarity  to  the  relationship 
between the entrepreneur and their businesses. In other words, not only will mistakes during an 
Action Research project  cost  everyone on a business  level, but  the  losses  impact personal and 
family relationships as well. 
The  importance  of  “trust”  and  a  personal  connection  between  the  change  agent  in  such  a 
transformation  project  and  the  owners  of  the  SME  firm  cannot  be  minimized  (Marshall  and 
NetLibrary  Inc.  1995;  Marshall  and  NetLibrary  Inc.  2000).  Because  the  financial  evidence 
connecting  sustainable  behaviors  in  enterprise  and  increased  profits  remains  conditional 
(Montalvo 2002),  invoking  the additional dimensions of  stewardship and ethics, on a personal 
level  for  the  entrepreneurs  involved  is  absolutely  necessary  to  build  the  vision  for  sustainable 
transformation.  This  may  be  a  limitation  towards  integration  of  sustainability  into  strategic 











Chapter  3:  Frameworks  and  Tools  for  Developing  a  Sustainable  Enterprise  Strategy.  Stuart 
Hart’s  Sustainable  Enterprise  Strategic  Framework  (Hart,  2005),  Montalvo’s  Organizational 
Behavior  Framework  (Montalvo  2002),  and  the  “sustainability  advantages”  described  by  Bob 
Willard  (Willard  2005)  are  shown  to  be  tools  that  enable  the  incorporation  of  sustainable 
technologies in formal strategic planning processes for SME planning. Sustainability is presented 
by  these  scholars  as  a  leverage  point  that  may  produce  opportunities  for  both  disruptive  and 
incremental  competitive  strategies. The  tools  of Hart, Montalvo,  and Willard  are  shown  to  be 




network  effects  and  the  idea  of  developing  an  intentional  process  for  examination  of  SME 
stakeholder networks as part of a sustainable enterprise strategy. 
Chapter 4: Action Research Methodologies: Introduction and Background for the Case Studies. 
Action  Research  techniques  were  designed  to  fully  develop  educational  approaches  for  three 
SMEs, which  agreed  to  provide  the  author  access  to  owners, managers  and  employees  of  the 
firms. This essentially produced an experimental space allowing the author to educate on the use 












introduced  to  the  principals  of  sustainable  development  and  the  author  worked  within  the 
management  teams seeking to find ways to innovate and build value via a transition to a triple 
bottom  line  strategy. This  particular  timeframe was  a  period of  collapse within  the  incumbent 
markets of all three firms, due to globalization. All three companies studied are located in North 
Carolina, USA, which was a geographic area heavily impacted via the loss of textile, agricultural 
and  furniture  production  companies,  which  moved  to  lower  cost  locations  in  Asia  and  south 
America.  These  circumstances  forced  each  firm  to  recreate  itself,  during  which  time  the 
opportunities provided by sustainable development were added to strategy development process. 
Care  is  taken  in  the  presentation  of  the  cases  to  describe  the  education  and  transformation 
process that led to the inclusion of sustainable enterprise as a possible mental model that could 
provide  additional  competitive  advantage  in  these  firms.  The  cases  are  recounted,  using  case 
study methodology  as  described  by (Naumes  and Naumes  2006)  and  presented  in  a  narrative 
format  as  described  by  (Czarniawska­Joerges  1997;  Czarniawska­Joerges  1998;  Czarniawska­ 
Joerges 1999; Czarniawska­Joerges and Hernes 2005). 
Chapter  10: Summary and  Findings.  This  final  chapter  integrates  the  findings  from  the  three 









local,  regional,  national  and  international  societies  network  together  will  become  critical. 










companies  that  insult  the social  and environmental commons, making  their behaviors  in many 
cases  rapidly  transparent,  and  subject  to  global  scrutiny. 8  The  world  continues  to  shrink  as 
markets  flatten  and  there  is  no  place  where  companies  can  hide  environmentally  or  socially 
irresponsible behaviors. 
By  the  last  two  decades  of  the  20 th  century  the  media  and  interconnection  of  markets  also 
produced  a  new  awareness  that  ignoring  the  consequences  of  environmental,  social,  and 
economic impacts of 20 th century economic development, resulted in a false sense of capitalism, 
one  that  is  not  “rightly  understood”  and  which  an  ever  larger  demographic  does  not  find 
sustainable. Growing evidence indicates  the traditional processes of economic development are 
impairing  the  global  commons  such  that,  if  allowed  to  continued  unabated,  the  resultant 
conditions  threaten enterprises’ customers’ ability  to behave  as  consumers  (Bakan 2004). This 
threat  is  fundamental  to  the  currently  promoted vision  of  laissez­faire  capitalism and  possibly 
even to the existence of the corporation itself. 
Realizing  that,  as  the  21 st  century  emerges,  globalization,  population  pressures  and  social 
inequity  were  bringing  even  greater  environmental,  social,  and  economic  challenges,  business 
began  to  seek  new  approaches  to  maximizing  the  value  of  its  activities.  These  strategies 
necessitate  basic  changes  in  market  capitalism  and  the  corporation,  as  circumstances  force 
businesses  to address  the  issues of  sustainable production and consumption (Bakan 2004; Hart 
2005;  Barber  2007).  Economics,  behaviorism,  legal  precedent  and  policy  pressures  have  all 
created new drivers for enterprises to invest in these radical strategies (Montalvo 2002). 
In  short,  much  of  the  impetus  for  the  development  of  sustainable  enterprise  comes  from  the 
growing  societal  perception  that  perhaps  economic  “growth”  as  defined  by  GDP  is  not  the 
answer  to  poverty  or  population  growth,  and  that  consumption  must  be  controlled  through 
8 Throughout this thesis, the term commons is defined in Hardin’s terms from his 1968 article, “The Tragedy of the Commons”. 





policy,  not  unfettered  market  behavior  (Wheeler,  Zohar  et  al.  2005).  Such  realizations  have 
induced worldwide research efforts measuring the effects of the current unsustainable behaviors 
on future markets and enterprise profitability. This research,  in turn, has led to the evolution of 




to be gained  from adopting at  least  some principles of  sustainability (Montalvo 2002) (Collins 
and Porras 1994). They must envision what will  define success  in  the conditions of  the  future 
and find competitive advantages from adapting to the emerging situation. 
Still, management  frameworks  that  encourage  sustainability  as  a  competitive  advantage  face  a 
fundamental challenge: how to transform enterprises when essential changes are in tension with 










have the  incentive, examples, capabilities and resources to do so, and if  these changes  increase 
profits.  It  is  very  important  to  understand  that  the  disconnect  between  profits  and 
environmentally­  and  socially­responsible  corporate  behavior  forms  the  primary  hurdle  to 
sustainable enterprise (Senge 2004). 
Willard  (Willard  2002),  who  has  designed  tools  to  demonstrate  the  links  from  sustainability 
towards  improving  economic  performance  for  business,  argues  that  firmly  linking  sustainable 
behaviors to profitability  is the result of a normative process of strategy development. Hart and 
Milstein  (Hart  and  Milstein  2003)  also  indicate  that  intentional  enterprise  strategies  must 
discover competitive advantages within an environmentally constrained, consumer driven global 
economy of 6.5  to 9 billion people. Hart  additionally (Hart  and Prahalad 2002)  insists  that by 
adding  3  billion  new  consumers  during  the  21 st  century,  enterprise  is  on  the  verge  of  a  great 
period  of  growth,  but  only  if  that  growth  is  sustainable.  The  process  of  combining  these  two 
frameworks  into  strategic  planning  processes  for  SMEs  is  the  essence  of  the  action  research 
cases discussed in subsequent chapters. 
However,  for SMEs  in particular,  strategic changes and  the paths  towards  those changes must 
make  “sense”  from  an  owner’s  very  practical  point  of  view.  “Explicit  efforts  at  sense­making 







2005,  p.  409).  The  owners  and  entrepreneurs  managing  SME  firms  do  not  have  boards  of 
advisors  to  help  them  make  decisions  in  many  cases,  therefore,  “to  deal  with  ambiguity, 
interdependent people search for meaning, settle for plausibility and move on to the next set of 
challenges  (Sutcliffe, Weick  et  al.  2005, p. 419).  In  this  fashion SMEs must be  given  enough 
information  to  concur  that  the  future  is  going  to  be  “hot  flat  and  crowded”  and  that  it makes 
“sense” to consider actions that include sustainability. 
This research findings incorporated into this thesis  indicates that the objective of most research 
on  sustainable  enterprise  is  to  understand  and  describe  the  link(s)  between  social  and 
environmental  sustainability  and  profitability.  These  are  the  links  that  must  exist  for 
sustainability to be a sensible forecast of the future for SME owners. The links between profits 
and sustainable behaviors are beginning develop and produce organizational changes, especially 









Still,  while  the  news  that  large  global  firms  are  realizing  benefits  from  sustainability  changes 
makes  such  change  more  attractive,  little  study  has  been  put  into  addressing  how  to  make 
effective change in SME firms, the small to medium sized ones where 80+ percent of the world’s 
business  is  carried  out. The primary  focus  of  this  thesis  research  is  exploring  the  competitive 












principles  can  improve  both  environmental  and  corporate  sustainability  by  expanding  the 
diversity  of  stakeholders  and  providing  additional  interconnections  even  among  global  SME 
networks.  Since  this  approach  to  sustainability  expands  the  number  and  types  of  stakeholders
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participating  in a  network,  it  also  increases  the  learning  loops  for  the SME and as well as  the 
diversity  of  opportunity.  Such  effects may  result  in  SME  networks  that  are  resilient  over  the 
long­term and could result in rapid implementation of disruptive clean technologies, since such 
companies have fewer incumbent practices and allegiances to discard before adopting new ones. 




To  lay  the  foundation  for  exploring  how  this  Sustainability  Lens,  network  cultivation  and 




In  his  recent  study  of  the  role  played  by  small  firms  within  the  U.S.  economy,  Audretsch 
(Audretsch  2002)  delineated  the  basis  of  a  fundamental  and  ongoing  shift  in  research 
perspectives  on  enterprise  size  that  has  occurred  over  the  past  quarter  century  or  so.  The 
“traditional static” view, as Audretsch refers to it, proceeds from the long­standing assumption 
that  small  enterprises  generate  economic  and  social  costs  because  they  do  not  possess  the 
requisite  scale  to  achieve  optimal  operational  efficiencies.  As  a  consequence,  small  firms 
typically have  lower levels of factor productivity  than their  large counterparts and this,  in  turn, 
severely constrains their capacity to provide their workers with wages and benefits equivalent to 
industry  norms.  In  this  view,  small  enterprises  are  vulnerable  to  abnormally  high  rates  of 
business  failure,  owing  to  their  competitive  disadvantages  vis­à­vis  larger  rivals  in 
product/service  and  in  factor  markets.  According  to  Audretsch,  major  corollary  of  this  static, 
economy­of­scale conception of  small enterprises posits  that  they are also  less  innovative  than 
the market­share  leaders  in  their  respective  industries  because  they  lack  the  capital  to  finance 
formal  research  and  development  activities,  and  the  scale  and  scope  needed  to  recoup  their 
outlays on innovation inputs. 
In  the  early  1980s,  however,  Porter's  work  (Porter  1980;  Porter  1985)  on  the  exploitation  of 
niche or focus strategies initiated a revision of the long standing assumption that enterprise size 
invariably  displays  positive  correlations  with  competitive  performance  and  innovation.  Even 
apart from inroads on narrow or peripheral markets, small and medium­sized enterprises (SMEs) 
were  found  to  possess  certain  key  advantages  that  enabled  them  to  respond  in  a  timely  and 
flexible manner to rapidly evolving market environments and technological regimes. Within the 
field of industrial economics, empirical studies demonstrated that entrepreneurs do not enter into 
growing  sectors  to  capture  a  small  share  of  the  above­mean  profits  available  within  them. 
Instead, from a “dynamic emerging” perspective on industry structures, it was found that small 
start­up firms were not simply lower­case clones of larger incumbents but functioned as: “agents 
of  change  through  innovative  activity”  (Audretsch  2002.  p.  17).  Beginning  with  Acs  and 
Audretsch's (Acs and Audretsch 1987; Acs 1988) pioneering work, empirical studies showed that 
SMEs  are  able  to  compete  successfully  and,  in  fact,  to  replace  larger  enterprises  owing  to  the 





1980’s were  very  small  in  comparison  to 2005, most  likely  due  to  Internet  influences  and  the 





certainly  accelerated  the  evolutionary  process  by  rapidly  inducing  evolutionary  and  creative 
destruction effects (Schumpeter and Opie 1934; Schumpeter 1942; Andersen 2004; Hart 2005). 
While  central  to  a  full  appreciation  of  the  transition  that  has  taken  place  in  approaches  to  the 
study  of  SMEs  within  industrialized  economies,  Audretsch's  analysis  did  not  explicitly 
incorporate  the  over­arching  influence of  substantive  trends  that  had  unfolded  in  the world  at 
large.  It  is  not merely  that  advances  in  the  concepts, methods,  and data bases  associated with 
small  and  medium­sized  firms  are  now  disclosing  competencies  or  advantages  that  were 
previously unrecognized. Fundamentally, the production and consumption of goods and services 
has  undergone  a  paradigm  shift  owing  to  those  concurrent  economic,  political,  social,  and 
cultural  trends  that  may  be  associated  under  the  rubric  of  globalization.  Facilitated  by 
accelerating  progress  in  information­  and  communications  technologies,  globalization  has 
enabled enormous changes  in production networks,  including  the decomposition of production 
and marketing  activities  previously  conducted  in  house  by  dominant multinational  enterprises 
(MNEs) within their home nations and overseas subsidiaries. 
At  the  same  time,  governments  around  the  world  have  jettisoned  inward­looking,  import­ 
substitution  development  models  bolstered  by  protectionist  barriers  and  embraced  outward­ 
oriented  export  growth  strategies  demanding  liberalization  of  cross­border  trade,  production 
factor  and  information  flows.  Both  organizational  and  national  boundaries  have  become 
increasingly  fluid  and  indistinct,  while  consumers  have  not  stopped  demanding  products  and 
services that fit their diverse needs and preferences. This, in turn, has compelled enterprises of all 
sizes to discard the large­scale, centralized production chains operating under tightly­integrated, 
hierarchical  organizational  structures  in  favor  of  flexible  systems  that  encompass  cooperative 
commercial alliances, knowledge networks, and the capacity for rapid innovation (Manring and 
Moore  2004).  Taken  collectively,  these  developments  have  raised  and  broadened  the 
contributions of SMEs to local, regional, national, and global economies. 





Thus,  for  example,  in  1993  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
(UNCTAD)  (United  Nations  1993)issued  a  pivotal  report  on  the  role  of  small  and  medium 
transnational corporations  (TNCs)  for  the  future of non­OECD developing economies  in Asia, 
Latin  America,  and  Africa,  as  well  as  the  transitional  economies  of  Eastern  Europe.  The 









than  being  alternatives  to  reliance  upon  overseas  producers  of  exports  that  could  only  be 





industrial workers,  technicians, managers and entrepreneurs; provide the  impetus for  inter­ 
firm  linkages  to  the  domestic  economy;  play  a  vital  complementary  role  to  large 
corporations  and  are  a major  vehicle  for  transferring  or  developing  technical  know  how; 















possibilities  confront  significant  constraints”  (Cheah  and Cheah  2005, p. 51). Nevertheless,  as 
the potential of SMEs to serve as economic change agents  is manifested, it is possible that they 
may serve as catalysts in the evolution of sustainable ecological, social, and ethical systems on a 
world­wide  basis,  if  sustainable  behaviors  can  be  linked  to  success  for  practicing  firms  as 
Montalvo (Montalvo 2002) highlights. 
The empirical  study of  small­ and medium­sized enterprises  is woefully  inadequate  relative  to 
their prospective contributions. During the past two decades, a vast, sprawling body of studies on 
SMEs  has  come  into  existence.  As  noted  in  passing  above,  most  of  these  works  have  been 
conducted  in  North  America,  the  European  Union,  and  a  handful  of  Asian  economies. 
Consequently,  their  relevance  to  the  developing  world  is  questionable.  Moreover,  study 











(or  even  intentional)  researcher  bias  during  sample  selection  and  construction  is  high.  Such 
biases, discussed in Chapter 4, Action Research Methods, may be inherent in SME research due 
to the personal nature of the owners to their firms. Even the most basic variables utilized in the 
published  literature  on  SMEs  display  a  frustrating  lack  of  definitional  standardization.  For 
example, where the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) defines a “small business” as one 
with criteria such as 250, 200, or 100 workers; revenues of less than $10 million, and so on, in 
their  attempts  to  operationalize  independent  variables,  some  of  the  studies  reviewed  in  this 
chapter arbitrarily divide the larger from the smaller organizations within a given sample. 
Although  some  of  the  assertions  that  have  been  put  forth  concerning  SMEs  rest  upon  readily 
quantifiable  outcome  variables,  as,  for  example,  their  employment  effects  or  productive 
efficiency, others  steadfastly  resist quantification. Researchers  have attempted  to measure such 
qualitative  phenomena  as  level  of  “innovation”  or  degree  of  “flexibility,”  for  instance,  in  a 
bewildering  variety  of  ways,  none  of  which  are  entirely  satisfactory  or  command  consensus 
(Bhattacharya and Bloch 2004). Data­gathering instruments used in this burgeoning subject area 
range  from exceedingly  complex econometric models  to  surveys and questionnaires,  interview 
protocols,  and observational methods  that are  idiosyncratic. Moreover,  and especially  in  large­ 








necessarily  selective,  the  remainder  of  this  review  consists  of  four  broad  sections.  Section  II 
focuses on enterprise stability,  share of  national  output,  and  the  employment effects of SMEs. 
Section III covers the knotty question of SME innovation attributes, including innovation output, 
sources of economic knowledge, geographic  clusters and  networks. Section  IV  is addressed  to 




Audretsch  (Audretsch  1995)  has  observed  that,  within  the  United  States  and  other  OECD 
economies,  some  generalizations  can  be  made  about  enterprise  size  in  relation  to  enterprise 
stability or duration. Across enterprises of all sizes, firm entry (or “birth”) and exit (or “death”) 
rates are surprisingly high. Furthermore, exit rates also tend to be highest  in those industries  in 





longer  period  of  time  and/or  have more  than  500  full­time  employees.  From  his  econometric 
analysis of all manufacturing  firms  in the U.S. economy, Audretsch (Audretsch 2002) reported 
that  in  every  major  sector,  the  birth  rate  and  the  death  rate  of  SMEs  exceeds  that  of  larger 
enterprises.  The  expansion  rate  for  SMEs  also  exceeds  that  of  larger  organizations, while  the 
contraction  rate  of  the  large organizations  exceeds  that  of  smaller  firms,  and,  across  time,  net 
employment gain is higher in small firms than it is in large ones (p. 22). In short, at least within 
the  U.S. manufacturing  sector,  SMEs  are  less  stable  than  larger  firms  and,  taken  collectively, 
they account for an inordinate share of industry­wide churn. 
If  anything,  small enterprises  in developing economies appear  to be even  less  stable  than  their 
counterparts  in  the developed world. Drawing upon  the  results of  field  studies  from one Latin 
American  and  five African  economies —  the Dominican Republic Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Swaziland  and  Zimbabwe — Mead  and  Liedholm  (Mead  and  Leidholm  1998)  reported  that 
enterprises with less than 50 workers are “in a constant state of flux” (p. 64). While the annual 
rate of start­up for comparably­sized firms in OECD economies is 10 percent, the corresponding 
rate  within  these  six  economies  ranged  from  approximately  20  percent  in  Kenya  to  over  30 
percent  in Botswana. The mean rate of enterprise deaths for  the five African economies  in this 




As  Mulhern  and  Stewart  (Mulhern  and  Stewart  2003)  have  observed,  in  most  industrialized 
countries the share of output in manufacturing and in total GDP attributable to SMEs (variously 
defined) has increased steadily since the early 1980s. According to these researchers, the growth 
of SME national output  share between 1990 and 1998 has been  reported  in  the United States, 
Western Europe as a whole, Italy, Greece, Norway, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In the main, 
enterprises  defined  as  being  “small”  or  “small/medium”  have  come  to  command  a  larger 
proportion  of  total  manufacturing  production  during  the  final  two  decades  of  the  twentieth 
century. 
Turpin  (Turpin  2002)  has  observed  that  small  firms  in  developing  nations  are  particularly 
vulnerable to economic dislocations. He noted, for example, that  in the immediate aftermath of 
the Asian currency/financial crisis of 1997­1998, among some 200,000 enterprises  surveyed in 
the  East Asia  region,  18  percent  of  small  firms  ceased  a major  business  activity  and  over  25 
percent  reduced  their  business  activity.  Nevertheless,  in  Indonesia,  the  contribution  of  small 


















12.96  percent  for  the  small  firms).  Focusing  exclusively  on  labor  productivity  within  Finish 
manufacturing firms as a whole, Hohti (Hohti 2000) found that, across the  years 1980 through 
1994, enterprises with 10­49 employees  recorded average  labor productivity  that was 16  to 35 
percent  less  than the manufacturing average for Finland as a whole, while those manufacturing 
firms  with  250  or  more  workers  exceeded  the  mean  labor  productivity  rates  for  the  Finnish 
manufacturing  sector  in  every  year  encompassed  in  the  analysis. On  the whole,  these  studies 
indicate  that  labor  productivity  in  small  manufacturing  enterprises  (along  with  total  factor 







that  these  findings,  “challenge  the  conventional  view  of  small  business  flexibility  and  their 
superior  ability  to  succeed  where  large  firms  fail”  (Mata  1991,  p.  58).  In  a  subsequent 
longitudinal  study,  Mata  (Mata  1994)  found  that  among  Portuguese  manufacturing  firms 
established in the year 1983, a full 20 percent died during first year in business, while 50 percent 
shuttered  their  operations  within  four  years.  Not  only  was  the  churn  rate  here  above  OECD 
norms,  Mata  reported  a  significant  positive  correlation  between  firm  size  at  the  time  of 
establishment  and  the  likelihood  of  their  survival.  They  explained  that  small  Portuguese 
manufacturing  firms  suffered  from  lower  quality managements  that were  unable  to  accurately 
estimate  their  actual  ability  when  deciding  to  enter  a  given  industry.  Access  to  capital  and 
technology were not adequately addressed in these studies. 
Mulhern  and Stewart  (Mulhern  and Stewart  2003) documented  the  long­term decline  in SME 
share  in Venezuelan GDP share from 1961 through 2000. They attributed this erosion  in SME 
share of national manufacturing to two factors: (1) the failure of Venezuelan SMEs to innovate 
relative  to  large  firms  within  that  nation;  and,  (2)  a  business  environment  that  was  generally 
hostile to SMEs. During most of the time period under analysis, Mulhern and Stewart (Mulhern 
and  Stewart  2003)  observed,  the  Venezuelan  government  pursued  a  policy  of  state­led 
industrialization,  focusing  on  import  substitution  through  government­owned  manufacturing 
enterprises  financed  through  oil  export  revenues.  When  the  state  departed  from  this  course 
during  the period 1989  through 1993 and  instituted  temporary  liberalization  reforms,  the SME 







world,  for as Cheah and Cheah (Cheah and Cheah 2005) have  reported,  in many poor nations 
SMEs, “represent almost the only employment opportunity available to a large proportion of the 
population”  (p.  29).  Taken  in  aggregate,  the  empirical  literature  strongly  suggests  that  small 




Using  Longitudinal  Establishment  and  Enterprise  (LEEM)  data  from  the  SBA,  Audretsch 
(Audretsch 2002) calculated the percentage change of employment owing to new manufacturing 
firms (firm births) between 1990 and 1995. For the sample as a whole, there was a 12.76 percent 
increase  in  employment  due  to  the  birth  of  new  firms  over  that  time  span;  but  for  small 
enterprises (20 workers or less) there was an increase in employment of 144.69 percent resulting 
from the start­up of new businesses. By the same token,  loss of  jobs due to firm deaths for  the 
sample as a whole was 15.92 percent. The loss of jobs from the death rate was 12.79 percent for 
corporations  with  more  than  500  workers,  19.37  percent  for  enterprises  with  20  to  499 
employees and 28.69 percent for enterprises with less  than 20 employees. Using the same data 
base,  Audretsch  (Audretsch  2002)  calculated  that  the  employment  expansion  rate  for  large 
manufacturing corporations (more than 500) that survived throughout the 1990­1995 period was 
slightly  more  than  10  percent;  the  corresponding  figure  for  enterprises  with  less  than  20 
employees was nearly 33 percent. Moreover, the job contraction rate for incumbent firms varied 
directly with size; the largest firms lost the highest percentage of  jobs, small firms suffered the 
lowest  percentage  of  job  loss.  Taking  all  of  the  data  into  account  for  firms  that  remained  in 
operation  over  the  entire  period,  Audretsch  (Audretsch  2002)  concluded  that  between  1990­ 
1995, employment levels at large enterprises (more than 500 workers) declined by 8.47 percent; 
by  contrast,  small  enterprises  (less  than  20)  enjoyed  a  net  increase  in  employment  of  21.25 
percent. 
Johansson  (Johansson  2004)  studied  net  employment  creation  among  small  and  large  firms 





up)  added  13,697  jobs  to  the  sector,  approximately  9  percent  of  total  employment within  the 
Swedish  IT  industry.  In  this  study,  then,  net  employment  levels  displayed  a  strong  inverse 
correlation with both firm size and firm age. 
In partial contrast  to  the unambiguously  favorable findings of Audretsch (Audretsch 2002) and 
Johansson (Johansson 2004) on the role of SME in  job creation, Hohti's (Hohti 2000) study of 
employment  in  the  Finnish  manufacturing  sector  revealed  that  while  net  employment  for  the 
sample  as  a  whole  was  negative,  there  was  a  slightly  higher  rate  of  net  job  loss  among  the 
smaller  firms.  Hohti  remarked  that  both  the  bulk  of  the  job  losses  and  the  emergence  of  a 













employment;  instead,  employment  expansion  was  restricted  to  a  small  minority  of  these 
enterprises, most of which were  located within  urban  districts.  Focusing  on Kenya, Mead  and 
Liedholm  (Mead  and Leidholm 1998) noted  that  the  employment  level  of  small  enterprises  in 
that  economy  illustrated  just  how  heavily  these  entities  are  affected  by  macro­economic 
conditions.  In  1994  (a  year  in which Kenyan GDP per  capita  growth was  stagnant)  registered 
employment in the nation's small enterprises grew by nearly 100,000 jobs. However, incumbent 
enterprises added only 27,000 new jobs while firms that went out of business lost 157,000 jobs 





ups were  less  than  97,000.  In Kenya,  as  in  all  five  of  the  other  developing  economies  in  this 
study,  when  the  national  economy  is  stagnant,  existing  SMEs  suffer  job  losses  but  newly­ 
established  enterprises  contribute  to  net  job  growth  in  excess  of  these  levels;  when  times  are 
good, existing enterprises add jobs at a very rapid rate, but the contribution of enterprise start­ups 
to net job creation tends to decline. 
Finally, most  studies  have  reported  that wage  rates  paid  to workers  at  SMEs  are  substantially 






or  fewer  employees.  Similarly,  Audretsch  (Audretsch  1995)  reported  that  small  U.S. 
manufacturing firms with sub­optimal production scales paid their workers only 80.5 percent of 
the mean industry wage rates. Even after adjusting for job quality, Hohti (Hohti 2000) reported 
that employees at Finnish manufacturing  firms with more  than 500 workers earned at  least 10 
percent more that their small counterparts in all years between 1980 and 1994. 
On the whole, the findings of the studies reviewed in this section suggest that SMEs do, in fact, 
contribute  more  manufacturing  jobs  on  net  than  larger  enterprises  in  both  developed  and 
developing  economies,  and  that  their  share  of  GDP  has  risen  since  the  1980s.  Taken  as
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well  as  to  improvements  in  existing  offerings  and  production  processes.  Without  exception, 
studies employing this  yardstick demonstrated that  innovation  intensity  is powerfully related to 
enterprise size; in OECD economies, formal research and development activities dominated large 
firms, notably MNEs, which expend more capital per employee than their smaller counterparts in 
the  vast  majority  of  industries  (Bhattacharya  and  Bloch  2004).  In  the  developed  world, 
approximately  80  percent  of  all  R&D  activities  within  privately­owned  firms  takes  place  in 
enterprises with more than 100,000 employees, and in most sectors, large enterprises have much 
higher R&D intensity ratios (Eden, Levitas et al. 1997). 
In  1982,  however,  the  U.S.  SBA  introduced  an  index  of  actual  innovation  outputs  and 
researchers  began  to  examine  enterprise  innovation  activities  other  than  those  taking  place 
through  designated  R&D  departments.  Since  then,  as  Hansen  (Hansen  1992)  has  observed, 
virtually  every  study  of  innovation  indicators  undertaken  within  the  United  States  and  other 
industrialized  economies  has  concluded  that  innovation  is  far  more  widespread  than  official 
statistics  indicate, and several researchers have argued that undercounting of  informal inputs  to 





nearly  18  percent  actual)  and  that  of  firms  with  10  to  49  workers  by  an  even  wider  margin. 










More  recently,  Roper  (Roper  1999)  reported  that  the  innovation  intensity  of  small  firms  (500 
workers  or  less)  in  Great  Britain  was  13.9  percent  higher  than  the  ratio  reflected  in  official 
statistics while that of their German SME counterparts was 2.4 percent greater. 
Yet even when adjustments are made to counteract  the exclusion of  informal R&D, it  is  likely 
that  conventional  approaches  grossly  underestimate  the  innovativeness  of  SMEs.  There  is,  to 






demonstrated  that  even  those  small  firms  that  report  negligible  expenditures  on  formal  R&D 
provide  a  significant  share  of  innovative  output most  of  which  is  incremental,  as  opposed  to 









was  43  percent  higher  than  that  of  large  enterprises.  They  did  find  that  large  firm  innovation 
rates  are  significantly  greater  than  those of  small  enterprises within mature  industries  that  are 
capital­intensive, advertising­intensive and display a high degree of market concentration. 
On the other hand, within sectors that are rapidly growing and in which total innovation and the 
use  of  skilled  labor  play  a  large  role,  small  firms  are  far  more  innovation  intensive.  Indeed, 
within  the 35 most  innovative  industries,  the  ratio of  innovations per employee  for  firms with 
less than 500 workers was 6.64 times than that of larger enterprises (Acs 1988). Intriguingly, Acs 
and Audretsch (Acs and Audretsch 1987; Acs 1988) discovered that while  large firms have an 
innovation  advantage  in  highly  concentrated  industries,  many  of  the  most  innovative  small 
enterprises in their sample(s) were active within those same industries, implying that they were 
able  to  compete  against  larger  rivals  on  the  basis  of  superior  innovation  outputs.  Audretsch 
(Audretsch  1995)  subsequently  found  that  small  firms  are  far  more  effective  in  translating 
innovation  inputs  into  actual  innovation.  Indeed,  he  found  that  a  simple  correlation  between 
R&D  inputs  and  innovative  outputs  across  all  manufacturing  industries  was  0.84,  but  for  the 
largest firm in the sample it was only about 0.40. 
Many  empirical  studies  focusing  upon  the  relationship  between  enterprise  size  and  innovation 
outputs have shown that small enterprises are considerably more innovative than their large firm 
competitors. Hansen (Hansen 1992), for example, surveyed 598 manufacture firms to determine 
the  proportion  of  total  sales  that  they  had  obtained  from products  introduced  in  the  prior  five 
years. Even after controlling for the influence of firm age, small manufacturing companies were 
significantly more  innovative  in  terms of  sales derived  from new product  introductions;  across
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the entire  study  sample, both  firm size and  firm age were  inversely correlated with  innovative 
output measured in this manner. 
In  their  study  of  Dutch  manufacturing  and  service  firms,  Kleinknecht,  Reijen  and  Smits 
(Kleinknecht, Reijen et al. 1993) reported that enterprises with 10 to 49 workers introduced 0.79 
innovations per 1,000 employees over a  four  year period as compared  to 0.19  innovations per 
1,000 employees in enterprises with more than 500 workers. Using a similar study design with a 
sample  Irish manufacturing  firms, Cogan  (Cogan 1993)  reported  that  the  smallest  firms  in  his 
study (less than 5 workers) had introduced 1.02 innovations per 1,000 employees, in contrast to a 
mere  0.03  innovations  per  1,000  workers  among  enterprises  with  more  than  500  workers. 
Santarelli  and  Piergiovanni  (Piergiovanni,  Santarelli  et  al.  1997)  found  that  across  all  Italian 




rapidly  than  their  larger  competitors.  Turpin  (Turpin  2002)  found  the mean  time  between  the 
completion of R&D on a product innovation and its actual commercialization was six to twelve 
months among small Australian manufacturing enterprises (less than 20 workers) as compared to 
a  mean  implementation  time  of  one  to  two  years  for  enterprises  having  more  than  100 
employees. 
The  widely­reported  innovation  output  superiority  of  small  enterprises  has  not  gone 
unchallenged. Tether (Tether 1998) argued that  the most commonly used yardstick (number of 
innovation per employee) does not capture  the  variable economic value of  innovation outputs. 
Examining  the  commercial  value  of  443  product  innovations  introduced  by  British 
manufacturing firms between 1977 and 1990, Tether reported that  large companies (those with 
more  than  500  workers  in  this  study)  were  responsible  for  almost  all  of  the  higher  value 
innovations while the bulk of the lower value innovations came from small firms. He noted still 
further  that  the  impact  of  product  innovations  on  sales  growth  was  much  higher  among  the 
former  and  that  the  most  innovative  small  firms  (as  measured  by  innovations  per  worker) 
enjoyed only modest increases in revenue growth. 
Using  data  from  the  Business  Longitudinal  Survey  published  by  the  Australian  Bureau  of 
Statistics,  Bhattacharya  and  Bloch  (Bhattacharya  and  Bloch  2004)  attempted  to  determine 
whether the determinants of innovation are the same for small and large enterprises and whether 





for  firm  size)  than  larger  enterprises  has  not  been  conclusively  validated,  it  is  nonetheless 
apparent that small enterprises are far more innovative than their expenditures on R&D activities 




One  source  of  spill­over  stems  from  the  migration  of  individuals  to  small  firms  (including 
enterprises that  they found), who bring  innovative knowledge with them to their new positions 
(Acs, Audrestch et al. 1994; Audretsch 2002), but also the  influence of  the  Internet and search 
engines  such  as  Google,  provides  ready  access  that was  unavailable  prior  to  the mid  1980’s. 




with  that  enterprise  but  that  share  a  common knowledge base,  as well  as  competitors  that  are 
horizontally related to the enterprise. 
Taken collectively,  these  external  sources of  spill­overs constitute complex networks  in which 
SMEs participate as both generators and recipients of innovative knowledge (Porter 1996; OECD 
2000). As will be discussed in Chapter 3, such synergistic network effects are known and can be 
described  well  enough  to  allow  for  the  analysis  of  a  firm’s  stakeholder  network  and  its 
boundaries  to  be  used  in  designing  an  intentional  innovation  path  for  SMEs  (Watts  2003; 
Goerner, Dyck et al. 2008; Goerner, Lietaer et al. 2009). Because innovation often entails  tacit 
knowledge  that  is  difficult  to  encode  but  readily  transferred  on  a  face­to­face  basis,  these 






The  perceived  value  of  this  network  is  a  primary  argument  for  inclusion  of  as  many  diverse 
stakeholders  as  possible within  a  firm’s  network. Given  this  conception:  empirical  analysis  is 
progressively  focusing  on  networks  and  clusters  of  SMEs,  as  they  combine  the  advantages  of 
small scale with several benefits of large scale, enhancing SMEs' productivity, rate of innovation 
and competitive performance (Piscitellio and Sgobbi 2004). According to Audretsch (Audretsch 
2002),  one  of  the  key  paradoxes  of  ongoing  globalization,  “is  that  even  as  the  relevant 
geographic  market  for  most  goods  and  services  becomes  increasingly  global,  the  increased 
importance of  innovative activity  in the  leading developed countries has triggered a resurgence 
in  the  importance  of  local  regions  as  key  sources  of  comparative  advantage”  (p.  35).  This  is 
further  reinforced by Shuman  (Shuman 2006) and  the mechanism  at  least  partially  defined by 
Watts (Watts 2003) and Strogantz (Strogatz 2003) and Johnson (Johnson 2001). 
Jaffe (Jaffe 1989) was the first researcher to investigate the spill­over of research carried out by 
universities  into  the  private  sector. Using  patent  data,  he  found  that  academic  research  in  the 
fields of biotech, electronics,  and optics was a  significant  source of  innovation outputs among 









inter­regional  innovation  output  variance was  due  to  formal  R&D,  there were  also  significant 
associations  between  aggregate  regional  innovation  and  levels  of  university  research  across 






overs  from university  research were  far more  important  in  generating  innovative output of  the 
smaller  firms  (less  than 500 employees). Feldman  calculated  that  small  enterprises drew more 
than twice as much of their innovative input from university research as their larger counterparts 
did. 
In a study of  the sources of  innovative  input used by 204 SMEs engaged  in  the production of 
scientific  instruments  within  New  York  State,  MacPherson's  (MacPherson  1997)  survey  and 
interview data revealed that those firms that combined in­house R&D with inputs from external 
specialists  were  considerably more  successful  in  their  product  development  efforts  than  those 
who  relied  exclusively  on  their  own  research  and  development  programs.  Interviews with  the 
CEOs of the 129 innovative SMEs in the sample (that is, those firms that had introduced a new 
or improved product between 1989 and 1993), indicated that they typically combined ideas from 
in­house  research  with  complementary  knowledge  from  independent  consultants,  universities, 
and government research centers. By contrast,  the non­innovators  in MacPherson's study made 
considerably  less use of knowledge  spill­overs  from external  sources.  In  this  study,  innovative 
firms  typically  garnered  inputs  from  external  sources  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  the 
marketability and/or commercial value of new products on their respective drawing boards, that 
is, at the later stages of the product innovation process. 
Surveying  576 manufacturing  enterprises  in  Great  Britain,  Love  and  Roper  (Love  and  Roper 
1999) identified network intensity as a strong predictor of the number of product innovation that 
these  firms  brought  to  full  commercialization  in  1995. They  found  that  network  intensity was 
inversely  correlated  with  R&D  outlays  per  worker  and  with  technology  transfer  from  parent 
companies  to  enterprise  subsidiaries.  Love  and  Roper's  principal  finding  was  that  external 
knowledge spill­overs from networks served as an alternative or substitute source of innovation 
inputs. In other words, “in each case,  investments in R&D, technology transfer and networking 
are  acting  as  substitutes”  such  that  those  firms  with  low  (or  no)  levels  of  R&D/intra­firm 











manner. On  the other  hand, across all  four clusters, Schmitz  found  that horizontal cooperation 
(among competitors) was weaker than expected (p. 329). 
The  impact  of  network  support  upon  the  success  of  newly­founded  businesses  (measured  by 
sales  growth)  was  examined  by  Bruderl  and  Presiendorfer  (Bruderl  and  Presiendorfer  1998) 
through retrospective  interview data from the CEO/founders of 1,710 enterprises that had been 




owner­managers  of  SMEs  located  in  two  British  cities  along with  critical  incident  interviews 
conducted  with  34  of  these  participants  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  extent  to  which 
networking enhanced the commercial growth of these small businesses. A full 71 percent of the 
subjects  in  this  studied  said  that  they  had  gathered  important  business  information  from  their 
















and  the  success  of  Silicon  Valley  information  technology  SMEs  could  not  be  completely 
explained by the availability of a skilled work force within that region. She found that complex 
networks  consisting  of  research  institutions  (notably  Stanford  University)  trade  associations, 
local  business  organizations  and  a  host  of  specialized  consulting,  marketing  research,  public 





high rates of  innovation that  they achieved via network activities. Collectively,  they unbundled 
production and adopted flexible design and manufacturing technologies: these firms were niche 
oriented within  the  industry­wide production chain:  some  focused on chip design alone, others
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on  fabrication  processes,  others  on  engineering  and  design  services,  and  still  others  on  fast 
turnaround  manufacturing.  But  as  these  firms  grew  and  became  more  bureaucratic,  they 
responded to threat of competition from Japan/East Asia by investing in high­volume production 
lines  and  undertaking  cost­  cutting  measures  while  neglecting  network  exchanges.  As  a 
consequence,  they  began  to  lose market  share  to Asian  rivals. This  characteristic  of  SMEs ― 
shifting value definitions under competitive or policy pressures and losing network synergies ― 
was also seen in the cases described in Chapters 6­8 of this thesis. 
In  the  1980s,  however,  Saxenian  found  there  was  a  second  wave  of  semiconductor  start­up 
activity,  as  newly­founded small  firms entered  into  formal alliances and networks partnerships 
with  customers  and  suppliers  to  monitor  changing markets  and  jointly  redefine  products  and 
processes.  These  second­wave  SMEs  recaptured  clustered  network  innovation  competitive 
advantages.  Writing  in  1990,  Saxenian  (Saxenian  1990)  asserted  that  the  success  of  small 
enterprise start­ups was: “inseparable from a regional environment  that  is not only rich  in  skill 
and know­how, but one which fosters new firm formation and collective learning” (p. 95). In her 
1994  follow­on  to  this  work,  Saxenian  (Saxenian  1994)  drew  a  sharp  contrast  between  the 
success of small semiconductor start­up firms in Silicon Valley and the decline of the IT industry 
firms  in  the  Route  128  region  around  Boston.  The  latter  had  initially  benefited  from M.I.T. 
knowledge spill­overs and the availability of a high­skill labor pool, but as these firms grew and 
matured,  they  became  increasingly  isolated.  Eventually,  their  failure  to  generate  collective 
knowledge through networks and alliances led to declining innovation and competitiveness. 
Revisiting semiconductor innovation clusters in their 1997 study, Almeida and Kogut (Almeida 




had  stronger  network  ties  outside of  their  respective  regions,  notably  to  Japan. Elaborating  on 




from their activities  in  IT firms located within the same regions;  indeed, 88 percent of  the 176 
semiconductor  firm  founders  in  this  study  were  employed  in  the  same  region  prior  to  the 
formation of their respective start­ups. Among the reasons for the success of small firm start­ups 
was  that  they  had  gained  initial  funding  from  venture  capital  firms  to  explore  new  fields. 




enterprises  in  the  San  Francisco  Bay  area.  He  found  that  SMEs  in  the  areas  of  therapeutics, 
diagnostics,  and  equipment/research  tools  formed  intense  innovation  networks,  while  those 
involved  in  chemical,  food,  and  agricultural  products  sub­sectors  engaged  in  much  less 








(p.  325).  In  an  early  study  in  this  setting,  Camagni  (Camagni  1991)  explored  clusters  within 
Italy's textile district. Unlike the IT and biotech clusters of the United States, textile production 
by SMEs in this region had been in continuous operation for centuries. In Camagni's analysis, the 
key  to  the  success  of  these  SMEs  was  the  existence  of  a  local  milieu  held  together  by 





benefited  enormously  from  the  R&D  activities  of  other  firms  within  their  network  clusters. 
External  knowledge  spill­overs,  in  turn, were  strongly  associated with  increases  in  total  factor 
productivity levels among participating firms with comparatively small investments of in­house: 
R&D.  Antonelli  (Antonelli  1994)  concluded  that,  “intra­mural  R&D  activities  carried  out  by 
each  firm generate a  flow of  technological,  learning, and  training opportunities  that are  spread 




innovations  reported  during  the  year  1989  to  determine  the  degree  to  which  university  and 
corporate R&D knowledge spilled over to SMEs at the regional level. Their results indicated that 
small  firms  had  substantially  greater  reliance  upon  spill­overs  from  third­part  private  and 




innovation  input  only  for  the  smaller  enterprises  in  the  sample.  The  SMEs  also  drew  heavily 
upon innovations from firms located within their respective regions but working outside of their 
specific industries. The researchers commented that the capacity of Italian manufacturing SMEs 








firms  in  the  study. Maillat, Lecoq, Nemeti,  and Pfister  (Maillat, Lecoq  et  al. 1995)  traced  the 




et  al.  1995)  stated,  the  region's  small­scale  producers  of watches, measuring  instruments,  and 
optical  devices  broke  up  pre­existing  innovation  networks  based  on  conventional  micro­ 
engineering  and  formed  new  configurations  based  upon  micro­electronic  technologies. 
According to the researchers,  the cooperation and trust  that  these SMEs developed prior  to the 
1970s  facilitated  their  recombination  into  new  alliances.  The  participants  in  these  networks 





The  association  between  the  adoption  of  a  new  production  technology by  plant managers  and 
attributes  of  the  local  environments  in Great Britain was  investigated  by Harrison, Kelley  and 
Gant (Harrison, Kelley et al. 1996). From the responses of 962 managers at manufacturing plants 
participating  in  21  industries  within  the  machining­intensive  durable  goods  sector,  the 
researchers  learned that 52 percent had adopted at  least one machine tool  that was numerically 
controlled,  computer  numerically  controlled  or  a  component  of  a  flexible  machining  system. 
Harrison,  et  al.,  (Harrison,  Kelley  et  al.  1996)  found  that  the  probability  of  technological 
adoption was significantly greater  in  localities  that displayed a high degree or urbanity,  that  is, 
location in a metropolitan (as opposed to non­metropolitan) setting and a suburban (as opposed 
to  downtown urban  or  a  rural)  community. Most  importantly,  they  found  a  strong  correlation 
between technological adoption, on the one hand, and the degree of industry diversity within the 
plant's  immediate  environment,  on  the  other.  On  the  other  hand,  Harrison  and  his  co­authors 
found no  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  industry  specialization within  a  locality  is  associated 
with manufacturing technology adoption. 
Audretsch (Audretsch 2002) noted that there is an unresolved debate between those scholars who 
claim  that  innovation­related knowledge  spill­overs  is  stronger within  regions  that have a  high 
degree  of  specialization  and  those  who  maintain  that  diversity  or  complementary  knowledge 
facilitates  technology transfers within geographic clusters. Audretsch (Audretsch 1995) himself 
has argued that when information from outside an industry is relatively important as an input to 
innovative  activity,  newly­established  firms  tend  to  have  a  competitive  advantage  vis­à­vis 
incumbent  firms;  this  association  tends  to  lend  indirect  support  to  the  “diversity”  or 
“complementary  knowledge”  position.  Along  with  Feldman  (Feldman  and  Audretsch  1999), 
Audretsch  tested  the  relative  predictive  power  of  the  specialization  and  diversity  hypotheses. 
Using  patent  citation  data  from  innovation  clusters  across  the  United  States,  Feldman  and 
Audretsch found when a given region has higher levels of industry diversity, external knowledge 
spill­over  is  substantially  greater  than when  a  region  is  dominated  by  a  single  industry.  They 




discover  technologically­based  commercial  opportunities. Through  a  set  of  eight  in­depth  case 
studies, Shane found that all of the entrepreneurs who used an innovation developed at M.I.T. (a 
3­D photography process)  had  some background knowledge  that  allowed  them  to  recognize  a 
viable  product  opportunity.  None  of  the  eight  entrepreneurs  (all  of  whom  founded  small
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companies  on  the  basis  of  the M.I.T.  process)  had  a  background  in  the  specific  field  (optical 




imply  that  innovations  are  more  likely  to  arise  among  agents  who  have  diverse  pre­existing 
knowledge.  However,  there  is  an  emerging  creation  theory  of  innovation  promulgated  by 
Alvarez  and  Barney  (Alvarez  and  Barney  2007)  that  promotes  the  idea  that  not  only  is 
recognition or discovery an important determinate but that the path, process, and intention allow 
for creation of innovation. 
Several  studies  published  over  the  past  fifteen  years  qualify  the  empirical  generalization  that 
SMEs  in  rapidly  growing  industries  derive  above­mean  innovation  benefits  from  their 
participation in geographically­clustered networks. Rogers (Rogers 2004) investigated the impact 
of networking through the analysis of data collected from 4,500 Australian enterprises between 
1994  and  1997.  Consistent  with  the  research  reported  thus  far  in  this  section,  he  found  that 
networking intensity was associated with higher rates of innovation across all of the enterprises 
in the study. He also reported that small enterprises rely upon external knowledge networks as a 
source  of  innovation  inputs  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  do  large  enterprises.  However,  the 
association between network activity and innovation in non­manufacturing sectors was observed 
only among large and medium­sized enterprise; among non­manufacturing enterprises there was 
no  statistically  significant  association  between  network  intensity  and  innovation  for  small 
enterprises. 
Karlsson and Olsson (Karlsson and Olsson 1998) studied the early adoption of advanced process 
innovations  within  a  sample  of  270  machinery,  electrical,  and  instrument  manufacturing 
enterprises  located  within  three  Swedish  counties.  In  this  study,  enterprises  with  10  to  50 
workers were classified as small firms while those with more than 50 employees were classified 
as  large firms. Using this cut­off point, Karlsson and Olsson found that that university research 
and exchanges with customers served as  important channels of  information  that had a positive 
effect on the adoption of technologically­advanced manufacturing firms for the large firms in the 
sample,  but  not  for  the  small  enterprises.  Indeed,  among  the  small  firms,  location  in  a  rural 
county  with  no  major  university  was  associated  with  a  higher  likelihood  of  early  process 
innovation adoption. 
Results  presented  in  Keeble's  (Keeble  1999)  study  of  598  manufacturing  and  service  British 
SMEs presented a somewhat strong challenge to the regional or local network hypothesis. Using 
data  collected  between  1990  and  1995, Keeble  found  that  SMEs  located  in  the  network  rich, 
South East  core  region  of Great Britain  grew  faster  and  reported more  innovations  than  firms 
located in Britain's peripheral regions. Nevertheless, SMEs located in those peripheral areas had 
a much better record of continuing innovations and substantially higher R&D intensity ratios. On 
this  second  count,  Keeble  (Keeble  1999)  speculated  that  SMEs  located  outside  of  core 
technology­rich  regions  may  try  to  compensate  for,  “environmental  handicaps  by  pro­active 
engagement  in  research  and  development  to  an  even  greater  degree  than  their  counterparts  in 
core regions” (p. 289). He also noted that SMEs located in core regions experienced substantial 
higher  closure  rates  than  those  in  peripheral  regions,  that  innovations were  steadier  and more 
consistent  across  years  among  the  latter,  and  that  peripheral  SMEs  tended  toward  process
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innovations  that  enabled  them  to  compete  on  the  bases  of  rapid  service  and  lower  price/cost 






of  their  firms  and  that  a  relative  lack  of  spill­overs  from  local  enterprises  had  not  exerted  a 
significant  influence  on  their  development  of  process  and  product  improvement  performance. 
Two­thirds  of North  and Smallbone's  (North  and Smallbone 2000)  sample  disclosed  that  they 
relied  principally  upon  in­house  research  and  development  and  that  their  external  innovation 
inputs  were  derived  from  suppliers  and  customers  outside  of  the  region  that  were  accessed 
through  advanced  telecommunications  channels.  The  most  innovative  enterprises,  North  and 
Smallbone's  added,  had made  significant  contributions  to  their  local  communities  despite  the 
absence of spill­over clustering. Within the study sample, the most innovative enterprises added 
a mean of eight jobs to their payrolls between 1991 and 1996; during the same time period, firms 
judged  to be moderately  innovative augmented  their  respective work  forces by a mean of  four 
positions, while the least innovative entities reported no net employment growth. 
Within  two  South  Korean  regions  that  Hassink  (Hassink  2001)  investigated,  SMEs  were  not 
deeply  embedded  in  local  innovation  networks.  In  both  the  labor­intensive  enterprises  of 
Kyongbuk­Taegu province and  the  high­tech  firms of  the Kyonggi  region, external  innovation 
inputs were derived principally from long­reach vertical production networks, from suppliers and 
customers  located  in  other  regions  of  Korea  and/or  outside  of  the  country  altogether,  most 
notably  in  Japan.  From  his  interviews  with  38  government  and  academic  experts  working  in 
programs aimed at developing SME  innovation capacity  in  these  two  regions, Hassink  learned 
that  the  contribution  of  local  SME  innovation  networks  was  comparatively  minor.  Study 
participants  reported  that  rather  than  an  autonomous,  grassroots  network,  South  Korea's 
industrial  conglomerates  (chaebols)  essentially  determined  the  location  of  government­ 
designated  SME  industrial  districts  and  the  functions  of  the  SMEs  within  them,  leading  the 





with university  research agencies between 1994 and 1996, exceeding  the  non­innovators  (13.2 





Madill,  Haines,  and  Riding  (Madill,  Haines  et  al.  2004)  received  responses  to  a  postal 
questionnaire from the CEOs of 111 technology and 75 non­technology SMEs located within the 












activity,  the size­adjusted  job creation  rates of non­innovative enterprises  in  the study were on 
average  twice  as  high  as  those  of  the  innovative  firms  during  the  period  1990  to  1996.  This 
finding  prompted  Kalantaridis  and  Pheby  (Kalantaridis  and  Pheby  1998)  to  assert  that 
government  programs  to  enhance  the  innovative  propensity  of  SMEs  would  not  necessarily 
reduce unemployment rates in backward regions. 
From  the  results of  the empirical  studies of SME  innovation  networks  reported above, we can 
reasonably  surmise  that  small  and medium­sized  enterprises  can  overcome  comparatively  low 
levels of  internal  research and development  intensities by drawing upon knowledge spill­overs 
from external parties,  including universities,  independent consultants,  customers,  suppliers  and 
other  SMEs.  The  innovation  capacity  of  SMEs  that  participate  in  network  activity  can  be 
enhanced  by  exchanges  of  tacit  knowledge  communicated  on  a  face­to­face  basis  among 




Valley's  semiconductor  industry  or  the  San  Francisco Bay's  biotechnology  cluster),  and  grow 
rapidly  thereafter  through  firm  start­ups. Alternatively,  regional SME  innovation  clusters may 
have be grounded  in associations  that extend decades or even centuries  into  the past,  as  in  the 
Italian  and  Swiss  industrial  districts,  with  the  cooperative  norms  of  the  local milieu  enabling 
participants  to  respond  to  opportunities  and  challenges  arising  from  ongoing  technological 
advances. On the other hand, SMEs located within peripheral regions are able to utilize linkages 
to entities outside of  their  respective  regions  to acquire external  innovation  inputs and at  least 
some  have  successfully  innovated  through  in­house  research  and  development  activities. 





cooperation  along  horizontal  lines.  Government  policies  and  programs  can  facilitate  the 
emergence of regional  innovation systems, notably  through the extension of academic research 
programs into local settings, but they can also suppress their emergence through policies aimed 
at  developing  national  and  international  production  chains.  Under  the  appropriate  conditions 
SMEs  can  become  an  integral  part  of  globalization  processes  either  through  their  individual 









Globalization  processes  and  their  underlying  determinants  (world­wide  digital  information 
systems, reduced barriers to trade and direct investment, and the like) have clearly contributed to 
an expansion in the scope of SME activities and their effects during the past two decades. While 
most  SMEs  are  not  as  international  in  their  orientation  as  the  large, multinational  enterprises 
(MNEs)  that  continue  to  dominate  cross­border  flows,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  small  and 
medium­sized enterprises are  increasing their rate of participation in overseas markets (Lu and 
Beamish 2001). 
In  many  instances,  clusters  of  SMEs  have  arisen  in  response  to  MNE  factor  cost  reduction 
efforts,  as  multinationals  out­source  intermediate  input  manufacturing  and  assembly  work  to 
developing  economies  for  the  purpose  of  exploiting  low­wage  labor  pools.  In  other  cases, 
however,  SMEs  have  arisen  or  grown  to  service  global  markets  outside  of  MNE­dominated 
production chains. There appears  to be a strong association between SME innovation capacity, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  degree  of  internationalization,  on  the  other.  The  thrust  of  SME 
internalization  processes  has  occurred  through  exports,  as  opposed  to  the  deeper  involvement 
entailed  in  direct  investment  (Chen  and Huang 2004). Nevertheless,  at  least  some SMEs have 
established overseas production subsidiaries, with a preponderance of these enterprises pursuing 
deep niche strategies aimed at narrowly­defined but highly lucrative markets  in host economies 




Empirical  studies  have demonstrated  that  innovation  capacity  can  serve  as  the  cutting  edge of 
SME internationalization. There  is a very strong association between an SME’s innovativeness 
and its propensity to export, which implies  that  the  internationalization of SMEs may occur on 
the basis of high value­added activities rather than as an artifact of labor cost advantages. 
Most  studies  have  shown  a  direct  correlation  between  firm  size  and  propensity  to  export. 











Small  enterprises  with  above­mean  labor  skill  profiles  that  participated  in  niche  domestic 
markets and that dedicated a high share of their capital expenditures to the purchase of modern 
production equipment were  far more  likely  to export  than  small  firms  lacking  these attributes. 




Lefebvre,  Lefebrve  and  Bourgault's  (Lefebvre,  Lefebrve  et  al.  1998)  study  of  236  Canadian 
SMEs  yielded  a  robust  association  between  export  success  and  the  translation  of  knowledge 
spill­overs from local networks (including university, customers, suppliers and competitors) into 
product  innovations.  Unambiguously,  those  firms  that  continuously  explored  new  product 
opportunities  through collaborative  research and development and  that  had stronger  links with 
external  sources  of  innovation  spill­over  had  a  correspondingly  stronger  presence  in  global 
markets. Lefebvre,  et  al.  concluded  that  in  the  view of  the SME CEOs who  took part  in  their 
study,  “an  increased  presence  in  global  markets  requires  more  proactive,  aggressive  and 
externally­oriented  R&D  related  capabilities”  (p.  374).  The  responses  of  the  subjects  to 
Lefebvre,  et  al.'s  questionnaire  suggested  a  bi­directional  relationship  between  innovation 
network participation and export performance: product innovation driven by network knowledge 
spill­overs  allowed  SMEs  to  participate  in  foreign  markets;  overseas  activities  enabled 
enterprises to expand the number, diversity, and geographic range of their innovation­knowledge 
networks. 
Sterlacchini (Sterlacchini 1999) conducted  interviews with  the CEOs 143 small  (less  than 200 
workers)  Italian manufacturing  firms  in  six  industries  (clothing,  knitwear, wood  and  furniture, 
footwear, plastic products and dies), all of which had below mean R&D intensities. Within this 
sample,  the  salient  source  of  product  and  process  innovation  was  not  formal  research  and 
development  activities,  but,  instead,  incremental  changes  in  product  design,  production 
engineering,  and  pre­production  development.  The  strongest  determinant  of  export  intensity 
(overseas sales as a percentage of total sales) was enterprise status as a sub­contractor to Italian 
MNEs.  Nonetheless,  export  performance  was  positively  and  significantly  influenced  by  the 
intensity  of  expenditures  on  design,  engineering,  trial  production  and,  more  modestly,  to  the 
innovative content of enterprise capital stock. 
After  noting  that  an  extraordinarily  high  97  percent  of  Taiwan's  manufacturing  output  is 
generated  by  SMEs,  Yang,  Chen  and  Chuang  (Yang,  Chen  et  al.  2004)  reported  significant 
correlations  among  firm  size,  R&D  intensity  and  propensity  to  export  for  manufacturers  of 
textiles  and  consumer  electronic  products.  In  fact,  virtually  all  of  the  firms  in  this  study were 
SMEs.  The  mean  size  Yang,  et  al.’s  “R&D  intensive”  group  was  136  full­time  employees 
(FTEs), while  that  of  the  “non R&D”  group was  45  FTEs. Within Yang,  et  al.'s  sample  as  a 
whole,  firm  size was  positively  associated with  propensity  to  export. More  importantly, Yang 
and his colleagues found that high technological capability embodied in  firms (as measured by 
R&D  technology  import  and  training  investment)  was  a  consistent  predictor  of  export 
performance. Those enterprises  that devoted an above mean proportion of  their budgets  to  the 
purchase of high­tech production equipment and to the training of their respective workers in its 
usage  (the R&D group) were much more  likely  to  sell  a portion of  their products abroad  than
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an  in­depth  study  of  seven  small U.S.  computer­technology  firms, Gomes­Casseres  found  that 
when firms are small relative to their rivals, they use alliances to gain the economies of scale and 







Italian MNEs  in  this  industry,  the  SMEs  in  this  study  organized  their  international  efforts  in 
accordance with the same network model that they used in Italy. Through cooperative strategies 
of  joint  ventures,  commercial  and  distribution  agreements, manufacturing  licensing,  long­term 
subcontracts with a broad range of overseas partners, the SMEs in Berra, et al.'s study built rich, 
diverse  networks  across  national  borders  akin  to  those  in  their  home  regions.  They  focused 








channels.  The  vast  majority  of  the  CEOs  of  these  companies  were  enthusiastic  about  export 




From his examination of UNCTAD data, Buckley (Buckley 1997)  reported  that SMEs  tend  to 
avoid  foreign  direct  investment  as  a  means  for  capitalizing  upon  the  process  and  product 
innovations  that  they  develop.  As  a  rule,  Buckley  noted,  small  and medium­sized  enterprises 
evince  a  strong  preference  for  non­equity  technology  transfer  through  patents  and  licensing 
agreements  as  opposed  to  wholly­owned  or  joint  venture.  While  MNEs  establish  foreign 
subsidiaries  throughout  the  world  (including  developing  economies),  SMEs  from  advanced 







Lu  and Beamish  (Lu  and Beamish  2001)  investigated  the  impact  of  export  activities,  foreign 
direct  investment,  and  cross­border  alliances  upon  the  financial  performance  of  164  Japanese 
SMEs  (less  than  500  workers)  between  1989  and  1996.  All  of  the  enterprises  in  this  sample 
engaged  in  export  to  some  extent, while more  than  half  (95)  reported  having  initiated  one  or 
more FDI projects during the period for which data was collected. The researchers found that the 
initial  impact  of  FDI  was  a  decline  in  profitability,  but  that  over  time  (and  with  additional 
resource  transfers);  foreign  direct  investment  had  a  positive  contribution  to  enterprise 
profitability. Oddly, Lu and Beamish found that exporting (figured as a percentage of total sales) 
had  a  negative  impact  upon  enterprise  financial  performance  over  the  temporal  period 
encompassed in the study. The researchers argued that this unexpected result may have been an 
artifact  the  inordinate  strength of  the  yen  in  the  early 1990s. After  adjusting  for  the  impact of 
unfavorable exchange  rates, Lu and Beamish  found  that  higher export  intensity was positively 
associated with  firm  profitability.  Interviews with  SME CEOs  underscored  the  importance  of 
alliances  with  partners  that  have  local  knowledge  of  overseas  markets  for  the  commercial 
success of both exports and FDI projects. They found that having an alliance with a firm in the 









The  presence,  extent,  and  impact  of  these  technology  diffusion  processes  are  exceedingly 
difficult to document and gauge. We do know that MNEs conduct the bulk of their formal R&D 
activities  within  their  home  economies;  according  to  U.S.  Office  of  Technology  Assessment 
(United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. 1994), 87 percent of  the all R&D 
expenditures by U.S. MNEs are attributable to work conducted in the United States. When U.S. 
multinationals  establish  R&D  facilities  abroad,  they  tend  to  concentrate  upon  customizing 
products  for  local  markets  or  meeting  foreign  government  local  content  import  requirements 
(United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. 1994, p. 76). As Eden, Levitas and 




SMEs).  Although  Blomstrom  and  Sjoholm  were  able  to  determine  that  intra­industries  spill­ 
overs  do  exist  among  Indonesian  enterprises  and  that  they  have  a  positive  impact  upon 
Indonesian  manufacturing  performance,  they  found  no  firm  evidence  of  direct  technology 
transfer spill­overs from MNEs through local Indonesian partners into the Indonesian economy. 
The  only  spill­over  effect  that  these  researchers  were  able  to  observe was  that  joint  ventures 
between  U.S.  MNEs  and  Indonesian  firms  exerted  competitive  pressure  on  other  Indonesian 




Based  on  UNCTAD  data,  Buckley  (Buckley  1997)  found  that  small  and  medium­sized 
multinational  corporations  do  transfer  technology  to  their  overseas  subsidiaries  (as  is  the 
dominant  pattern  for  large MNEs). More  commonly  than  is  the  case  for MNEs, multinational 
SMEs convey technology and know how to joint ventures with local partners in host economies. 
The most  important forms of  technology transfer, Buckley noted from his own survey of small 
and  medium­sized  U.S.  transnational  enterprises,  are  on­the­job  training  and  transfer  of 
machinery/parts  that  embody  new  technologies.  Expenditures  on  the  formal  training  of  local 
work  forces  by  small  and medium­sized multinational  corporations were  exceedingly  low. On 
the  basis  of  his  analysis,  Buckley  concluded  that  SMEs  will  not,  in  the  aggregate,  be major 
suppliers or conduits  for  the diffusion of  technology  in  the  global economy, but  that  they may 
play key niche roles. 









development  role  with  large  multinational  corporations,  which  enhances  the  competitive 
performance of the latter in overseas markets. 
What we find, then, is that a significant proportion of SMEs are undergoing internationalization 
through  the  inauguration  or  expansion  of  export  and  (to  a  much  lesser  extent)  foreign  direct 
investment  activities. There  is  a  strong  linkage between SME  innovation  capacity,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  SME  export  propensity/intensity,  on  the  other.  Although  a  few  SMEs  are  able  to 
compete independently abroad by pursuing focused niche strategies targeted at lucrative markets, 
many  more  utilize  their  local  networks  connections  to  overcome  the  risks  associated  with 
participation  in  foreign markets.  SMEs may  also  extend  their  penetration  into  foreign markets 
through alliances with local partners, replicating the networking model that they rely upon within 
their  own  economies.  Some  SMEs  have  established  production  operations  abroad;  these  are 
almost  invariably  joint ventures with  local partners rather  than wholly­owned subsidiaries. It  is 
extraordinarily  difficult  to  document  the  cross­border  technology  diffusion  role  attributed  to 
SMEs. Small  and medium­sized  businesses  do  transfer  technology  via  licensing  agreement  to 












and niche­filling capabilities”  (p. 724). They  then added  that,  “the possession of  these  traits  is 
often accepted as a given, but empirical research in this area is extremely limited” (Dean, Brown 
et al. 1998, p. 724). 
The  evidence  that Dean  and  his  colleagues  drew upon  in  arriving  at  this  finding  is,  however, 
inferential.  It  is  highly  plausible  that  SMEs  are  capable  of  greater  flexibility  than  their  larger 
rivals. Their owners have closer knowledge of enterprise capabilities  than do top executives at 
large firms; their organizational structures are flatter than those of their  larger rivals;  in at  least 
some  instance,  SMEs  appear  to  have  organizational  cultures  that  support  collective  learning 
rather than top­down control. Although the researcher has not encountered any empirical studies 
dedicated  to  the  use  of  flexible  manufacturing  systems  by  SMEs,  both  Gupta  and  Cawthorn 
(Gupta and Cawthorn 1996) and Levy and Powell (1998) have asserted that a high proportion of 
U.S.  and  Western  European  SMEs  have  adopted  production  systems  that  allow  them  to 
efficiently  produce  small  batch  runs  and  customize  their  offerings  to meet  variable  consumer 
preferences.  At  bottom,  both  strategic  and  technical  flexibility  is  inordinately  difficult  to 
measure. 
Advances in information technology, most notably the Internet, have greatly lowered barriers to 
long­distancing  marketing  and  environmental  scanning  that  had  previously  put  SMEs  at  a 
competitive  disadvantage  relative  to  larger  enterprises.  Recently,  some  empirical  studies  have 
been  focused  on  SME  adoption  of  information  technology  and  its  capacity  to  magnify  the 
purported flexibility advantages of small and medium­sized enterprises. 
Levy  and  Powell  (Levy  and  Powell  1998)  conducted  a  set  of  in­depth  case  studies  at  four 
manufacturing  SMEs  located  in  the  West  Midlands  region  of  the  United  Kingdom  that  had 
recently made major  investments  in  information technology. They noted in passing that  two of 
these firms continued to work with obsolete machinery (dating back to World War II), and that 
neither of these enterprises planned modernize their production systems due to the costs entailed 
in purchasing computer­assisted capital goods. All of  the enterprises  in the study used their  IT 
systems to enhance stock management and to increase the rapidity with which they filled orders, 
yet  none  of  them  had,  “realized  the  potential  of  connecting  this  data  to  overall  strategies  and 
competitive  analysis”  (Levy  and  Powell  1998,  p.  188).  More  specifically,  none  of  the  four 
concerns used their IT capabilities  to identify or attract new customers;  instead,  they tended to 
use their systems to meet the demands of their existing customers for speed in order delivery and 
for quality control certification. Levy and Powell concluded that these, “case studies indicate that 
SMEs  do  not  readily  confirm  to  the  received  wisdom  that  they  are  particularly  flexible  or 
adaptable”  (Levy  and  Powell  1998,  p.  192).  Rather  than  moving  rapidly  to  capture  the 




(Sadowski, Maitland  et  al.  2002)  exploratory  study  of  the  strategic  use  of  the  Internet  by  264 
Dutch manufacturing and service SMEs. After noting that the availability of the Internet makes 
possible  new  strategic  opportunities  with  customers  and  business  partners,  Sadowski  and  his 
colleagues  reported  that  of  the  264  enterprises  in  their  sample,  most  (198)  had  an  on­site
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connection  to  the  Internet, but only 94 had established  their own websites. Moreover, of  those 
94, only 39 enterprises had developed the capacity to sell products/services on­line. “Whereas it 
is  established  that  Internet  usage  provides  strategic  advantages,”  Sadowski,  et  al.  remarked, 
“only  a  small  fraction  of  SMEs  (in  their  study)  intend  to  draw  on  these  gains”  (Sadowski, 
Maitland et al. 2002, p. 89). Instead, they too had adopted a wait­and­see stance, allowing their 
larger rivals to gain strategic advantages during the interim. 
The  twelve entrepreneur/owners of  textile  industry SMEs  textile  located  in  Italy's Prato region 
with whom Piscitellio and Sgobbi (Piscitellio and Sgobbi 2004) spoke made considerably greater 
use of  the e­commerce capabilities of  the  Internet.  In contrast  to  the participants  in  the British 
and  Dutch  studies  summarized  directly  above,  Piscitellio  and  Sgobbi  (Piscitellio  and  Sgobbi 
2004)  informants  were  far  more  enthusiastic  about  the  capacity  of  the  Internet  to  extend  the 
scope  of  their  marketing  activities  and  to  induce  collective  learning  in  their  respective 
workforces. Nevertheless, the subjects in this study used the Internet primarily as an alternative 
marketing channel, to solicit sales agents  in Italy and in foreign markets, and to take orders for 
customized  goods. They  continued  to  rely  upon  face­to­face  contact with  local  suppliers,  and 
they were extremely averse  to  integrating  their operations with overseas  joint  venture partners 
who lacked the tacit knowledge base that these entrepreneurs valued. While there were variations 
in  the  extent  to  which  subjects  had  embraced  e­business,  the  researchers  disclosed  their, 





As  with  flexibility,  the  claim  that  SMEs  enjoy  greater  collective  learning  than  their  larger 
counterparts is intuitively appealing, but difficult to test. In one of the few studies undertaken in 
this  topical domain, Chaston, Badger and Sadler­Smith (Chaston, Badger et al. 2001) surveyed 
179 U.K. manufacturing SMEs  (10  to  50 workers)  to determine whether  entrepreneurial  firms 
used  higher­order  (double  loop)  learning  to  a  greater  extent  than  non­entrepreneurial  firms. 
Chaston, et al. distinguished between entrepreneurial and non­entrepreneurial enterprises on the 
basis  of  scorecard  ratings  from CEO  responses  to  items  on  their  respective  firms'  innovation, 
risk­taking, and proactive behavior records. On that basis, 92 enterprises were classified by the 
researchers  as  being  entrepreneurial,  and  the  remaining  87  as  being  non­entrepreneurial. They 
then defined “lower­order” or “single­loop” learning as the capacity to apply existing knowledge 
and experience as the basis for improving the efficiency of current operations in contradistinction 
to  “high­order” or  “double­loop”  learning  as  the  capacity  to  exploit  new  knowledge  to  evolve 
new  practices,  perspectives  and  operational  frameworks.  The  study's  results  indicated  that 
entrepreneurial enterprises engaged  in and benefited from “higher order” learning and that  this 
learning  took  place on  a  collective  (enterprise­wide) basis. This  speaks  to  both  discovery  and 
creation mechanisms of entrepreneurship and innovation as factors in double loop learning. 
Finally, the assertion that SMEs contribute to the “common good” through civic engagement and 
the  development  of “social  capital”  has  not  been  tested  extensively (Curran, Rutherford  et  al. 
2000). In a study of 400 owners of service and manufacturing SMEs located in five British cities, 





to  be  seen  as  showing  a  need  for  others”  (p.  172).  Using  a  similar  study  design,  Curran, 
Rutherford, and Blackburn (Curran, Rutherford et al. 2000) reported that SME owners were not, 
as  a  whole,  deeply  engaged  in  community  affairs  or  local  economic  initiatives.  By  contrast, 
Joseph  (Joseph  2000)  reported  that  British  SMEs  played  a  vital  role  in  local  economic 
development and were, on the whole, positive examples of civic engagement behavior. 
More recently, Spence and Schmidpeter (Spence and Schmidpeter 2003) compared the level of 
civic  engagement  and  social  capital  development  activities  among  British  and  German  SME 
owner­managers.  Their  study  drew  together  information  gathered  from  interviews  and 
observations at 30 food manufacturing, marketing services and garages located in West London 
and Munich which they illustrated in six ethnographic in­depth case studies. The German SME 
owners  were  far  more  likely  than  their  British  counterparts  to  belong  to  both  local  trade 
associations  and  civic  improvement  bodies.  The  researchers  explained  this  difference  by 
referring to the high degree of liberalism and individualism in British culture as opposed to the 
democratic social welfare norms prevalent in Germany. 
Across sectors,  the owners of businesses that drew their workforces  from the  local community 
(notably  the  food processing SMEs) displayed a higher degree of civic engagement  than  those 




free  time.  Spence  and  Schmidpeter  (Spence  and  Schmidpeter  2003)  concluded  that:  “SME 
owner­managers are quite capable of being motivated (to engage in civic activities) by social and 
ethical  reasons”  (p.  106).  The  results  of  Spence  and  Schmidpeter's  2003  study  suggest  that 




suggest  that  the  capital  and  human  resources  limitations  they  typically  display  constrain  their 
capacity to leverage that flexibility. The handful of empirical  investigations into the topic of IT 
adoption by small firms that have been published to date suggest that SME owner­managers may 




which  they  are  embedded  within  local  communities  varies  substantially,  a  considerable 
proportion  of  small  and  medium­sized  enterprise  are  deeply  engaged  in  the  development  of 
social  capital  outside  of  organizational  boundaries.  As  will  be  seen  in  later  chapters,  as  the 
pitfalls  of  globalization  impact  SMEs,  local  or  regional  SME networks  that  take  advantage of 
local  stakeholder  synergies  may  find  more  sustainable  success  and  opportunities  to  innovate 
because of the speedy nature of feedback loops in such networks. The importance and synergies 
of  network  formation  and  operations  have  not  gone  unnoticed  by  researchers  who  propose  a 
focus  on  studying  the  interdependencies  between  business  and  society  as  a  method  to  better 
understand  the  transition  to more  sustainable  enterprise.  Loorbach,  et.al., presents  a  variety  of
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supporting  evidence  supporting  the  idea  that  “sustainability  issues  are  too  complex  and 
interconnected to be solved by individual firms” (Loorbach, Whiteman et al. 2010). Loorback et 
al  build  on  Gunderson  and  Holling’s  findings  (Gunderson  and  Holling  2002)  that  the 
interconnections  and  activities  of  networks  and  systems  provide  opportunities  to  build 
sustainable  economies.  This  research  implies  that  the  workings  of  sustainability  can  be  best 
understood only through the study and understanding of the behavior of firms within functioning 
networks of TBL  interconnected stakeholders, which must  include business, governments,  and 
NGOs. 
There  is  evidence  that  small,  responsive  and  self­sufficient  networks,  linked  together  (initially 
locally or regionally and eventually, even globally) may produce enterprises that “think globally 
and  act  locally”  through  using  effects  first  learned  from understanding  local  boundaries.  It  is 
important  therefore,  to  consider,  albeit  briefly,  the  perceived  advantages  that  small  firms  gain 
when  working  in  local  economies  to  determine  how  local  networks  might  be  replicated  and 




Since  the  action  research  cases  presented  in  Chapters  5  through  7  of  this  thesis  highlight  the 
network structure  in which SMEs work and how  the networks contribute  to value creation, an 
introduction  to  some  aspects  of  network  science  and  theory  are  needed  to  explain  how  the 




products  and  services  the  companies  provide.  Consequently,  understanding  whether  a  SME’s 
value  lags  behind  the  network’s  value  (that  is,  the SME does  not  produce  equitable  value  for 
other  members  in  the  network)  or  whether  a  SME  can  produce  greater  value  by  entering  or 
creating  a  new  network  are  important  strategic  considerations  (Spence  and Schmidpeter 2003; 
Wheeler, Mckague et al. 2005). 
2.3.1  Introduction 
Michael  Schuman  (Shuman  2006),  a  leading  proponent  of  prioritizing  local  economic 
development and self­sufficiency above globalization, 10  summarizes eight  trends which support 
the growth of SMEs in local markets in the USA. If these trends are indicative of the advantages 












































Shuman’s  (Shuman 2006) perspective  is  based  on  his  experience  as  the  founder  of  a  national 
SME network (see BALLE website 11 ). BALLE’s purpose is to address the inefficiencies and lack 
of  sustainability  of  globalization,  which  in  their  view  is  inefficient  and  producing  negative 
economic  effects  on  local  economies  by  proving  the  sustainability  of  being  “local.”  BALLE 





Shuman  argues  that  his  eight  trends  represent  forces  that  provide  competitive  advantages  for 
SME’s production and delivery of goods and services  in  local and regional markets  in the US. 
He further states that supporting local networks creates positive synergistic economic effects and 
that these results are more in alignment with sustainable development than those produced from 
either  multi­national  enterprises  (MNE)  or  from  “ad  hoc”  (see  below)  global  networks.  He 
believes that the demonstrated value created by SMEs in local economies reinforces the idea of 
local networks as the ideal medium for SMEs due to short connections and rapid feedback loops, 
which promote  rapid  innovation and  improved entrepreneurship. These  ideas  are  supported by 
Loorbach  and  Whiteman  (2010)  who  introduced  the  idea  that  not  only  are  the  business 
relationships  important  for  innovation  and  value  creation,  but  the  broader  context  of  societal 
systems  and  the  power  structures  that  exude  influence  beyond  the  marketplace  must  be 
considered when  sustainability  is  introduced  (Loorbach, Whiteman  et  al.  2010).  The  question 
remains  to be answered as  to what  scope of  influence can be exerted on or by SMEs “beyond 
local” and what does local really mean in the context of sustainable business networks? 
Schumacher, of course,  also discussed  the concept of appropriate size and  technology  creating 
efficiency  and  vitality  in  the  1970’s  (Schumacher  1973;  Schumacher  1977). He  described  the 
competitive  advantages  of  smaller  firms  filling  needs  in  markets,  where  multi­national 
enterprises  and  advanced  technologies  are  overkill.  He  called  this  appropriate  technology  or 
appropriate scaling (Schumacher 1973). He agreed that a firm’s innovation, speed to market, and 
ability  to  respond  quickly  on  intentional  strategy,  provides  small  firms  advantages  over 
competitors which may be  too  large  to  focus  specifically on customer’s needs  in  local,  highly 
technical, or regional (non­global), opportunities and whose ecological and social footprints are 
simply  too  large  to  be  efficient.  Good  examples  of  successful  specialization  even  in  large 
networks  are  small  private  restaurants  that  continue  to  thrive  even  when  national  and  global 
chains are the low cost producers and have national advertising (Shuman 2006). 
The discussions that follow in this section tend to reinforce the idea that synergistic effects from 
local  networks  improve  efficiencies  and  enhanced  resilience  in  participating  SMEs.  Such 
findings  support  the  idea  of  intentional  network  architecture  based  on  right­sized,  intentional 
interconnections  and  consciously  recognized  common  value  due  to  interdependences.  In  this 
view, “appropriate”  size  can be described as a competitive advantage because  it  allows one  to 






variety of different ways most of which  rely on  an underlying  structural understanding of  the 
factors  crucial  to  system  rebound,  such  as:  number  and  diversity  of  alternate  paths,  degree  of 
redundancy,  and  system  rigidity  and  dominating  momentum.  Folk,  Carpenter,  et  al  (Folke, 
Carpenter  et  al.  2002),  for  example,  relate  resilience  to  the magnitude of  shock  a  system  can 









and  all  its  subsystems,  derived  from  the  Greek  god  Pan  connoting  dualistic,  chaotic  change 
(panic)  on  one  hand  and  the  creative  forces  of  nature  on  the  other.  Panarchy  allows  for 














In  business  lexicon,  entrepreneurial  SMEs  begin  at  the  flux  boundary  between  the  α  and  r 
regions  by  either  forming  or  reforming  strategies  that make  them  successful. As  they  become 
successful  as  a  result,  they  accumulate  assets  and  market  share  as  they  move  toward  the  K 
region,  also  forming  strong  bonds with  stakeholders  that  can  deter  competitors  from  entering 
markets. Firms  in  the  r  region are adapting  to external  variables and  firms  in  the K region are 
controlling the variables. As the K phase matures,  there are incentives to increase efficiency in 
controlling  variables,  so much  so  that  they  become  “brittle”  leaving  them  unable  to  invest  or
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perhaps  even  see  opportunities  outside  their  dominate  area.  (The  Burlington  Chemicals  Case 
discussed later is a good example of this characteristic). It is in the K phase where companies are 
subject to disruption (Schumpeter’s destruction). “Accumulated resources are released from their 
bounds  (customers  move  from  an  incumbent  product  or  service  to  a  new  upstart)  and 
restructuring of successful but deteriorating firms begin” (Gunderson and Holling, 2002, p. 47). 
This could be where new divisions are formed, CEOs are fired, and what was once a predictable 




market  share  and  technology  increases,  but  as  the marketplace  is  dynamic,  such  expertise  can 
become old  and  less  efficient, which  opens  the  door  for upstarts  to  enter.  Firms  successful  in 
producing stability and order  ignore  these mosquitoes until  the pain  is  too  late. These upstarts 
create chaos…and so it goes. 












that  include  sustainability  to  build  diversity,  have  the  potential  to  behave  in  a  similar  brittle 
fashion  with  negative  effects  on  value  creation,  therefore,  before  examining  the  conditions 




to  be  concerned  about  the  negative  social,  economic  and  environmental  impacts  of  K  phase 













beneficial  toward  this  single  need.  The  means  that  the  SME  ramps  quickly  into  a  K  phase 
organization.  This  provides  opportunities  for  ad  hoc  members  to  focus  on  a  single  goal, 
withholding the costs of consideration of the broader spectrum of stakeholders. Ad hoc networks 
are often  inconsiderate of  systemic  impacts because  they only  need  to  survive  long  enough  to 
fulfill their single objective and therefore are disengaged from policy or behavioral norms. 
In the US, for example, Wal­Mart contracts out its store cleaning needs to ad hoc SMEs as a way 




Many  of  these  new  ad  hoc,  global  networks  intentionally  address  the  needs within  the  global 
marketplace,  by  building  highly  focused  and  efficient  networks  over  broader  geographies  or 
markets that are focused on a single efficient deliverable. Such networks may expand to compete 
with MNEs (Friedman 2005). This  is a SME behavior  that  is not as well described by Shuman 
because this self assembled, mono­focused, ad hoc SME network structure is in its infancy. Only 
by  studying  the  Internet  and  the  effects  of  mobile  phone  networks,  can  such  behaviors  be 
modeled and better understood (Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2003). 
In today’s disruptive, technology driven global markets, many SME ad hoc networks may have a 
more negative  impact  than  a  structurally­integrated MNE  (Aldrich  1999)  in  part  because  such 
networks can appear and disappear so rapidly that society cannot identify and regulate them fast 
enough to hold them accountable for  their  intentional actions and unintended consequences. In 
short,  this  these  types of uncaring, unaccountable,  short­term, mono­focus businesses  have  the 
potential to be very dangerous because, as former CEO of Interface Corporation, Ray Anderson 
puts it, they can be “as bad as the law allows” (Anderson 1998). 
Potential  threats  to  the  advancement  of  sustainable  enterprise  emerge  from networks  that  lack 
feedback  from a diversity of  stakeholders. Shuman states emphatically  that  this cannot happen 
with  local  SME  networks  because  of  the  SMEs  accountability  to  local  stakeholders  in  a  very 








from  an  expanding  SME  population  to  fulfil  the  short  term  goals  of  global  supply  chains  for 
efficient production, its behaviors should be aligned with the needs of the global commons with a 
target  of  building  long­term  value  and  resilient  markets(Gunderson  and  Holling  2002). 









arises  as  to  what  kinds  of  conditions  and  network  effects  lead  some  SME  networks  to 
successfully  produce  broad,  long­term  value,  while  others  do  not.  The  literature  provides 
examples of at  least  some of  the necessary characteristics, but before exploring  these we must 
first introduce some terminology. 
One of  the most  important  factors  influencing SME’s  successes  appears  to be  enhanced  value 
creation  via  network  effects. 12  The  contrast  between  the  potential  benefits  of  SMEs  and  the 
negative Ad Hoc example presented  in  the previous  section, offers  the opportunity  to evaluate 
the conditions that produce these alternatives in terms of two proposed forms of SME networks: 
bounded networks and random networks. 
Figure  2.2  Network  A  depicts  a  bounded  network  ―  also  called  a  “normalized  networks  of 
coupled dynamic systems” ― visualized here as a ring lattice due to interdependent boundaries 







12 The notion  of “network  effects” or “network externalities,” as  the  tendency  for  products or  services  to  become 
more  valuable  as  more  people  use  them,  finds  mathematical  expression  in Metcalfe’s  law.  Named  for  Ethernet 







Note  that  all  stakeholders  in  Network  A  are  interdependent  and  interrelated  by  normalized 
connections and bounded by various factors. One could envision this as a tax district or a water­ 
shed  or  a  county  or  state  boundary.  The  stakeholders  would  be  ideally  connected  diversely 
through TBL commons and markets and most  importantly,  these connections would change  in 
importance  depending  on  circumstance.  These  dynamic  circumstances  creates  boundaries  and 
bounded conditions fitting with the behaviors described by Gunderson and Holling (Gunderson 
and Holling  2002). The  adaptive  systems model  described  in  the  second  chapter  of Panarchy 
(Gunderson  and  Holling  2002)  describes  the  role  of  dynamic  connections  between  network 
stakeholders  as  various  cycles  of  exploitation,  conservation,  release  and  reorganization  occur. 









One  could  also  describe  networked  interdependencies,  i.e.,  boundaries  created  through 
connections, like the walls of a handball court. Any feedback (balls) served, can interact with the 
walls,  but  always  bounce  back  into  the  game.  This  can  be  described  as  “percussive  effects” 
which  also  rather  nicely  describe  the  speed  and  the  energy  with  which  an  idea  or  issue  can 
resonate with a network. The closer to the boundary and the greater the vigor with which an idea 
is  pressed  through  the  network,  the more  vigorous  and  speedy  the  re­percussion  or  feedback 
from  the boundary. Because  local  networks are dynamic and efficient,  the more  feedback  that 
bounces  among  SME  member  firms  as  feedback  loops,  the  more  the  value  of  this  feedback 
multiplies among the stakeholders (Kelly 1998). Highly efficient feedback loops also offer great 
opportunities  for  network  synchronization  (Strogatz  2003)  and  synergistic  cluster  effects  to 
develop within such networks, but diversity among stakeholders that avoids blind efficiency and 
increases resilience due to reduction in unintended consequences, may be a first order benefit. 
The  literature  also  provides  indications  that  the  relatively  short  distance  between members  in 




implementation  of  an  intentional  sustainability  strategy,  however,  the  stakeholders  also  have 
rapid  influence  over  the  SME  due  to  the  speed  and  proximity  of  stakeholders  in  closely  knit 
networks. 
Note the random Network B (Figure 2.2) directly links some stakeholders just as in Network A, 
but  it  also  isolates  others.  This  isolation  leads  to  a  lack  of  diversity  in  connections  with 
stakeholders  and,  therefore,  does  not  create  beneficial  feedback  boundaries  of  commonality. 









network  that  are  not  readily  apparent  (Granovetter  1984;  Capra  2002;  Folke,  Carpenter  et  al. 
2002).  This  verifies  the  concepts  of  the  high  value  of  inclusion  and  the  management  skills 
necessary to learn in a diversified environment (Hart and Milstein 2003). 
Network  B,  is  different.  It  may  be  a  highly  efficient  network  for  a  specific  task,  short­term, 
because  it  eliminates  some  “less  efficient”  stakeholder  connections  thereby  eliminating  the 
overhead  time  and management  of  diverse  stakeholders. However,  it  is  also  a  brittle  network, 
which may have  limited longevity due to lacking the ability  to learn and anticipate disruptions 
simply  because  of  the  isolation  of  valuable  stakeholders  and  a  lack  of  diversity  of 
stakeholders(Gunderson  and Holling 2002). This  lack  of  diversity  in  connections  that  leads  to 
great efficiencies also produces a lack of resilience within the network to withstand changes due 
to  unintended  consequences.  For  example,  if  the  transition  to  electric  automobiles  occurs,  the 
highly  efficient  chain  of  petrol  filling  stations  will  be  out  of  business,  unless  their  strategy 
includes providing charging services for electric autos. 
It  is  possible  that  deliberately  seeking  a  strategy  to  include  disenfranchised  or  uninterested 
stakeholders could create the opportunities for connections even in hyper efficient networks. The 
could allow for the evolution of broader connection that would reduce hyper­efficiency, thereby 
reducing  the possibilities of disruption. Regardless of whether  stakeholders are  linked  together 




improve  the  number of  diverse  connections  and  reduce  isolations  in  this  network. This would 
make Network B more bounded, dynamic and inclusive, thereby, making it more resilient. Need 
citation here 
Boundaries  induced  by  policies  that  encourage  stakeholder  inclusion  produce  powerful 
repercussive  effects  in  feedback  loops.  If  policy  is  used  to  force  inclusion  of  excluded 
stakeholders  into  network  involvement,  then  policy  assumes  a  role  that  can  produce 
sustainability  effects.  This  is  documented  in  this  author’s  paper  on  policy  effects  on  the  US 
Textile  industry (Ausley  and Moore 2004). During  the  1980’s,  new  regulatory  reform,  policy 
decisions emerged that forced textile companies to measure the aquatic toxicity of wastewaters 
discharged into NC rivers. This pressure induced a virtuous cycle that eventually spawned new 
process  and  chemistry  designs, which  cost­effectively  reduced  aquatic  toxicity  impacts  on  the 
surface waters of NC.  In  this case, policy  induced changes  in  stakeholder behaviors producing 
more sustainable textile dyeing processes and reducing the load of toxic chemicals on publically 
owned  waste  treatment  facilities.  However  Ostrum  (Ostrom  1990;  Ostrom  2005)  and 
Holling(Gunderson  and Holling  2002) warn  that  policy  is  not  the most  efficient,  nor  the most 
viable means of producing dynamic sustainable development. The most efficient mechanisms are 
for  the stakeholders  themselves to produce dynamic  innovations within the opportunity created
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by  the policy  and  indeed  this  is  shown by Gunderson and Holling as an  important part of  the 
Panarchy model(Gunderson and Holling 2002). 
A network environment  that  is bounded by dynamic activities of  stakeholders within an active 
policy  environment  (Network  A)  also  produces  a  barrier  to  entry  for  competitors  outside  the 
network  who  for  political  or  other  reasons  cannot  dynamically  interact:  outsiders  may  have 
additional  difficulty  connecting  because  they  must  prove  both  their  value  contribution  and 
interdependency with  other  network  stakeholders.  Such  effects,  however, may be  a  two­edged 
sword, limiting those on the inside from benefits gained from outside interaction. Thus, bounded 




In  short, one characteristic of  successful SME networks  is  that  they are “bounded.” De Genus 







rapid  feedback  loops  (bounded),  and which  have  synergies  and  connection  (weak  and  strong) 
producing  resilience  and  perhaps  providing  SMEs  an  environment  of  increasing  innovation, 
efficiency and resilience (Hart and Simanis 2008) (Folke, Carpenter et al. 2002). For SMEs, such 
advantageous contexts historically are to be found in the dynamic environment of local and niche 
markets  where  connections  and  stocks  and  flows  are  diverse  and  the  value  propositions  are 
equally diverse and influential. 
For example, Shuman’s  (Shuman 2006) contribution to the discussion of SME networks  is  the 
idea  that  local  economies  are  networks  bounded by: market  geography;  local  concerns; mores 
(language, etc.); a diversity of behaviors; and rapid feedback from interconnected stakeholders. 
Within those local economies (networks), there is a highly structured, highly efficient, dynamic 
based on  interdependency. This  interdependency  creates great  value  in many ways as dialogue 
and idea exchange between stakeholders is almost immediate. 
Additional  benefits  may  also  include  the  actual  formation  of  boundaries  created  by  this 
interdependency. These boundaries  can  be  thought  of  as walls  or  fences  constructed of  values 
and concerns of the local network. If an idea or topic can be considered as a ball, thrown against 
this wall,  it bounces back,  influenced by the values and concerns of  the stakeholders. Standing 





Sarasvathy  (Sarasvathy  2001)  reinforces  the  idea  of  the  power  of  rapid  communication  and 
feedback  loops  for  small  entrepreneurial  firms,  implying  that  the  power  of  effective 
communication is at the event horizon of innovation: 
…And when destinations  are  unclear  and  there  are  no pre­existing  goals,  causal  road 
maps are  less useful  than effectual exchanges of  information between all  stakeholders 
involved in the journey (p. 262). 
The literature review on the global impact of SMEs broadly supports Sarasvathy and Shuman’s 
findings.  The  numbers  of  SMEs  continue  to  increase  globally,  and  the  reason  appears  to  be 
increased opportunities caused by global growth (Ács 1996), particularly the addition of millions 
to  the  consumer  class  as  economic  development  occurs  in  Asia.  This  idea  of  global  growth 
causing a “rising development tide floating all boats,” is also supported by Friedman (Friedman 










it  is  used  to  include not  only material  things,  but  (as  John  Locke defined  it)  the  “life, 
liberty and estates” of every  individual  is  the only  solution men have  yet discovered to 
the problem of reconciling individual freedom with the absence of conflict. Law, liberty, 
and property are an inseparable trinity. There can be no law in the sense of universal rules 
of  conduct which  does  not  determine boundaries  of  the  domains  of  freedom by  laying 
down rules that enable each to ascertain where he is free to act (p. 107). 
For  local  economies  and  the  SMEs  working  in  them,  allowing  networks  to  form  boundaries 
based on interconnectivity, interdependency, and self­sufficient value creation for the members, 
forms  the  necessary  dynamic  network  connections,  the  “fences”  reinforcing  interdependency. 
This concentration of value creation due  to barriers and  the energy created within  the network 
produces valuable network effects  for all stakeholders within the network. This arrangement  is 
known to create a more creative internal environment, which may create very valuable goods and 





stakeholders  that  have  a  common  interest  in  keeping  the  quality  high  and  product  unique.  In 
other  words,  the  fences  and  boundaries  imposed  within  the  region  are  what  allow  Bordeaux 
wines  to  be  exported  as  being  unique  and  special.  Such  fences  have  also  created  clustering 





Certain  characteristics  of  networks,  such  as  “Long Tail”  effects  (Anderson  2006)  and  “Small­ 
World”  synergies  (Strogatz  and  Watts  1998)  also  improve  efficiency  through  rapid 
communication  and  learning  arising  from  alignment  of  broad  sensibilities  and  values  among 
stakeholders  and  not  readily  apparent  connections  between  stakeholders.  In  the  case  of  SME 
networks,  Long  Tail  effects  come  from  crowd  sourcing  or  the  use  of  diverse  stakeholders  to 
gather  opinion  and  information  that,  without  the  internet  or  some  social  media,  would  be 
impossible  to  collect. 14  Long Tail  effects  support Hart’s  (Hart  2005) development  of  dialogue 
and business with as large a diversity of stakeholders as possible as catalysts for innovation and 
value creation, even from obscure viewpoints, but obscure viewpoints that get heard. 
The  idea  of  “small  worlds”  existing  within  broader  networks  also  speaks  to  dialogue  and 
diversity. When one  has  a  large  number of  stakeholders  in dialogue,  for example all of Apple 
iPhone users, the use of networked communications allows people to make a connection because 
of  that  common  trait,  even  if  those  people  have  no  other  contact  with  each  other  except  by 
owning an iPhone. 15 Networked communications allows people who, for example, have an Apple 
iPhone to connect with people who have an iPhone and own a Blue­tick hound dog. The subset 
of  people  owning  iPhones  and  Blue­tick  hound  dogs  can  now  create  enough  synergy  rapidly 
enough to perhaps get this breed of hunting dog into the Westminster Dog Show! 
Small  World  synergies  or  the  dynamic  and  even  random  appearing  connections  –  weak 
connections­ between stakeholders help catalyze an SME network’s ability to rapidly understand 
and  integrate  (learn)  from  network  and  individual  successes  and  failures  using  a  variety  of 
expected (regular) and unexpected (random) connections to associated network members. Hence, 
the  intervention  used  in  all  three  case  studies  in  this  dissertation  looked  through  all  existing 
stakeholders and even sought new potential stakeholders of these companies in an effort to find 
some  links  of  interest  or  common  value  that  would  form  sub­networks  of  stakeholders.  For 
example,  in  the case of TS Designs  (Eric Henry),  the company has a growing Small World of 
connected  stakeholders who  are  interested  in  local  cotton  and  apparel  production.  This  Small 
World within TSD’s larger world of stakeholders formed spontaneously around these products or 
the idea of them and because TSD was working within a market network that had “sustainability 
driven”  sensibilities,  these  connections  could  form  rapidly.  Along  the  same  lines,  the  multi­ 
dimensional  TBL  feedback  loops  emerging  from  the  diverse  stakeholders  and  Small  World 
synergies  (Strogatz  and  Watts  1998)  may  also  help  SMEs  differentiate  themselves  from 
competitors inside the network (which can be very competitive environments). 
Local economic networks can be efficient and resilient for very long periods when not disrupted 












of  lowest  cost  as  the  measure  of  success  are  not  rapidly  self  correcting  due  to  their  lack  of 
boundaries  and  multi­dimensional  value  propositions.  Size  and  distance  between  nodes  also 










of  society’s  children,  did  not  exist,  even  with  the  direct  customer  who  is  normally  the most 
important  stakeholder  in business networks. Therefore, policy creation and policy  enforcement 
disappeared or became  impossible when whole  classes  of  stakeholders were  ignored  (Barboza 
2007). 
One well  recognized  problem  is  that  limited  “bandwidth” 17  within  global  communications  and 
market  information  systems  currently  limits  effectiveness  of  communication  among 
interconnected and interdependent stakeholders and,  in turn, fails  to provide adequate feedback 
loops.  However,  as  the  bandwidth  continues  to  broaden,  it  may  become  efficient  enough  to 
create a “conscience” boundary of  the  global commons  just  as  local  networks are bounded by 
local social and ecological realities today. 
Still, the broader sustainability movement’s slogan, “think globally, act locally,” speaks to one of 




1968),  and  producing  local  and  global  economic,  social  and  environmental  prosperity.  This 
slogan  emphasizes  that  the  global  commons  should  not  be  forgotten,  even  as  action  can  only 




Value  creation  in  SMEs  also  appears  to  be  enhanced  by  a  proper  combination  of  dynamic 
cooperation,  synergy  and  resilience.  For  example,  cooperative  networks  are  famous  for 







overall  better  results  than  individuals working  separately  toward  the  same  goal  (Manring  and 
Moore 2004). Healthy networks are also resilient, the ability to adapt and rebound rapidly from 
unexpected events. 





other organizational  forms such as  large multinational  enterprises  (MNE)  is due  to  the  greater 
speed  with  which  such  networks  move  and  the  lack  of  encumbering  organizational  overhead 




connections  that are  not  free  to  form new connections. An analogy  here  is  that when  single,  a 
person  is  free  to make many  sexual  connections. Once  a marriage  is  formed,  this  freedom  to 
connect is limited by many factors, legal, financial, moral, etc. 
Consequently, one characteristic all SMEs have  in common is  that  they are competitive due to 
innovation  that creates  value and  therefore,  leaves  the  firm  free  to create a customer  (Drucker 
1954), which is one of the most important functions of any enterprise. 
Axelrod  (Axelrod  1984)  described  the  value  of  cooperation  within  network  stakeholders  via 










In  an  infinite  game  scenario,  if  the  network’s  success  produces  increased  opportunities  for  all 
stakeholders,  then  the  network  expands  or  replicates  to  fulfill  these  opportunities.  Hence, 
expanding  the  size  or  abundance  (opportunities)  within  a  network must  also  be  accompanied 
with expanding opportunities  for a wide variety  of  stakeholders as bounded by  the  recognition 
of:  the  value of  interdependency;  the security of  self  sufficiency; and  the number and  types of 
connections. When such conditions are met, they increase the value for all. 
The antithesis of this expanding opportunity situation occurs when the network’s sustainability is 
lost  because  its  connections  become  too  random  or  one  or more  nodes  become  too  large  and 
efficient to maintain a broader vision of an interconnected commons. Such networks eventually 
collapse due  to brittleness or complacency caused by  the  loss or  isolation of  stakeholders who
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of  agglomeration  within  regional  Italian  textile  manufacturers.  These  textile  firms’  successes 
were  based  on  an  intentional  strategy  of  providing  goods  and  services  only  within  that 
geographical bounded textile district where rapid communications and logistical systems existed 
to support a specialized niche and provided broad value for all members. It was found that none 
of  the  network members had significant business advantages outside of  this  network. Network 
success produced individual SME success as a reinforced dynamic. 
Such highly  interdependent, but self­sufficient networks of SMEs that contain both regular and 
diverse  (apparently  unrelated)  connections,  and  are  bounded  by  commonality  of  vision  or 
purpose  are  often  very  effective.  Such  networks  often  develop  synergistic  rather  than  strictly 
additive performance. Such capability formations are described as agglomeration effects, which 
may be geographical, ethical, or technical in nature. 
Agglomeration  effects  may  occur  because  SME  network  boundaries ―  as  stakeholder  nodes 
within  a  highly  connected  network  are  bounded  by  interconnectivity  on  many  issues ― may 
increase the rate of cooperation and synchronization within the network. Increased cooperation 
within  networks  of  SMEs  is  also  due  to  the  nature  of  the  complex  relationship  between  the 
owners of SMEs and  their  firms. Rapid cooperation not only  increases  their SME’s value, but 
also  simultaneously  increases  the  value  of  every  other  network  member  that  enjoys  in  the 
expansion and increased value for the owners of the firms that are members of the network. 
2.3.6  Local SME Networks and Global Markets 
Although  business  networking  opportunities  were  not  his  primary  focus,  network  theorist, 
Duncan Watts (Watts 2003) also describes how the evolution of structural synergies of network 
clustering  produces  networks  capable  of  being  vital,  efficient,  resilient,  and  connected  as  they 
grow. As Watts states: 
Individuals, therefore, have severe limitations imposed on what they can deduce about 
the world based on what  they  can  observe. A well­known  aphorism  contends  that  all 





clustered — and  everyone  else’s  neighborhood  is  likewise  clustered,  then we  tend  to 
assume that not all these clusters can be connected. But they can be, and that is why the 
small­world  phenomenon  is  so  counterintuitive;  it  is  a  global  phenomenon,  yet 
individuals are capable of only local measurement. (Watts 2003, pp. 82­83) 
Watts  implies  that  it  is  possible  to  recreate  the  synergies  of Shuman’s  smaller  local  networks 




markets  through  unexpected,  even  random  connections  between/among  stakeholders.  Watts 
explored  this concept by examining existing  networks and behaviors and describing  the Small 
World clustering and loose ties and network re­creation mechanisms. 
The question  remains  concerning whether  or  not  “ties  that  bind”  can  be developed  enough  to 
enable long distance networks to develop network feedback loops that function as if they were in 
small,  local  networks.  If  the  continued development  enabled  such  connection  then  such Small 
World  effects  might  also  create  highly  effective  and  sustainable  global  SME  networks.  This 
could  allow  local  networks  to  function  as  efficient,  local  clusters  with  random  or  intentional 
connections to the global economy. 
However, in the opinion of this thesis author, the functionality of local network communication 
is  not  easily  accomplished  over  global  distances  due  to  the  lack  of  adequate  communication 
pipelines with the ability  to accept feedback from a wide diversity of stakeholders. While such 
feedback is more readily produced within  local economic networks,  it  remains very difficult  to 
recreate  in  networks  or  clusters  of  networks  separated  by  global  cultural  and  geographical 
distances. 18 This is of course the basis for all common resource challenges relating to the Tragedy 
of  the  Commons  behavior  archetype  (Ostrom  1990).  Today,  it  is  also  physically  difficult  to 
recreate  the  nuances  and  influences  of  “local”  communication  via  the  bandwidth  of  current 
email, telephony and social networking technologies. 




to  study using  the Panarchy model as a design  for  the boundaries and structure of cooperative 
loops (Gunderson and Holling 2002). 
Shuman  (Shuman  2006)  similarly  addresses  the  value­add  of  local  SME  networks  on  local 
economies, but does not delve deeply into the increasing influence of global SME networks on 











Shuman would say  is  important because of  the multiplier effects of  local economies. The price 






feed  the  pig,  process  the  meat,  cure  the  ham,  distribute  local  and  package,  etc  within  the 
boundaries  and  limits  of  the  network. Rather  than  greatly  increase  and  also  compromising  the 
quality  of  this  special  product  by  engaging  in  higher  volumes  for  Denny’s,  it  may  be  more 
valuable  to  recreate  the  conditions  of  the  local  net  work  in  various  regions  through  out  the 
country to maintain all the synergies of the original network. To simply scale production to meet 
volumes  and  compromise  on  any  of  the  stakeholder  dynamics  within  the  original  network 




agrees with  the  concept of  sustainable  global  economic development  described by Stuart Hart 
and his concepts of sustainable economic development through networks of SMEs in developing 
economies.  Hart  and  his  colleagues  at  Cornell  University  describe  this  as  the  Base  of  the 
Economic Pyramid Development Protocol 19  (Hart 2005). 
BOP  is not about moving goods produced in developed regions to BOP markets ― Nike tried 
this with  their World  shoe and others have  tried  it  and  failed.  Instead, BOP means developing 
entrepreneurial  infrastructure  by  using  clean  technologies  as  an  impetus  to  develop  enterprise 
infrastructure that is scaled to the market. This is a very “Schumacherian” concept (Schumacher 
1973; Schumacher 1977) in which high technology can be used, but must be scaled to fit its BOP 
application.  Practitioners  of  the  BOP  Protocol  first  live  within  these  local  communities  and 
assess  needs  and market  capabilities  before  trying  to  fit  in  new  clean­tech  opportunities. This 
protocol,  therefore,  is  less  a matter of  introducing a product,  and more a process of creating  a 
market maintained by the people living in it. 
2.2.8 Using Natural Networks to Understand and Measure Healthy Development 
Most  of  the  literature  on SME network  effects  that  this  author  found was  based  on  computer 
simulations  or  theoretical  mathematics,  not  on  recent  advances  in  understanding  real­life 
networks, such as ecosystems and living organisms. There is, however, an emerging science and 
expanding  literature  pertaining  to  natural  networks  that  advances  our  ability  to  describe  and 
understand how such real­life networks behave and evolve. For example, natural networks often 
exhibit the phenomenon of “subsidiarity,” a form of distributed empowerment and intelligence in 
which  decisions  and  actions  are  made  at  the  lowest  possible  levels.  Understanding  how 
subsidiarity  works  in  nature  helps  expand  our  understanding  of  “learning  organizations”  in 
business (Senge 1990). 
Of  greater  import  to  the  emerging  themes  of  intentional  enterprise  network  development,  the 
science  of  resiliency  has  enabled  Ulanowicz,  et  al.  (Goerner,  Lietaer  et  al.  2009)  to  develop 
quantitative measure of durable health for natural systems based on long­standing data on how 
network structure affects  the system’s  long­term health. Goerner, et al. (Goerner, Lietaer et al. 
2009) has extended  these concepts and measures  to business  networks as well building on  the 
ideas and scholarship referenced through Panarchy (Gunderson and Holling 2002). The result is 






QED’s  assessment  of  sustainable  development  grows  out  of  energy  flow’s  natural 
connection  to  network  structure.  Ecologists,  for  example,  have  long  known  that  an 
ecosystem’s  ability  to  maintain  its  own  vitality  over  long  periods  (that  is,  its 
“sustainability”), depends largely on the  layout and magnitudes of  the trophic pathways 
by which energy, information and resources are circulated. (Goerner, Lietaer et al. 2009) 




connectivity  in  the  system.  More  diversity  means  greater  the  resilience  and  the  less  the 
efficiency;  less diversity means more streamlining, more efficiency and less resilience. Balance 
is  crucial  because  too  much  or  too  little  of  either  characteristic  leads  to  calamity:  too  much 
streamlining  (efficiency)  leads  to  brittleness  and  too  much  diversity  (resilience)  leads  to 
stagnation.  Gunderson  and  Holling  perhaps  further  this  idea  by  expression  envisioning  that 
resilience  is  a  relative  feature  that  cycles  waxes  and  wanes  at  different  speeds  based  on  the 
dynamics of a system at any given time. (Gunderson and Holling 2002) 
The  long­term  maintenance  of  (network)  vitality  appears  to  rest  heavily  on  two 






are  inversely  related  to  the  levels  of  diversity  and  connectivity  found  in  the  network. 
For  example,  a well­woven multiplicity  of  connections  and  diversity  plays  a  positive 
role  in  resilience because additional options help  the system rebound  from  the  loss or 
disruption of one or more pathways or nodes. Yet, flow systems also require efficient 
end­to­end circulation of products in order to properly catalyze crucial processes at all 
levels of  the whole. Redundant pathways and excess diversity hinder  such  throughput 
efficiency, leading to stagnation that erodes vitality by dissipating weak throughput via 
various  inefficient  sectors. Consequently,  greater  efficiency means  less  resilience and, 
conversely,  greater  resilience  means  less  efficiency  because  the  streamlining  that 
augments efficiency also reduces diversity/connectivity. 
This  inherent  push­pull  trade­off  explains  why,  after  a  certain  point,  increasing  a 
system’s  efficiency makes  it more brittle  even  as  it  grows  bigger  and more directed. 
Conversely, while  increasing  diversity  and  connectivity makes  the  system  technically 
more resilient, beyond a certain point the loss of efficiency also makes it more stagnant. 











network  sustainability  can  reasonably  be defined  as  the  optimal  balance of  efficiency 
and resilience  as determined by  nature 20  and measured by system structure.  (Goerner, 
Lietaer et al. 2009) 
Goerner’s (Goerner, Lietaer et al. 2009) most useful visualization tool (see Figure 2.3) indicates 
where an organization might  lie on a continuum from stagnation  (due  to excessive small­scale 
diversity) to brittleness (due to excessive large­scale efficiency, streamlining and size). Optimal 




































(Gunderson  and  Holling  2002),  provides  a  quantitative  foundation  for  intentional  network 
development. Connections between stakeholders and other stakeholder networks can be mapped, 
stocks  and  flows  of  information  and money measured,  and  a  visualization  of  these  networks’ 
efficiency  and  resilience  provides  information  on where  investments were made  that were  not 
diverse enough and those, which were too diverse. 
Goerner, et al. (Goerner, Lietaer et al. 2009) as well has Gunderson and Holling (Gunderson and 
Holling  2002)  show  that  networks  that  isolate  stakeholders  and  focus  on  a  single­minded 
efficiency  become  “brittle” with  extreme  streamlined  efficiency  and  large  size/capacity  in  one 
node  eroding  the  grassroots  network  and  leading  toward  collapse.  Adding  stakeholders  in 
dimensions  that  deflect  and  balance  this  single­mindedness,  may  reduce  efficiency,  but  it 
increases  the  resilience  or  sustainability  of  the  network, by  reducing  unintended  consequences 
that result from such isolation and exclusion. For SMEs, this may mean engaging with or even 
adding stakeholders within the network that have been ignored in the past. 
This  empirical  explanation  of  why  both  extremes ―  hyper  efficiency/capacity  and  excessive 
diversity/smallness ― lead to economic instability also provides new clarity on several pressing 
economic conundrums. QED, for example, explains exactly why “too big to fail” actually means 
“too  big  to  be  viable.”  In  fact,  the  same  excessive  size,  efficiency  and  capacity  that  leads  to 
monopolistic  dominance  by  a  small  number  of  organizations,  also  erodes  the  small­scale 
economic  root  system,  and  pushes  the  economic  system  as  a  whole  towards  brittleness  and 
potential collapse (i.e., “un­sustainability”). 
Similarly, understanding the balance needed between  large­scale and small­scale organizations, 
also creates at new view of  the current political battles being  fought over  local SME networks 
versus global MNEs. Currently,  the battle between small, responsive,  local economic networks 
and the massive global economy is usually cast as “protectionism” on the one hand, versus “free 
trade”  on  the  other.  Here, MNE­favoring  economists warn  of  the  consequences  for  any  local 












to  strike  a  balance  between  large  and  small  is  complicated  and  hence  controversial,  QED 
provides a clear  theoretical basis  for why  the  current, black­and­white  neoliberal  vision of  the 
unerring  benefit  of  totally  unfettered  giants  is  a  recipe  for  disaster  for  every  sector  of  the 
economy,  large,  small  and  middle.  The  loss  of  US  jobs  in  the  name  of  the  “efficiency”  of 
outsourcing  to  low  cost  labor  sites  and  the massive  consolidation  leading  to  excessive  size  of 




economy based  on  the  boundaries,  stakeholders,  and  size  and  scope of  the  networks  to which 
those SMEs belong: 
The first pattern is the specialized SME that intentionally focuses on smaller niches and markets 
and  relies  on  interdependence  and  interconnections  of  these  small  networks  to  provide  rapid 
feedback and value. In such networks, expanding the size or abundance (opportunities) within a 




Within  a  highly  interconnected,  self  sufficient,  interdependent  network with  formal,  informal, 
regular and random connections, and where growth is dependent on expanding opportunities and 
connections  for as many  stakeholders as possible,  there may also be opportunity  for greater or 
more  effective  democracy. Similarly,  the  economic pattern  described  earlier  as  free  enterprise 
rightly  understood  might  arise  from  a  network  where  all  nodes  could  be  linked  and  bounded 
equally  by  an  environmental  and  social  commons, which  could  be  envisioned  as  the  ultimate 
boundary of natural and social capital. 
The  second  pattern  of  SME behavior  results  in  formation  of much  larger, more  random,  less 
bounded, ad hoc networks, which  are  focused on competing  in  global markets,  and which, by 
21  Rising  to  global  dominance  under Ronald Reagan  and Margaret  Thatcher  in  1980,  neoliberalism  is  both  an  economic  and 
political philosophy that holds  that  the economic malaise (particularly  that of  the 1970s) is the result of  too much government 
intervention in the free market. Also known as the Chicago School or simply the “Washington Consensus”, neoliberalism is now 










































definition, cannot be as  tightly  interconnected  (Manring and Moore 2009). This second type of 
SME  behavior  attempts  to  take  advantage  of  the  inefficiencies  caused  by  the  inertia  and 
incumbent friction of large centralized organizations, and uses networking in their supply chains 
to provide the goods and services with greater efficiency (Hart and Simanis 2008). It also uses its 
size and monetary power  to push  for policies  that  further  support  continued escalation of  size. 
Goerner, et al. (Goerner, Lietaer et al. 2009) show that this excessive support for the large­scale 
organizations  leads  to  the  kind  of  economic brittleness  seen  in  the  global  crisis  that  began  in 
2007. 
Furthermore, because isolated stakeholders lack the connections and interdependencies of more 
bounded  networks,  the  larger,  less  interdependent  networks  cannot  provide  the  vision  and 
feedback  loops  that  ensure  the  proper  sustainability  valuation  or  even  a  definition  of  the 
“commons” 23  beyond  a  short­term profit motive  (Moore 2009).  In  such  networks,  inadequate 

















By  contrasting  the  opportunities  available  with  a  single  focus  on  maximizing  only  financial 
returns  verses  those  available  when  maximizing  financial,  environmental  and  social 
responsibility  simultaneously, Hart  (Hart 1997) helps envision why opportunities  increase as a 
result  of  using  a  TBL  strategy  (see  Figure  2.4).  In  this  view,  incorporating  the  Sustainability 
Lens not only helps the environment, but also increases opportunities by expanding the number 
of  possible  stakeholder  nodes  and  connections  within  the  network  (Wilber  1996;  Hart  1997; 
Capra 2002; Hart and Milstein 2003; Sullivan 2004; Hart 2005). Forming new connections also 
increases the interdependencies of all members of the network(s). Ostrom, who recently received 
the  Nobel  Prize  for  Economics  for  her  works  on  resolving  common  resource  challenges  and 
involving  enterprises,  also  demonstrated  that  the  more  financial,  environmental  and  social 
networks  expand  and  create  opportunities,  the  greater  the  number  of  stakeholders  that  are 
involved  connect  and  benefit  (Ostrom  1990).  In  Panarchy,  this  is  also  made  quite 
clear(Gunderson  and  Holling  2002)  through  five  points  required  for  constructive  changes  in 
enterprise behaviors to promote resilient, sustainable development: 





·  Encourage  new  foundations  for  renewal  that  build  and  sustain  the  capacity  of  people, 
economies, and nature for dealing with change. 
·  Encourage new foundations to consolidate and expand understanding of change. 
Consequently,  when  the  idea  of  markets  is  examined  through  the  Sustainability  Lens,  some 







adapt  to  change  by  retaining  the  resources  to  survive  and  thrive when disruptions  occur. This 
happens  effectively  when  the  dynamic  TBL  connections  form  the  glue  that  builds  dynamic 
resilience and abundance in markets. 
In  contrast,  global  networks  are  often  isolated  from  stakeholder  diversity  and  single­mindedly 
focused on a short­term measure of efficiency. Because of the “observation limits” described by 













higher  “quid  pro  quo”  for  their  innovations  and  higher  efficiency  without  taking  undue 
advantage of the commons or any other stakeholder’s opportunities. This thesis author proposes 
that one mechanism to allow higher rewards for higher producers without creating a “tragedy of 




Adding  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  (CSR)  and  Corporate  Environmental  Responsibility 
(CER) to the mission and boundary conditions of a network can also help reduce the unintended 
consequences  and  facilitate  the  balancing  loop  influences  caused  by  social  inequity  and 
environmental  impacts. By  reducing unintended consequences and  inequitable quid pro quo at 
the  expense  of  the  commons,  and  by  inclusion  of  diverse  stakeholder  connections  and  more 




not as an efficient mechanism  as  the  interconnected  feedback  loops  found  in  local or  regional 
networks. 24  As  SMEs  adopt  CSR  and  CER,  they  also  become more  resilient  (sustainable)  by 
24 Beginning in late 2008, Chinese factories began complaining to major retail brands such as GAP that a huge percentage of their 

















adding TBL opportunities  and  new  stakeholders,  instead of  decreasing  both  via  destruction  or 
consumption of common resources. This increases the value of both the SMEs and the networks 
to  which  they  belong  (Adams  1997;  Hampden­Turner  and  Trompenaars  1997;  Wheeler, 
Mckague et al. 2005). 
Large  global  firms  have  “seen  the  light”  that  an  environmental  “tragedy  of  the  commons” 
(Harden 1968), the resulting requiem scenario (Senge 2004) and poverty would not provide the 
best  conditions  for  business. They  also  recognize  that  there  is  the  potential  of  adding  billions 
more customers and workers if economic development can occur sustainably (Hart 2005). With 
meta­communications and globalization of trade, small firms now also have the ability to achieve 
the  market  breadth,  once  only  available  to  large  firms.  This  literature  review  indicates  the 
mechanism of this development will be achieved through networking. 
However,  it  is  important  to acknowledge  that  long distance, more ad hoc SME networks  have 
behaviors  and  structures  that  are  also  dangerously  different  even  from  a  multi  national 
corporation’s  (Aldrich  1999).  Being  focused  on  short  term,  single­dimensional  goals,  ad  hoc 
SME  networks  may  be  more  efficient  cost­wise  but  have  fewer  direct  connections  to  the 
communities and societies  in which they work. These broad and in some cases global networks 
are currently struggling with the discrepancies between local, regional and international policies 
and  regulation. Adoption  of CSR and CER with  a  global perspective  help  can  eliminate  these 
discrepancies and provide networked SMEs a real opportunity to outperform traditional, global 
corporate  organizations  in  all  dimensions  (Wheeler,  Mckague  et  al.  2005).  Since  delays  in 
feedback  can  be  insidious  to  society  and  to  the  environment,  the  more  efficient  global 
communications  systems  become,  the more  difficult  it  will  become  for  global,  ad  hoc,  SME 




This  chapter  examined  the  realities  and  the  science  of  networking  on  strategic  development 
among SMEs. Becoming aware of the differences in structured, rational, bounded networks and 
less  rational,  more  random,  ad  hoc  networks  should  be  an  important  part  of  any  strategic 






be  taken  to  ensure  diversity  and  interdependence,  or  the  networks  may  become  brittle,  lack 
resilience  and will  be  too  narrowly  defined  to  survive  and  thrive.  It  is  also  quite  important  to 








and  the world at­large,  it  is acutely  evident  that  the empirical  study of SMEs  is  in  its  infancy, 











The  evolving  role  of  global  sustainable  development  is  likely  to  accelerate  this  trend  by 
expanding the number of stakeholders and SMEs. SMEs have not yet realized their full potential 
as exporters, sources of direct investment, and of cross­border technology transfer. Nevertheless, 
we  can  reasonably  posit  that  the  same  network  resources  that  they  enjoy  within  their  local, 
regional  or  national  economies  could  facilitate  their  internationalization  and,  hence,  increase 





robust  job  creation  function  to  build  social/human  capital  for  the  common  good.  It  is  this 





1980’s,  the  science  of man­made networking  is  in  its  infancy. However,  our understanding  of 
natural  systems  and  how  they  have  survived  and  thrived  through many  changes  is  increasing. 
How  will  this  emerging  understanding  of  network  mechanics  and  architecture  influence  the 
formation of such networks? Can networks of SMEs be held accountable for their behaviors by 
society more efficiently than MNEs? These remain vital questions, which only can be answered 









as  a  part  of  integrating  sustainability  into  the  traditional  planning  frameworks  for  SMEs.  It 
proposes  an  expanded  strategic  planning  process  based  on:  1)  an  integration  of  Stuart  Hart, 
Montalvo  and  Bob  Willard’s  distinct  approaches  to  sustainable  value­creation  for  SMEs;  2) 
network analyses and mapping used to focus Intentional Network Development; and the use of 
the Sustainability Lens for strategic differentiation and value enhancement. 






2)  produce  strategies  for  growth  and  organizational  capabilities  for  learning;  and  3)  create 





information  and  access  to markets  and  information  (Surowiecki  2004;  Surowiecki  2004),  and 
bounded yet  flexible, SME networks of  interdependent  stakeholders may  come  to out perform 
integrated MNEs, particularly in TBL dimensions. The fact that interdependency and recognition 
of  the  value  of  sustainability  for  such  networks  is  being  demanded  by  various  constituencies 
globally (Hawken 2007) helps to explain the rapid increases of SMEs globally. 
Such SME networks, of course, have a  fundamentally different organizational  structure  than a 
MNE  conglomerate.  MNEs  rely  on  the  value  created  by  centralized  brand  value,  quality 
assurance  and  market  breadth,  which  lead  to  higher  returns  on  investment  on  research  and 
development investments to compete (Acs 1988). These assets are funded by channelling profits 
back to a central location, the home office, rather than by distributing all profits equitably among 
network  stakeholders. An MNE,  therefore,  could  be  shown  as  a  network where  all  nodes  are 




2202), as have  the  values, potential behavior,  and structure of networked SMEs  (Manring  and 
Moore 2004) 






structures,  may  aid  in  promoting  innovation  by  reducing  organizational  barriers  to  creative 





The  ability of  a SME  to  rapidly  integrate with  others  to  create  opportunity  and  to  “creatively 
destroy”  (Christensen  and  Overdorf  2000)  or  discard  less  favorable  nodes  in  favor  of  better 
opportunities,  is  a  unique  benefit  of  SME  networks  that  are  not  burdened  with  incumbent 
“corporate overheads and interests” (Manring and Moore 2009). In times of rapid market change 
and short  innovation cycles,  this ability to discard the old and reinvest  in new  innovation often 






for  intentionally  cultivating  diversity within SME  stakeholder  networks  can  aid  small  firms  in 
developing  successful  strategies  in  a  “hot,  flat,  and  crowded”  global  marketplace  (Friedman 
2008).  This  research  suggests  that  the  opportunities  arising  from  network  synergies  tend  to 
increase the quality of innovation without reducing speed, and, thus, ensure greater sustainability 
and long term financial stability for the adopting SMEs. Efficient value creation, as part of local 
business  networks  (Blackford 2003),  has  always  been  the  strength  of  the SME maintained  by 
quick response, rapid communication and multidimensional value creation. 
SMEs will continue to succeed through innovation and differentiation mechanisms in local and 
regional environments,  and are held  swiftly accountable by  local and  regional  stakeholders  for 
what they do well and what they do wrong. These standards will be different region to region. 
For  this  reason,  standardizing  an  approach  to  incorporating  sustainable  strategies  into  SME 
operations and practices will be a challenge. 
The challenge to the emergence of effective and sustainable SME networks lies in development 
of  planning  strategies  that  utilize  the  synergies  of  SMEs  to  produce  competitive,  resilient, 
diverse,  bounded,  interdependent  and  responsive  enterprises.  This  means  that  SMEs  must  be 










to  help  SMEs  expand  these  network  effects  further  through  formation  of  previously  ignored 
stock and flow connections that can provide new and exciting perspectives (Hart 1997). 
Due  to  their  small  size  and  influence,  smaller  firms  have  been  traditionally  perceived  as 
“limited” by  their  ability  to  leverage R & D  and  capital  investments  across  broad markets.  In 
contrast, intentional network formation using potent new communication technologies help open 
new  markets  and  level  the  playing  fields  for  SMEs  (Acs  1990).  The  necessary  process  of 






understanding  can  produce  present­value  in  existing  operations,  and  can  project  and  develop 





























that  reinforce  the  positive  aspects  of  adoption  of  sustainable  strategies  through  avoidance  of 
unintended  consequences  and  archetypal  behaviors  that  limit  success  (Senge  1990; 
Wolstenholme 2003). 
While  the  connections  and  intentions  can  and  should  be based  on  ethical  principles,  business 
strategy and actions should be grounded in sound management concepts as well. New planning 
approaches  should  include  the  ideas  from  leading  sustainable  strategists  and  organizational 
behaviorists, focusing strategy sharply on a new sustainable vision for success. 
These  new  sustainability­based  approaches  must  be  introduced  within  a  normalized  business 
planning process, with the  final results being expanded value creation that  includes profits and 
economic  success  as  well  as  value  creation  in  environmental  and  social  spaces.  Any  new 
planning  process,  and  the  ideas  behind  it,  must  be  rational,  realistic  and  backed  by  practical 
examples of  success. The process must be normalized enough  to be accepted by businessmen, 
i.e., the owners and managers of the SMEs and their shareholders and lenders. 
Strategies  developed  incorporating  a  Sustainability  Lens  should  be  judged  as  “worthy”  or 





If  strategy  is  used  to  preserve  and  enhance  distinctiveness,  then  strategic  planning  is  a 
systematic,  intentional  route  towards  distinction  and  improvements  in  enterprise  performance. 
Typically, most strategic plans include financial projections, sales and marketing projections, a 
SWOT  analysis  (Strengths,  Weaknesses,  Opportunities  and  Threats),  a  Research  and 
Development  assessment,  and  an  operational  analysis.  These  different  forces  produce  the 
organizational tension that is the creative force behind strategic planning. See Figure 3.1. 
Senge (Senge 1994) described strategic planning as taking the “tensions” outlined in Figure 3.1 




more  tension  the  organization will  experience. Try  to  stretch  too  far  and  the  rubber band will 
break;  not  stretching  far  enough  puts  no  tension  on  the  organization  and  thus,  produces  little 
tension that induces change. 
This  thesis  author  suggests  adding  a  Sustainability  Lens  (Robert,  Schmidt­Bleek  et  al.  2001) 
(Hoffman  2000)  component  and  analysis  to  this  Present­state/Future­state,  organizational 
planning  matrix.  By  this  process,  the  company  leaders  are  acknowledging  the  increasing 
opportunities from the changing conditions of the global markets and environment, primarily by 
increasing efficiency and taking advantage of increasingly networked populations of consumers. 

























The  addition  of  environmental  and  social  considerations  in  addition  to  profitability  as  an 
integrated objective for enterprise strategy dramatically increases the number of stakeholders, the 
number  of  connections  between  stakeholders,  and  variables  that  must  be  considered  and 
managed,  i.e.  complexity.  Conscious  understanding  of  network  effects  (Watts  2003)  and 
Panarchical cycles (Gunderson and Holling 2002), provides the link between intentional network 






Understanding  and  then  controlling  the  complexity  formed  by  the  addition  of  social  and 
environmental  stakeholders  should  produce  network  synergies  and  benefits  for  customers  and 
produce value for firms engaged is such activities within the network. 
3.4  The Importance of an SME Strategic Planning Process 





is  an  ongoing  process.  Yet,  though  it  is  a  part  of  prudent  management  and  is  a  fiduciary 
responsibility,  SMEs have  not  usually  been  known  to  fully  embrace  formal  strategic  planning 
processes (Perry 2001). 
Many  leaders  of  small  businesses  see  the  concept  of  strategic  planning  as  ineffectual,  in  part 
because  the  world  changes  so  rapidly,  and  also  because  of  the  lack  of  connection  between 
strategic planning and prosperity. This  thesis author, however, argues that  there  is a difference 
between taking quick tactical actions that are not aligned due to a lack of coherent strategy, and 





performing  these  activities  better—that  is,  faster,  or with  fewer  inputs  and defects — 
than rivals. 
Companies can reap enormous advantages  from operational effectiveness, as Japanese 
firms  demonstrated  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  with  such  practices  as  total  quality 
management  and  continuous  improvement.  But  from  a  competitive  standpoint,  the 
problem with operational effectiveness is that best practices are easily emulated. As all 
competitors in an industry adopt them, the productivity frontier — the maximum value 
a  company  can  deliver  at  a  given  cost,  the  best  available  technology,  skills,  and 
management  techniques — shifts outward,  lowering costs and  improving  value at  the 
same  time.  Such  competition  produces  absolute  improvement  in  operational 
effectiveness, but  relative  improvement  for no one. And,  the more benchmarking  that 
companies  do,  the  more  competitive  convergence  there  is  —  that  is,  the  more 
indistinguishable companies are from one another. 
Strategic  positioning  attempts  to  achieve  sustainable  competitive  advantage  by 
preserving what is distinctive about a company. It means performing different activities 
from rivals, or performing similar activities in different ways. 
Whether  the  firm  is  large  or  small,  strategy  is  intentionally  used  to  position  the  company:  to 


















seem  to have almost an  instinctive or  informal  reactionary development of  strategy (Chell  and 
Baines 2000) based on a highly iterative planning behavior with very short cycles of evaluation 
(feedback).  This  appears  to  be  a  successful  development  process,  and  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the 
recognized  efficiencies  of  smaller  firms  (Shane  2000).  Small  size,  rapid  feedback,  and  rapid 
changes  in behavior make SMEs nimble, quick  to change, and efficient  in  such environments, 
but a lack of strategic focus can produce a management sense of being busy, without achieving 
necessary objectives (Barnett and McKendrick 2004). 
Regardless  of  which  theory  of  entrepreneurship  or  business  development  one  favors  (Shane 
















These  numerous  and  fundamental  changes  of  direction  by SMEs do  not  imply  that SMEs  are 
necessarily  “poor  planners,”  nor  does  it  imply  that  their  planning  process  is  broken.  Instead, 
SME behavior reflects the lack of information SMEs have about the business opportunities they 
will  ultimately  exploit.  SMEs  generally  do  not  have  the  resources  and  confidence  to  be  as
Samuel B. Moore, Erasmus University 
84 
assured  as  larger  firms  with  their  planning  abilities.  Moreover,  SMEs  are  comfortable  with 
flexible  decision­making  that  is  adaptive  to  the  changes  required  from  new  information  and 






going  to  take,  and  the  networks  in which  it  intends  to  participate  (Audretsch  1991).  It  is  this 
intentional process of network analysis that  is new in terms of traditional approaches to SME’s 
strategic planning. 
Such  network  analysis  planning  is  even  more  fundamental  to  strategy  development,  if  the 
conditions  of  rapid  population  growth,  ecological  decline,  materials  scarcity,  and  expanding 





firms  with  greater  than  five  employees  that  used  a  formal  planning  process  were  more 
successful. As he says, “if your small business employs five or more people, you should consider 
engaging  in planning activities… because doing  so may enhance  your chances of  survival and 









Question  5  gets  to  the  basics  of  how  emerging  environmental  and  social  conditions  can  be 
integrated into SME planning. Answering the first four questions within Perry’s simple planning 
template produces important tactical operational information. An emphasis on sustainability can 











world  population  is  increasing  and  social  unrest,  technology  shifts,  economic  cycles,  natural 
disasters,  etc.,  can disrupt markets. Since competition  for  resources  is  fierce and  resources are 
becoming  scarce,  improved  efficiency  and more  resiliency  is  increasingly  important  for  small 
firms. 
The  focus of  strategy development  for SMEs must assume  that as  the  rate of global economic 
development and competition  for all  forms of capital  increase,  the  value of understanding and 
then utilizing network complexity, in all its forms, also increases. The importance of creation of 
strategy  that  embraces  dynamic  resilience  should  not  be  forgotten.  This  is  the  where 
understanding  where  a  particular  network  or  market  resides  within  its  broad  cycle  of 
stakeholders becomes a key tool for success (Sutcliffe, Weick et al. 2005). 
By  definition,  using  a  Sustainability  Lens  includes  previously  excluded,  external  stakeholder 
needs and provides an expanded, value definition beyond simply producing at  the  lowest cost. 
The new value definition must  include including  the  integration of  the global network’s social, 




critical  to  the  final  outcome  of  any  strategic  planning  process.  As  the  first  step  in  strategic 
development, this process leads to a coherent vision for the organization that is firmly grounded 





mission  development,  a  defined  value  proposition  should  directly  influence  the  products  and 
services that an enterprise brings to the market. The inclusion of a Sustainability Lens can help 





Figure 3.3 presents  one  approach  to broadly  defining  strategic  intent. These  ideas,  based on  a 
synthesis of ideas from:(Porter 1996; Hawken 1993; Capra, Pauli et al. 1995; Wilber 1996; and 
Sullivan 2004) rests on the premise that the world is a very complex and highly interconnected 
place  and  that  the  “value”  in  its  broadest  sense  is  increased  by  cooperation  and  expanding 












There  is  a  need  to define  “value”  in  order  to  achieve  a  vision  that  helps  the  firm differentiate 
itself via its actions. Value is defined by the costs or the price paid for the goods or services or 
investments and the benefits realized as a result. The greater the perception by the customer that 
complexity  is  controlled by  a  company’s  goods and  services  due  to  the  benefits  they  provide, 
even  if  they  are  intangible  or  not  adequately  accounted  for,  the  less  dominant  selling  price 
become in the buying consideration for the customer. 
Figure 3­3 Seeking Value in Enterprises Beyond Profits 












spectrums.  How  can  adoption  of  TBL  strategies  increase  the  value  of  products  in  the 
marketplace? 
Many US  consumers  define  economic  value by  the  price  one pays  for  goods  or  services. The 
value  is determined by the complexity that  is controlled by the product or service verses other 
products in the market. When there is the perception that the product is a commodity, 25  and there 
lots  of  competitors,  no  discernable  quality  differences,  then  selling  price  is  the  differentiating 






detriment of any  environmental or  social  stakeholders  (commons),  then  the value may only be 
short term and artificial (Brown 2003) creating a market advantage that is brittle and short­lived. 
Conversely,  if  the  dominant  strategy  for  value  creation  is  to  control  as  much  complexity  as 


















In  short,  working with  the  complexities  of  sustainable  development  should  enhance  the  value 
propositions for firms seeking greater efficiencies and lower costs as well as for firms seeking to 









profits  for  a  few,  towards  an  abundant  infinite  game  creating  value  for  as  many  as  possible 
(Hampden­Turner and Trompenaars 1997). This is accomplished through intentionally engaging 
the  market  and  the  world  as  a  very  complex  place  and  seeking  abundance  through  efficient 
cooperation  for  a  multiplicity  of  stakeholders  and  customers.  This  complexity  includes 









et  al.  2007). Value  creation  in  firms  by  attempting  to  benefit  from  the  complexity  created  by 
“sustainability” can result from an intentional strategy of creating current abundance for as many 
stakeholders  as  possible,  without  discounting  future  value;  this  should  be  possible  if  society 
ensures  that  resources are available  for  future generations. Creating abundance  for all  expands 
the  opportunities  for  all  (Hampden­Turner  and  Trompenaars  1997;  Sullivan  2004).  If  such 
complexity  is  to  be  addressed  by  small  business,  then  business  planning  that  addresses  this 
additional complexity becomes even more necessary;  such  functions are usually  not present  in 
SME’s planning templates (Bradford and Bradford 1990). 
To address the challenge of inadequate SME planning in any form, simple systematic approaches 
to  strategic  planning,  tailored  specifically  towards  SMEs,  have  been  developed.  One  such 
approach was produced by The Center for Simplified Strategic Planning (CSSP) in Vero Beach 
Florida,  USA.  This  plan  is  marketed  through  workshops  presented  by  the  Michigan  State 
University (Bradford and Bradford 1990) 27 . This plan contains the templates and procedures for 
developing  a  “traditional”  strategic  plan  for  SMEs  that  answers  Perry’s  (Perry  2001)  basic 
inquiries for strategic plans, but it does not include a lens for taking into account the “Hot, Flat, 
and Crowded” conditions of  the 21 st  century. The stakeholder definitions used are  too  internal 
and too narrow in this thesis author’s opinion. The emphasis is on a simplified, highly structured 
approach centered on present value financial performance. However, the CSSP plan offers plenty 
of  flexibility within  their method  to  integrate  a Sustainability Lens  that  includes  tools  such  as 





Today,  there  is  no  Sustainability  Lens  in  Bradford’s  or  any  published  “simplified”  strategy 
development framework that is truly appropriate for SMEs. This section’s objective is to provide 
frameworks for such a strategic planning module. 
As  the  following  paraphrase  of  Bradford  (Bradford  and  Bradford  1990)  indicates,  he  defines 
strategy in much the same way as Porter (Porter 1996): 
“Strategy,” Bradford believes,  is  the  leadership's  sense of  vision  to  the overall  course 
and  direction  of  any  endeavor  or  enterprise,  be  it  war,  government,  a  profit­seeking 
business, a non­profit organization, sports, one's personal or one's family life. 
The  term  “strategic  planning”  refers  to  a  coordinated  and  systematic  process  for 
developing a plan for the overall course and direction of the endeavor or enterprise for 












step  for  incorporation  of  sustainable  strategies  into  a  formal  planning  process  for  SMEs  is  to 








Stuart Hart  of  Cornell University’s  Johnson School  of Management  has  developed  a  strategic 
planning  framework  that  maps  sustainable  investments,  actions  and  value  creation  within  a 
shareholder  value  matrix  (Hart  2005).  Beginning  in  the  mid  1990’s,  Hart’s  history  of 
publications provides evidence that current economic development practices are not efficient or 
resilient enough to address the needs of  the developed economies of  the west [see (Hart 1997; 
Hart  and  Prahalad  2002;  Hart  and  Milstein  2003;  Hart  2005;  Hart  and  Simanis  2008)].  He 




discovering  competitive  advantages  by  using  a  Sustainability  Lens  to  redefine  “value”  and 
“success.” However, Hart also believes that there must be a new intentional strategic approach to 
discover such advantages. Hart describes a strategic framework that enables an enterprise to map 
the  value  proposition  for  various  sustainable  activities.  This  mapping  tool  can  be  useful  for 


































































































































of  Christensen  (Christensen  1997;  Christensen  and  Overdorf  2000;  Christensen  and  Raynor 
2003; Christensen, Anthony et al. 2004) who popularized the Schumpeterian ideas of capitalism 
28  In  The  Process  of  Creative Destruction,  Joseph  A.  Schumpeter  (1942)  says  in  "The  opening  up  of  new markets  and  the 
organizational  development  from  the  craft  shop  and  factory to  such  concerns  as US Steel  illustrate  the  process  of  industrial 





as a destructive,  revolutionary  economic  force. Putting “creative destruction”  into  the  terms of 
the  Hart­Milstein  matrix  offers  sustainability  as  not  only  a  concept  for  incremental 




by  seeking  customers  on  the  base  of  the  economic  pyramid,  the  top  half  of  the matrix ―  to 
disrupt less sustainable and inefficient practices and structures, and to create new value that was 
heretofore, unforeseen (Hart and Simanis 2008). In this way the Hart­Milstein matrix provides a 
new strategic  lens  for  strategic  sustainable development. Figure 3.5, derived  from Hart’s 2004 


















value  from  sustainable  change  requires  unique  organizational  assets  and  a  supportive  and 
encouraging  policy  environment.  Montalvo’s  great  contribution  is  discovering  which 
organizational behaviors, capabilities and attributes engender change towards cleaner production 
and sustainability. 
In  his  book,  Environmental  Policy  and  Technological  Innovation, Montalvo  (Montalvo  2002) 
built  upon  the  work  of  Ajzen  (Ajzen  and  Fishbein  1980;  Ajzen  1988)  by  modelling  and 
quantifying  attributes  and  determinates  that  influence  behavior  of  enterprises  located  in  the 
Northern  border  region  of  Mexico.  His  findings,  derived  from  a  survey  of  more  than  50 
companies, show in summary that: 
Firms,  currently  and  in  the  long  term,  are  not willing  to  develop  clean  technologies. 
This suggests, states Montalvo, that “it is not possible to reconcile” conflicting interests 


























His  book  also  examines  the  reasons  why  the  firms  would  not  adopt  business  strategies  that 
“include  radical  preventative  measures  to  eliminate  residuals  and  waste,  such  as  changing 
product designs and manufacturing processes that aim at the ideal recycling and zero emissions 











It  is  impossible  to move beyond  the  visioning step  in  the  strategic planning process without a 
method to assess whether or not the organization has the assets, attributes and core competencies 









Montalvo’s  framework  examines  the  fiscal,  physical  and  mental  assets  of  a  firm  in  order  to 
determine if the firm’s leadership is capable of using technologies or organizational strategies to 
produce  productive  change.  His  idea  is  that  a  firm  must  have  the  “will”  to  change,  before 
innovation can occur. His approach by inventorying and mapping these assets allows a strategic 














Advantage:  Seven  Business  Case  Benefits  of  a  Triple  Bottom  Line  (Willard  2002)  and  The 
Sustainability Wave: Building Boardroom Buy In  (Willard 2005).  In his first book, Willard, an 
ex IBM executive and lead instructor at the Sustainable Enterprise Academy, described the seven 
present  value  benefits  that  any  business  can  receive  from  making  investments  in  sustainable 
development as follows: 
·  Easier hiring of the best talent; 









risk),  all  contribute  to  profits.  People,  planet  and  profits —  an  integrated  win/win/win  case” 
(Willard 2002, p. 21). 
Willard  developed  the  business  case  and  financial  analysis  for  each  of  the  seven  bottom  line 
benefits  of  integration  of  sustainability  into  business  practices.  This  is  demonstrated  by 
producing  practical  spreadsheet  models  for  a  theoretical  company.  He  applied  a  conservation 































Willard’s  approach  to  benchmarking  the  perceived  benefits  of  strategies  incorporating 
sustainability and then measuring progress within a practical spreadsheet format, is a very sound 
bridge between  strategy  formation,  implementation  and  action  plans.  Such  practical  templates 
are  very  important  in  producing  usable  business  plans  that  require  involvement  of  financial 
institutions because this toolset is understandable to lending institutions and investment banks. 













The  final  tool  in  the  proposed  toolkit  is  Willard’s  practical  financial  and  management 
spreadsheet  models,  which  make  it  possible  to  develop  proforma  financial  projections  of  the 
likely impacts of a SME’s strategy that includes TBL value systems. 
3.5  Summary 









This  brings  us  full  circle  to  the  integration  of  these  three  planning  approaches  into  a  formal 
strategic planning process. Because of  increasing waves of uncertainty and creative destruction 
forces  within  technology  and markets,  formal  strategic  planning  is  increasingly  important  for 
SMEs. This thesis author selected these three scientists’ approaches because they are simplified 
enough for SME use in incorporating sustainability into their strategic development processes. 
















This  chapter  describes,  step­by­step,  the  action  research  methodology  developed  to  insert  a 
Sustainability Lens into the strategy planning process for SMEs. This strategic planning process 




The  action  research  cases  presented  in Chapters  6­8  are based on  previous work  by Kendrick 
(Kendrick  2009)  and  Czarniawska  (Czarniawska­Joerges  1998).  They  center  on  developing  a 
planning  process  designed  to  lead  to  the  application  of  successful  and  useful  Sustainability 
























After  this  network  analysis  is  complete,  the  strategic  planning  process  then  uses  this 
information to improve value­creation  in the adopting SME, while expanding the scope 













































This  thesis author  inserted his particular bias  towards embracing  the concepts of  sustainability 
into the strategies and production activities of each  firm in order  to discover  if  the adoption of 
































firm’s  leaders/owners  needed  to  see  this as an ongoing process and not a  finite project  and  to 
view this as an opportunity to adopt and utilize the new paradigm of sustainable business. 
This  process  of  linking  personal  and  business  visions  for  the  future,  resulting  in  a  vision  that 
includes  a  Sustainability  Lens,  evolved  from  the  author’s  experiences  at  the  Sustainable 
Enterprise Academy (SEA), where this thesis author was an active participant  from 2000­2006 
(SEA  2007).  The  SEA  is  an  executive  training  program where  executives  of  large  firms  are 
introduced to the possibilities of sustainability as a new business paradigm. Many of the recently 
acknowledged concepts, such as GE’s “Eco­imagination,” Canadian investments in wind power, 
and  emerging  “Clean  Tech”  Venture  capital  funds  were  catalyzed  during  these  sessions 
(Wheeler, Zohar et al. 2005). 
Changing the companies’ vision by adding a Sustainability Lens inclusive of new environmental, 
community, and social  stakeholders offered new opportunities due  to expansion of  stakeholder 
networks. This Sustainability Lens was presented to the client firms as a means of discovering 
value  from  new  or  existing  markets  and  customers  through  a  mechanism  of  controlling 
increasing  complexities  from  a  world  that  was  becoming  Hot,  Flat,  and  Crowded  (Friedman 
2008). Understanding  and  acting  on  such  complexities  expanded business  possibilities  beyond 








researchers  to  actively  work  to  bring  about  changes  and  to  analyze  the  outcomes  of  such 
changes, simultaneously. This is much different that the passive or objective observer role taken 
in many empirical research projects. 
In  action  research,  the  researcher  actively  promotes  an  agenda  that  s/he  believes will  broadly 
improve the targeted organizations. The researcher is an active promoter of the desired outcome. 





(Argyris,  Putnam  et  al.  1985),  and  the  website  http://www.actionscience.com/.  He  describes 
“action science” in this manner: 
Action science is a strategy for designing situations that foster effective stewardship of 
any  type of  organization.  It  is  a  framework  for  learning  how  to  be more  effective  in 
groups. It aims to help individuals, groups, and organizations to develop a readiness and 
ability to change to meet the needs of an often changing environment. 
To  help  individuals  in  groups  to  learn  how  to  overcome  barriers  to  organizational 
change, action science does not  simply  focus on  improving  the participants' problem­ 
solving  or  decision­making  skills.  It  also  does  not  look  only  at  making  incremental 
changes  (e.g.,  identifying  opportunities;  finding,  correcting,  reducing,  or  eliminating 
threats) in the external environment. Without eschewing these concerns, action science 
focuses on looking inward, learning new frameworks, and establishing new routines. 
A critical  issue in action science  is whether a problem is considered  routine/trivial vs. 
non­routine/difficult.  The  difference  is  not  always  clear. Nevertheless,  action  science 
focuses on  identifying and  resolving  the difficult,  complex,  real­life problems  that are 
critical  to  organizations  and  society.  This  includes  the  formidable  challenges  of 
leadership,  innovation,  informed  participation,  and  reducing  prejudice.  These 
bewildering problems often emerge and become more significant as group participants 





of  the  global  commons.  This  is,  in  essence,  the  emerging  concept  of  “sustainable  enterprise” 
described via the axiom of “Think Globally, Act Locally.” (Hart 1997) 
It is important to note that action research addresses “non­routine/difficult” problems by 











probably  cause  B.”  Probabilistic  causality  allows  for  the  richness  and  uniqueness  of 
concrete situations. It recognizes the inherent gap that exists between stored knowledge 
and  the  knowledge  required  to act  effectively,  the continual  need  to change  the status 
quo. 
Participants  who  reason  productively  recognize  that  any  innovation  is  likely  to  be 
inadequate  and,  therefore,  needs  monitoring.  They  reliably  repeat  effective  actions, 
making outcomes of  initiatives known publicly. They specify the action strategies and 




resolve  difficult  problems  by  taking  innovative  action  relatively  soon.  As  the 
participants question each other’s underlying programs or  the credibility of  their  ideas 
they maintain high levels of interpersonal openness. They accept that while openness is 
potentially or actually embarrassing, threatening, or frustrating, openness is necessary to 
increase  trust  and  individuality  in  their  group.  Individual  participants  may  deny  the 
difficulties  involved  in  carrying  out  their  challenging  plans  but  the  members  freely 
challenge,  test,  and  correct  the  claims.  By  possessing  high  levels  of  action  science 




actions  to  address  the  challenge.  Especially  in  this  emerging  realm  of  sustainability,  it  is 




of  plan,  act,  description  and  review  cycle,  for  inquiry  into  action  within  a  field  of  practice 
(Argyris,  Putnam  et  al.  1985).  Action  research  is  based  on  the  researcher  having  a  specific 





















set  of  the  researcher,  and  the  anticipated  audience  for  the  cases  that  result  from  the  studies. 
Langley  (Langley  1999)  describes  seven  strategies  that  allow  for  choices  based  on  the 
organizational  literature. “In my analysis I also look at the relative data needs of each approach 
both in terms of depth (process detail) and breadth (number of cases)…finally I show how each 
strategy  tends  to  favour  different  types  of  process  understanding  (senses).  Some  are  more 













her  biases  into  the  decision  making  process  of  an  organization  to  guide  the  actions  of  the 
organization. In this thesis, the focus is on three small to medium sized enterprises, whose basic 
markets have been disrupted by commoditization 31 or globalization. 32 
31  Commoditization means  to  lessen  the  importance  of  a  diversity  of  benefits within  a product  or  service  and  increasing  the 
importance of commonality to focus only on the cost or price of a thing. 


















Figure 4.2,  from Hart  (Hart  2005),  graphically  depicts  the  anticipated  limits  and  expansion  of 
opportunities  for  enterprises,  when  additional  engagement  of  previously  unconsidered 
stakeholder occurs. The  figure suggests  that an expansion of vision  inclusive of environmental 
and social responsibility may provide opportunities leading to new strategies and markets for the 
adopting firms and that these opportunities are beyond simple economic returns. This assumption 
can  be  considered  within  both  the  “discovery  and  creation”  theories  of  entrepreneurship  and 









Hart’s  concepts  are  not  unique  nor  have  they  been  developed  in  isolation. Many  others  also 
describe  organizational  benefits  realized  from  expansion  in  the  scope  of  visioning,  including 
cooperation  among diverse  stakeholders  (Capra 1982; Axelrod 1984; Adams 1997; Hampden­ 
Turner and Trompenaars 1997; Anderson 1998; Goerner 1999; Capra 2002). 
For  example,  in  The  Art  of  Possibility,  Zanders  (Zander  and  Zander  2000)  described  the 
importance  of  metaphors  and  eschewing  limits:  “We  perceive  only  the  sensations  we  are 
programmed to receive, and our awareness is further restricted by the fact that we recognize only 
those for which we have mental maps or categories” (p. 10). This  implies  that new  ideas must 
surely come from outside current mental models and maps and this implies the need for inclusion 
of atypical influences. 
Also,  Hampden­Turner  (Hampden­Turner  and  Trompenaars  1997)  provides  a  broader  insight 
that  is  directed  at  the  value  of  inclusion  and  broad  expansion  in  business  success:  “There  is
Samuel B. Moore, Erasmus University 
104 
another  source  of  improvement  (other  than  individual Darwinist  survivors),  the  evolution  and 
improvement  of  the Game  (marketplace)  itself.  It  is  technologies  and whole  industries, which 
survive, informed by human heads and hearts. The game (marketplace) is not a static institution, 
but  improves  and  co­evolves  with  its  players.  Better  games  “infinitely  improving”  are  what 
transform an economy and lead to fast growth (p. 23).” 
These  ideas  imply  that  expansion  of  a  firm’s  stakeholders  equals  more  opportunities  for 
everyone by expanding the opportunity­space rather than focusing on a single dimensional return 
for  relatively  few shareholders. This concept  is very much  in alignment with  the discussion  in 
Chapter 3 on the value of networks and networking for SMEs. 
Interestingly the incumbent common vision and mission for all three case study firms was the 













that  sustainability  could  create  new  opportunities  and  visions  for  the  firm  that  could  only  be 
discovered by adding a Sustainability Lens to the planning process. 
The  recent  article  by  Loorbach  (Loorbach,  Whiteman  et  al.  2010)  describes  the  process  of 















expand  the  set  of  stakeholders  for  each  company. This would  lead  into  strategy  and  a  tactical 










they  would  not  be  in  fundamental  opposition  to  the  very  idea  of  their  being  value  in 
environmental and social stewardship. The design of this educational approach was to help these 
leaders  realize  an  essential  strategic  restructuring  of  their  company’s  vision  that  sought 
alignment and reinforcement, rather than isolation, from sustainability. 
This linking process was an intentional part of this designed approach, whereby the author­action 





The  literature  was  clear  that,  to  achieve  the  utilization  of  a  Sustainability  Lens  within  the 
visioning process for  these SMEs, new strategies must begin with active leadership and buy­in 
from  the  entrepreneurs­owners  of  these  firms  (Drucker  1954;  Drucker  1985;  Bradford  and 
Bradford 1990; Anderson 1998; Davidson 2000; Freel 2000; Joseph 2000; Chaston, Badger et al. 
2001; Capra 2002; Czarniawska­Joerges  and Hernes  2005). After buy­in  from  the owners,  the 
upper­middle management  of  their  companies must  also  be  convinced  to  endorse  and  then  be 




futures.  This  transformation  process  energized  the  owners’  leadership,  exciting  them  to  get 
involved in the development of “new sustainable visions,” and the strategies to achieve them. 
The empowerment of the owners and the middle managers to revitalize their firms based upon 




planet  and  profit)  are  all  inter­dependant  upon  each  other,  as  members  of  an  interrelated 

















The  formal  envisioning  process  and  the  strategies  that  emerged  formed  a  clear  relationship 





social  commons  (Harden  1968; Hawken  1993; Anderson  1998; Hawken,  Lovins  et  al.  1999). 
Because  successful  examples  can  be  useful  for  effecting  awareness  rising  and  for  increasing 
motivation  for  change,  by  2002,  the  thesis  author  had  several  published  examples  from  the 
visions and experiences of various leaders in the American corporate world, who have achieved 
advantages for their firms by using a Sustainability Lens. Illustrative examples included: 



































presented  for  sale.  The popular  press  is  rife with  examples  that  connect  how doing well  in  the 
social and environmental arenas connect to financial success. A survey of popular US magazines 
in  2007,  performed by  a  group of  undergraduate  students  at  Elon  University  indicated  that,  by 












The  first  formal  sessions  with  these  firm’s  managers  were  spent  in  dynamic  educational 
interactions. The objective was  to  inspire a  realization  that  ignoring  the  tragedies of  the social 
and  environmental  commons  is  seriously  threatening  the  survival  of  their  children  and  their 
firms.  These  tragic  results  are  due  to  the  old  style  industrial  revolution  models  of  economic 
development  and  this  type  of  development  is  totally  lacking  the  strategic  consideration  of 
sustainability  or  network  expansion.  Once  this  tragedy  has  been  realized  personally,  this 
realization demands a reinvention of business. A reintegration of personal values into what had 
been  normally  isolated  business  considerations  was  discussed  in  detail.  By  adopting  a  new 
Sustainability Lens for expanding their personal vision to include sustainability, new visions and 





































the marketplace.  This  idea  of  alignment, while  so  simple  in  concept,  is  extremely  difficult  to 
discuss  with  “hard­nosed”  business  people  until  a  firm  alignment  with  increased  economic 
returns  is  presented. The  goal  is  to  create  the  business  case  for  sustainable  development. The 
PowerPoint presentations used  in  this education process can be  found  in Appendix 1  (attached 
separately from the dissertation). 
As mentioned before, in the case studies developed for this dissertation, the leaders of all three 
SMEs had  environmental  and  ethical  sensibilities  that made  them open  to  these more,  holistic 
sustainability  concepts  and  approaches.  The  owners  all  had  a  strong  sense  of  community  that 
included a prudent environmental ethic. The educational examples, exercises, books, articles and 
seminars  used  in  this  phase  were  very  effective  in  connecting  the  opportunity  for  economic 
success to the ideals of stewardship, which to be frank, was a new concept for the leaders of all 
three firms. 
However,  it  took  less  than  three  months  for  the  owners  and management  of  each  firm  to  be 
convinced that  it was worth some of their strategic planning time to investigate the possibilities 









the  ethics  of  environmental  stewardship  and  social  responsibility  to  a  successful  business 







framework,  described  as  “Presencing,”  were  recently  published  by  Senge  (Senge  2004)  (see 
Figure  4.5).  The  seven  steps  of  Presencing  are  based  upon  a  process  of  sensing  current 






dialogue that  led to the integration of sustainability as a  strategy lens  into these  firm’s leader’s 
mentalities and commitment. One of the most important steps was the left side of the U, within 
the steps of suspending, redirecting, and letting go. Reaching the stage of “letting go” was very 
important  to  reduce  the  seduction of maintaining  the  status quo. The  right  side of  the U came 
much easier  if successful release of  the  incumbent values, objectives, procedures and measures 
of success was achieved relatively early in the process and it was done with finality. 
The success of  this  release  in  these  three cases was dependent on  the urgency of  the  financial 
situation  of  the  company.  The more  severe  the  financial  crisis ―  cash  flow  and  inability  to 
obtain capital ― the easier  it was to get  the  leaders of  the companies to suspend and let go of 
incumbent models. Traditional thinking was “if its not broken, don’t fix it.” This finding was in 
complete  agreement  with Montalvo’s  conclusions  on  the  organization  influences  that  effect  a 
firm’s willingness to change. His findings for adoption of clean technologies for manufacturing 
firms  on  the  border  of  the  USA  and  Mexico  found  that  economic  risk  and  technological 






market  or  community  network might  be  in  its  evolutionary  cycle. As will  be  seen within  the 
more  detailed  analysis  of  the  cases  and  in  the  conclusions,  the  importance  of  being  able  to 
discern when not  to conserve assets by reinvesting  in markets heading  for disruption,  is a very 
critical tool. 
During the transformation process utilized by this thesis author, the severe declines in cash flows 
and markets  in  turmoil  for  all  three  companies were  great  incentives  for  them  to make major 









changes.  Theoretical  discussions  explaining  the  urgency  of  the  situations  were  not  necessary. 
The banks and the owners felt the “whip at the back”, so there were plenty of both internal and 
external  pressures  to  induce  change. As  the  process  of  implementing  new  strategies  took  hold 
and these changes in strategy and activities occurred, it “felt good” to the managers and owners 
of the firm to have those changes in alignment with social and environmental trends, which when 
translated  into  new  customers  and markets,  reinforced  these  activities.  It  therefore  became  the 
most important objective of the initial stages of these action research projects to present fully the 
case against “business as usual.” 
Once  there was consensus by  the owners and managers  that  there were opportunities available 
from expanding their company’s vision, and that the incumbent path would not be successful, the 




the  realities  of  the  “present  state”  of  the  organization  and  realization  of  the  desired  “future 
aspirations.” (Senge 2004; Senge 2008) 
4.5  Developing a Strategic Plan from Visioning 
The  visioning  process  used  in  all  three  cases  was  based  on  a  practice  developed  by  Senge’s 
teams at the Society for Organizational Learning (SOL) (Senge 1990; Senge 1994; Senge 1999; 
Senge  2004;  Senge  2008).  Each  of  Senge’s  books  builds  on  the  theme  of  “organizational 
learning” as the most important asset a company can achieve. His work moves from developing 
the  systems  approach  for  archetypal  organizational  behaviors  in  The  Fifth  Discipline,  to  real 
world  examples  in  his  Field  book  and  Dance  of  Change,  towards  the  integration  of 
organizational  behaviors with  human  ethos  and  sustainability  in  Presence  and  The Necessary 
Revolution. 
In  Senge’s  methodology,  disciplines  are  sought  within  these  organizations  leading  to  an 
organization that learns and adapts quickly. In his first book, the Fifth Discipline (Senge 1990), 
one  of  the  most  important  disciplines  is  described  as  “personal  mastery.”  This  concept  of 
“personal  mastery”  is  very  important  and  the  concept  is  illustrated  in  the  SOL  Website, 
http://www.solonline.org/: 
This discipline of aspiration (personal mastery) involves formulating a coherent picture of 
the  results  people most  desire  to  gain  as  individuals  (their  personal  vision),  alongside  a 
realistic assessment of the current state of their lives today (their current reality). Learning 
to cultivate the tension between vision and reality  (represented in this  icon by the rubber 
band)  can  expand people’s  capacity  to make  better  choices,  and  to  achieve more of  the 
results that they have chosen. 
Within the action research process this was accomplished by having the strategic planning team 
(owners  and  key  managers)  perform  a  situational  exercise  where  the  organization’s  current 
reality is described by placing facts or perceptions about the present state in a list. The committee 
is then asked, without regard to finances or feasibility, to present what they would like to see as a 







period of  three days  in  three 2­hour  sessions  to build verisimilitude  for 
the scenarios and also to help build credibility and a learning opportunity 
for  the  action  researcher.  In  the  first  session  the  owners  and  key 
managers  are  asked  to write  on  “post­it”  notes what  they  believed  the 





these on a board and describe  them  to  the  team. All  team members are 
given  this  chance  to  relate  their  ideas.  The  action  researcher  and  the  team  then  correlate  the 
answers into related lists as trends. 
During the second day’s session, they were asked to forget yesterday and without any regard to 
feasibility,  to describe and post  their vision  for a desired future state for  their company. It  is at 
this  point,  that  the  earlier  sustainability  training  and  the  developing  lens  began  to  impact  the 










through  developing  actions  and  tactical  plans  to  move  the  company  from  its  less  desirable 




This  resulting  vision  and  the  action  plan  are  then  evaluated  via  a  more  traditional  SWOT 
analysis. 35  This  sequence  evaluates  Current  Reality  and  Future  Aspirations  within  a  more 
traditional  business  capabilities  approach.  The  important  difference  is  that  the  Sustainability 
Lens  is  integrated  into  the  visioning,  as  the  assessment  and  compliance  steps  looks  at  present 
performance  and  status  quo  plus  the  strategy  and  entrepreneurship  steps  necessary  to  move 
beyond the present into future intent and actions. At this point, if the team does not adopt a TBL 
lens for  their brainstorming and planning,  that  the action researcher must press  the agenda and 
continue  to  develop  the metaphors  allowing  integration.  The  framework  shown  in  Figure  4.6, 
attributed to the Colorado School of Mines, works quite well as a way to flow, categorize and 




assures  that  the  science,  business  and policy  environment  assumptions  are  reasonable. These 
actions are categorized as compliance driven, strategy driven or entrepreneurial. 








opportunities  of  the  incumbent  business  must  be  set  aside  to  free  the  resources  for  the 
investments  in  the  new  visions  and  activities.  This  assumes  that  such  a  creative  destruction 
strategy is appropriate as a result of the visioning exercise. 
A  part  of  the  current  reality  exercise  includes  additional  enlightenment  to  the  current 
environmental  situation and  the business,  social,  and environmental  realities  (local and global) 
that  have  promulgated  the  global  efforts  towards  sustainable  enterprise.  At  this  point  more 
examples  of  businesses  that  have become more  successful  as  a  result  of  sustainable  strategies 
may be introduced as examples. Especially important are examples within the client’s category. 
It  is  evident  from  many  sources  that  many  small  business  owners  have  never  considered 
including this broader global view of stakeholders and environmental and social circumstances 
as elements of business opportunity. Examples of current failures by  firms that did not change 
and  examples  of  firms  that  have  emerged  as  leaders  by  reaction  to  these  realities  should  be 
35  SWOT  Analysis  is  a  strategic  planning  method  used  to  evaluate  the  Strengths,  Weaknesses,  Opportunities,  and  Threats 
involved  in  a  project  or  in  a  business  venture.  It  involves  specifying  the  objective  of  the  business  venture  or  project  and 
identifying  the  internal  and  external  factors  that  are  favorable  and  unfavorable  to  achieving  that  objective.  The  technique  is 
credited to Albert Humphrey, who led a convention at Stanford University in the 1960s and 1970s using data from Fortune 500 
companies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis). 
36  Entrepreneurship  according  to Onuoha  (2007,  "Entrepreneurship" AIST  International  Journal  10:  20­32.)  is  the practice of 



























































and  is  then  filtered  through  the  Strategy  Development  Framework  as  a  SWOT  analysis.  The 
current  situation  and  future  desired  state  emerges  having  then  been  vetted  through  an 
acknowledge business framework. 
The  next  steps  in  strategy  development  analysis  comes  from  the  tool  created  by  Hart  and 
Milstein  (Hart  and  Milstein  2003),  which  further  categorizes  current  state,  future  state  and 
planned activities  into a 2x2 matrix where present and future value internal to operations of the 
enterprise, and the present and future value, external to the enterprise are categorized and can be 











actions  that must be categorized by present or  future value contribution. The critical  nature of 
this  step  cannot  be  over  emphasized. Montalvo  (Montalvo  2002)  in  his  important  analysis  of 
enterprise behaviors  towards adoption of cleaner production, clearly determined  that without a 
direct  link  to  improved  financial  performance,  transitions  to  triple­bottom­line  behaviors  are 
doomed. This is further reinforced by taking the actions categorized by the Hart­Milstein matrix 




For  example,  the  visioning  exercise  may  find  an  internal  manufacturing  process  that  is  less 
efficient  than  desired.  Improving  this  would  create  positive  internal  value  for  the  firm  per 
Hart/Milstein’s  matrix.  However,  in  this  scenario,  current  vendors  do  not  have  the  products, 
skills, or technology to produce this improvement. Therefore, a new set of vendors and suppliers 
is  sought which  have solutions  that are  “more sustainable,” and alternative  “clean and green.” 
Perhaps  as  a  result  of  these  actions,  the  innovating  firm  achieves  its  economic  goals  and  also 
receives an “award” or article describing this innovation. This advertises the success and opens a 
future path  for new customers (and also competitors)  that are also  seeking success. A network 
analysis would  indicate  that  by  taking  a  path  off  the  “status  quo” and using  the Sustainability 
Lens,  a  new  path  and  new  networks  of  stakeholders  are  created.  (Alvarez  and Barney  2007); 
(Shane 2000) 
Therefore, even though the process of “realization” (the linking of ethics and business) and the 
subsequent  visioning  exercises  are  seen  by  many  business  planners  as  “fluffy”  exercises,  by 

















will  be  utilized  to  implement  strategies  within  the  organization.  This mechanism  can  only  be 





then  it  can be assumed that  the envisioned change process will be more evolutionary  in nature 











Present­External  value:  transformation  practices  can  also  be  evolutionary.  However  these 
changes generally involved increasing the number and diversity of engaged external stakeholders 
of  the  firm.  This  sometimes  is  very  difficult  and  involves  initiation  of  discussions  with 
stakeholders  that  were  thought  of  as  adversarial  in  the  past.  Such  engagement  produces 
opportunities and information that can be utilized in marketing to increase brand value for the 
firm  or  in  certain  circumstances  to  protect  its  license  to  operate  within  a  particular  market 
network. This  is where the hard work in full realization of the present reality of the firm in the 
realm of social responsibility  is realized. For example, if a firm had been cited in the past for a 




changes of  internal policy,  increases present  internal value to the firm. One would assume that 
some  internal  operations  get  optimized  as  a  result  of  the  audit  reducing  risk  but  also  costs. 
However,  this process also changes the relationships with external stakeholders. This produces 
increases  in  present  value  external  to  the  operations  of  the  firm  as well  as  in  good will,  risk 












The  recognition and documentation of both  intention and mechanism  implies  that a  thoughtful 
consideration  and  decision­making  has  occurred,  is working,  and  the  results  are  an  intentional 
process of change. These mechanisms must be recognized at this stage in the planning process. 
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improvement  of  the  existing  path  for  the  firm  or  the  more  disruptive  revolutionary  type. 
Recognizing  an  evolutionary  mechanism  acknowledges  that  disruption  is  not  likely  via 
technological advances or  from radical changes  in political or market circumstances, and  there 
exists  a  direct  link  between  investments  in  these  present  value  activities  and  production  of 
measurable  economic  returns.  Such  analysis  “fits”  with  the  two  recognized  mechanisms  of 
innovation and entrepreneurship, “Discovery Theory and Creation Theory” proposed by Shane 
(Shane  2000)  and  Alvarez  (Alvarez  and  Barney  2007).  In  discovery  theory,  an  organization 













more  revolutionary  approach  is  necessary.  This  approach  recognizes  the  disruptive  nature  of 
anticipated  changes  and mandates  a  creative  destruction  mechanism  to  achieve  sustainability. 
Creative destruction destroys  incumbent or existing  technologies or processes and  through  this 
destruction, assets are freed for  investment  in perhaps more radical means of obtaining similar 
results. 
It  is  very  important  to  understand  the  metaphor  and  mechanism  of  creative  destruction  as  it 
relates  to  strategic  planning  (Cowen 2002). A  synthesis  of  Schumpeter  (Schumpeter  and Opie 
1934;  Schumpeter  1942),  Christensen  (Christensen  1997;  Christensen  and  Overdorf  2000; 
Christensen and Raynor 2003; Christensen, Anthony et al. 2004), and Hart (Hart 1997; Hart and 
Milstein 2003; Hart 2005), Hawken (Hawken, Lovins et al. 1999; Hawken 2007), Senge (Senge 






practices  and  perhaps  even  the  company  itself.  For  example,  an  incremental  improvement 
program  in  gasoline  powered  fuel  efficiency  for  Pick­up  Trucks  and  SUV’s,  plus  undue 
protection  from  market  and  regulatory  pressures  has  brought  GM  into  bankruptcy.  This  has 
occurred  for  GM  while  Toyota  responded  to  urgent  needs  for  greater  fuel  efficiency,  and 
developed  hybrid  electric  automobiles,  and  as  a  result  has  become  the  largest  automobile 
company in the world. GM’s focus on large vehicles and incremental improvements in efficiency 
for  those vehicles did not allow them to invest  in any real manner  in emerging technologies. It 
has  even  been  suggested  that  in  order  to  protect  the  incumbent  industry,  the  legislators  of 
Michigan,  the State where GM is  located, protected  the company  from having  to comply with 
mileage  and  safety  standards,  which  would  have  forced  the  company  to  respond  to  broader 
societal pressures. “It’s just that the scale is so large and the changes came so late in the game. 







in a “Hot, Flat,  and Crowded”  future. So  rather  than  incrementally  improve  this process,  even 
though there was a reasonable short­term return on investment (ROI) the team decided to sell off 




a  very  difficult  strategy  to  implement  (Cowen  2002).  This  is  because  most  enterprises  have
Samuel B. Moore, Erasmus University 
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become  successful  due  to  incumbent  strategies  and  behaviors,  and  have  found  it  easier  to 
incrementally  improve on what one knows well,  rather  than  to address a heretofore unproven 
behavior. Nevertheless, creative destruction as a  strategy option, has gained favor over  the  last 
30 years, primarily due to recognition of rapid technology cycles in computing, communications, 






for  sustainable behaviors. These new actions, even  if  they  threaten  incumbent activities of  the 
firm,  may  outweigh  the  perceived  benefits  anticipated  from  continuous  evolutionary  changes 
within  incumbent practices. For developers of  strategy,  the challenge  is  to  recognize when  the 
mechanism of  creative  destruction  should be  applied  and  how  to  do  it without  destroying  the 
incumbent  value  within  the  existing  firm.  As  GM  and  many  other  firms  have  learned,  the 
destruction  can  be  “creative”  within  the  strategy  influences  of  the  company  or  the  financial 




strategies  leading  to  formation  of  new  business  units,  to  realize  the  highest  future  returns. 





This business  no  longer  fit DuPont’s grand strategy of a  future based  in biotech and  nanotech 
materials science. At the time of the divestment, textile fibers represented over 20% of the total 
turnover  for  the  company.  The  planners  at DuPont  did  not  see  a mechanism  to  incrementally 
invest in the fibers business and produce the growth and value needed in a “hot, flat and crowded 
world,” so they “destroyed” that business segment  in order  to invest  in “greener” technologies. 






















It  is  important  to  note,  that  devised  strategies  and  actions  developed  using  this  process  of 










lower  costs  due  to:  depreciation  of  equipment,  reductions  in  labor,  and  reduced  operational 
overheads,  carbon  footprint  and  waste.  Such  changes  would  be  a  good  example  of  an 
evolutionary sustainable change. However projections for 5 years in the future, indicate it may be 
prudent  to  remove  the  boilers  altogether  and move  to  a  steam­less  technology because  a  new 
manufacturing  process  is  projected  to  replace  the  current  incumbent  production  process.  This 
might be radical technology that  is known as a leap­frog technology as it  leaps or bypasses the 







to plot  anticipated value production,  so  it  is possible  to anticipate what  the possible  returns on 
investment  might  be,  however,  the  Hart­Milstein  matrix  does  not  address  whether  or  not  the 
company has the competencies, assets or stakeholder support to accomplish the strategy. Within 
the  strategy  planning  flow  chart,  actions  are  envisioned,  placed  on  the  Hart­Milstein Matrix, 
viewed and examined for network implications, and a rough idea of the mechanism to be used is 
determined. 
There  remains  the  challenge  of  organizational  will  and  capability  to  produce  the  necessary 
changes.  Montalvo  describes  that  the  willingness  of  an  organization  to  adopt  innovation  in 
Figure 3.6. Montalvo (Montalvo 2002; Montalvo 2006) approaches a firm’s willingness to adopt 




firm  has  the  Physical  and  Fiscal Assets  required  and  the  capabilities  to  utilize  the  assets  and 
change. Ranking these factors provides a systematic approach to assessment of whether or not a 
particular innovation strategy can succeed. 









too early, etc.  It  is clear  that  the path towards e­books for  this firm is fraught with uncertainty; 
this is partially due to the fact that the management doing the analysis is too heavily invested in 
the  incumbent  market  to  truly  envision  the  opportunities  in  e­books.  This  is  where  the 
Sustainability Lens can offer guidance as an indicator of future trends and market conditions by 
providing  carbon  footprints  and  projections  of  paper  availability  and market  competition  from 
existing web­based media sources. The music  industry might be a great  example. As part of a 
strategy,  the  traditional  book  publisher  might  want  to  form  a  new  firm  to  explore  this  new 
delivery  route, while  continuing  to make  traditional  books,  as  the  incumbent  business  simply 
does not have the tech­staff or resources to achieve results. 
This  unique  approach  to  strategy  development was  applied  to  three  action  research  cases,  and 
this will be described in detail in the next chapter. This approach enabled delivery of a TBL lens 
induced  visions,  goals  and  objectives  to  the  firms  studied.  This  process  created  new  paths 
forward. Innovation theory indicates that entrepreneurs in SMEs can discover new opportunities 
from  this approach, because  they are well prepared  to do so, but entrepreneurs can also create 
opportunities due to travelling on a new sustainable path. 
Therefore, an intentional approach towards visioning and change mechanisms for SMEs includes 
a  broader  vision  due  to  addition  of  a  Sustainability  Lens  and  envisions  actions  that  are 
intentionally  either  an  evolution  in  current  activities  or  destruction  of  incumbent  segments  to 
make  room  for  more  revolutionary  approaches.  The  Presencing  process  (see  Figure  4.5)  ― 
leading to a traditional approach to strategy planning, resulting  in strategies categorized by the 
value  they produce and  the capabilities of  the  firm  to carry  them out ― seems very powerful. 
However  skillful  the  Presencing  and  Visioning  and  strategic  analysis  might  be,  a  firm’s 
capabilities  to  enact  such  strategies,  must  be  assessed  and  gauged,  and  a  path  forward  that 
embraces existing capabilities or creates new ones mapped out. 
In summary, the first step in the newly synthesized change process developed for insertion of a 
Sustainability Lens  into  strategy  formation  for SMEs was Presencing and Visioning  leading  to 
production of  strategies. The second step  in  the  action  research process  generates action plans 
and  activities  from  the  strategy  derived  from  the  vision  and  a  complete  understanding  of  the 






The  process  followed  during  this  research  project  post­Presencing  and  visioning,  strategy 
development,  and  action  plan  implementation, was  to  gather  data  resulting  from  those  actions 
and formally reviewing these annually, unless there was an earlier indication of success or failure 






financial  returns  can  be  measured  quickly.  For  example,  if  one  of  the  pollution  prevention 
strategies was to reduce natural gas consumption, this could me measured daily, if need be, and 
ROI calculated. If however an action was to have 8 hours per quarter of voluntary community 
service  per  employee,  several  quarters  of  data would  be  necessary  to  assess  the  value  of  this 
strategy. Therefore, an important part of the strategic plan and the research plan was to analyze 
the data that were the best indicators of progress. 
Here  is  where  the  spreadsheet  tools  of  Willard  (Willard  2002)  become  highly  useful.  His 
spreadsheet models allow for input of financial and management data which categorizes savings 
and  value  creation  (internal  and  external)  from  eco­efficiency,  organizational  behavior,  and 
innovation  and  benchmarking  over  any  standard  time  period.  This  also  can  be  accomplished 
within any standard ERP or MRP management  software as  long as the correct benchmarks are 













a  formal  report  or  a  public  “vote  of  confidence.”  Rather,  as  data  from  the  firm’s  activities 
emerges and is reviewed by the SME’s managers and owners, it is important for the researcher to 
be absolutely clear on the opinion of these stakeholders, so that the researcher may adapt the next 







transition  of  SME  towards  adoption  of  a  “Sustainability  Lens” within  their  strategic  planning 
process. In some cases, there are various battles to be fought. One may be to help the owners and 




the  networks  in  which  a  firm  operates.  The  list  can  go  on  and  on.  However,  using  the 
frameworks  and  ideas  of  Senge,  Hart,  Montalvo,  and Willard,  there  seems  that  a  reasonable 
approach  towards  addressing  any  of  these  challenges  can  be overcome. Following  the  various 
flowcharts  in  this  chapter  the  steps  of:  realization­transformation­development  of  the 
Sustainability Lens  for a particular firm, can be accomplished for  the owners of  the SMEs and 
then  for  the  management.  The  formal  incorporation  of  the  lens  and  the  effects  of  this 
incorporation and adopt can be readily measure with the tools described. 
The next several Chapters report research case where this process was implemented. Chapter 6 
describes  a  Textile  Chemical  Manufacturing  company  of  225  people  and  $75  million  in 
revenues. Chapter 7 describes  a  south­eastern  family Dairy Farm with  revenues  between  $1­2 













means  to  understand  and  resolve  the  conundrum  between  capitalistic  economic  behavior  and 
ethical  value  creation  that  includes  the  off­spring  of  all  living  things 38 .This  is  the  bias  that  I 
brought to the action research projects and I offer these cases as an apologia in the classical sense 
of  the term as a formal  justification of  the use of action research and the process of  intentional 
introduction  of  sustainability  to  create  economic,  ecological  and  social  returns.  I  sought  to  be 
fully transparent to the firms involved and now also to the audience for these cases. 
From the journal of Sam Moore, during Christmas holiday, December, 1986: 
Earlier  this month,  in my  capacity  as  research  director  for  Burlington Chemical  Company,  I 
attended  a  public  hearing  in  Raleigh,  NC. My  goal  was  to  listen  to  stakeholders  discuss  the 
impacts of textile dyeing and finishing wastewaters on Publically Owned Waste Water Treatment 
Plant (POTW) operation and learn more about the resulting aquatic toxicity impacts from these 
treated wastewaters  on  the  rivers  of  North Carolina.  NCDEM  (NC  water  authority)  provided 
their  findings  on  the  impacts  of  treated  wastewaters  on  the  biota  in  NC’s  lakes,  rivers  and 
streams. The NCDEM reports and the waste treatment plant operators comments indicated that 
it  was  their  belief  that  textile  wastes  were  causing  wastewater  plants  to  perform  below 
specifications and that the resulting aquatic toxicity must be textile related. The textile industry 
stakeholders did not agree. 
As  this  hearing  was  open  to  the  public,  various  stakeholder  groups  were  in  attendance 
representing  the  textile  industry,  along  with  environmental  groups,  individual  citizens,  and 
various individual companies. The presentations from each group that spoke were formal and, 
for  the  most  part,  more  polite  than  I  expected.  However  polite,  these  discussions  were 
contentious at times, and there was a fair amount of emotion on both sides of the issue. 
The textile industry’s stance was that it could bear no more costs for wastewater treatment. The 
trade  associations  representing  the  industry  threatened  that  if  additional  cost  burdens  were 
added,  it would affect  the ability of  the industry to remain in NC. There were implications that 
NC was already losing textile production to Mexico and that it was increasingly difficult for US 










rivers  and  lakes  who provided  examples  along with NCDEM  that  increasingly  fish  and  other 
aquatic species were being impacted. The trouble was that no one was quite sure of the source of 
the problem, but  the statistics pointed directly at  the  textile dyeing  industry, as  they produced 
over 50% of all waste water in the state treated by these facilities that were owned by the public. 
















I  felt  compelled  to  speak  to her.  I  told her  that I had heard her  statements at  the hearing  last 







making  things  that  did  not  put  the  consumer  in  a  conflict  between  buying  their  products  and 
protecting the environment. Was it necessary that highly fashionable textiles and clean and safe 




I  decided  that  night  that  perhaps  Burlington Chemical  could  be a  leader  in making  “green” 
















of  the  insights  were  common  to  all  three  cases.  Both  the  unique  and  common  lessons  are 
important. 
The  idea  of  using  sustainability  in  this  manner  has  matured  greatly  since  2000,  and  these 
concepts  are  no  longer  deemed  radical  and  beyond  the  scope  of  enterprise.  This  is  due  to 
publicized successes by larger firms such as GE, BP, NIKE, Wal­Mart and many others. I hope 
these SME cases demonstrate a new path for value creation for SMALL FIRMS as well. 
The  Burlington  Chemical  case  is  presented  first.  My  highly  personal  involvement  with  this 
company as an owner, as an employee and eventually as  the CEO, provides a unique point of 
view. Documentation of the changes that occurred within this company, and the responses using 
strategies  developed  and  applied  within  the  context  of  sustainable  development  from  2002 
through 2007, were fascinating and at the same time, also highly personal. 
The  changes  affected  on  these  companies  and  their management  are  a  clear  demonstration  of 
Schumpeterian  economic  forces  in  action.  Even  though  the  changes  were  induced  and 
accelerated by  trade policy or  the government acting as  force majeure,  the market  forces were 
brutal and the lack of adequate guidance for small firms in such turbulent circumstances remains 
lacking. These cases should shed some additional light on the subject. 
The  second  and  third  action  research  cases,  Reedy  Fork  Dairy  and  TS  Designs,  Inc.  were 
performed  in parallel  as  the work  to  salvage Burlington Chemical was ongoing. This  situation 
allowed me  to  use  the work  I was  doing  at  BCC  and  the work  I was  doing within  this  PhD 
program  to  develop  a  structured  approach  to  insertion  of  the  sustainability  lens  within  small 




are made of people  interacting  together with  both  economic  and  environmental  intentions  and 










It  was  June,  1994.  Bascom  Moore,  the  65  year  old  CEO  of  Burlington  Chemical  Company 
(BCC) was tired. It was the end of a long day. The June board meeting had just ended. The news 
from  the meeting was mostly positive. BCC was on  track  in 1994  to make record revenue and 
profits. The company was running at a very high capacity in dye and chemical manufacturing, 
the  color matching  and  development  laboratories  were  operating  seven days  a week,  and  the 
core  customer  base  of  producers  of  knit  goods,  yarn  dyeing,  socks  and  hosiery were  all  very 
strong.  The  company had  200+  employees,  a  fleet  of  trucks  for  custom distribution,  and was 
taking orders and making deliveries 24 hours a day, seven days a week. BCC had come a long 
way towards becoming a $100 million­per­year company in the last decade. 
One disturbing bit of  information however, made  its way  from  the Board member’s  television 
sets into the boardroom. It appeared likely that sometime in 1995, the US would ratify the GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) accords for global free trade. This action was coming 
less  than a year after  the adoption of  the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)  in 
1993(Duke 2009; WTO 2009). For a  small  specialty dye and chemical producer  like BCC, all 
these changes in national and international trade policies cast a mysterious shadow on the future 
because  it  was  primarily  a  regional  supplier  of  dyes  and  chemicals  for  the  American  textile 
market. Mr. Moore wondered how such governmental policies would affect his company. 
Over a 10­year period, the NAFTA and GATT trade policy accords would remove all tariffs on 
imported  textile  and  apparel  items,  placing  American  textile  manufacturers  at  a  huge 
competitive  disadvantage  with  other  NAFTA  regions  such  as  Mexico,  Central  and  South 





$14.00  per  hour  and  the  EPA,  OSHA,  and  other  regulators  were  vigilant  with  constant 
inspections and monitoring. Moore had deep concerns about how globalization would impact the 
whole  of  American  manufacturing.  He  was  puzzled  about  why  the  government  would  want 
manufacturing capacity to leave the country. 




cast  to  fully  globalize  “free  trade” and  that  the  American  textile  and  apparel manufacturing 
sector  would  no  longer  be  protected  as  an  asset  “strategic”  to  the  American  economy  or 
national security. 






























































BCC was  only a $70 million  company  in a $2.2 billion dollar US market  for  textile dyes  and 
chemicals 39 . Just as his firm had adjusted and innovated their way through the recessions of the 
1970’s  and  turned  the  environmental  regulations  of  the mid  1980’s  into  a  “green”  chemistry 
advantage  that  transformed  the  company’s  way  of  doing  business,  Moore  believed  that  BCC 
would innovate and out compete the larger global firms for their share of the US textile market. 
The company was good at  turning adversity  into competitive advantage and  their eco­efficient 
products and services were very successful. BCC could ride this out and adapt. 
To  believe  otherwise,  would  leave  the  company with  only  one option:  to  walk  away  from  the 
textile  industry, and sell  the  firm now. This was unthinkable. The Chairman had spent his  life 
building  this business and he  certainly did not want  to walk away  from 50­year old  customer 
relationships  and  a  company  that  was  clearly  growing  and  doing  so  well.  Furthermore,  he 
literally  could  not  believe  a  basic  industry  such  as  textile  and  apparel  manufacturing  would 
change quickly. Changes  in  the  textile market usually came slowly. After all,  it had  taken  this 
industry a hundred years to move from New England to the South after the Civil War (Prentice 


























required a  vote. The  vote was unanimous  to  reject  consideration  for a  sale of  the  firm at  this 
time.  The  discussions  and  the  vote  were  a  clear  indication  that  the  majority  of  Moore’s 
shareholders  agreed  that  the  company  had  a  good  future,  even  when  presented  with  a  good 




The  board  proceeded  to  put  on  record  that  they  felt  that:  a)  there  were  many  remaining 
opportunities within the  textile market; b)  the company was only a  small player  in  the overall 
market;  c)  the  non­textile  performance  chemical  group  was  growing,  and  d)  that  they  had 
confidence  in  the managers  of  the  company,  including  the new COO and  the R&D  team. The 
board concluded that BCC could overcome a downturn in the textile market. 
While the board did not express interest in selling the company, they did authorize a hedge. They 
wanted  to  see  an  expansion  of  the  non­textile  distribution  and  formulation  business  and  the 
completion of construction of the surfactants manufacturing plant. The expansion would require 
a  total  investment of over  $2 million, which would  increase  the  company debt  to around $2.5 
million dollars, a  rate  that was still  very  low  for a $70 million dollar company. Both of  these 
investments  were  solid  diversifications  beyond  the  textile  industry,  and,  if  the  pundits  were 
wrong  and  the  markets  continued  to  grow,  the  assets  could  be  used  to  support  growth  and 
expansion in textiles. 
Bascom  Moore  thought  the  board  had  acted  responsibly.  He  was  quietly  pleased  with  the 
board’s  decision  on  hedging  the  threat  to  the  business  with  the  proposed  incremental 
investments in new markets and the surfactant manufacturing plant. The proposed 10­year phase 




Mr.  Moore  and  the  board  were  wrong.  By  1998,  the  full  impacts  of  the  NAFTA  and WTO 
agreements were destroying the textile industry in America far more rapidly than was anticipated 
with  the 10­year phase  in provisions  (see Table 6.1, “US Job Losses Due to NAFTA” below). 
Even as  the BCC board was meeting  in  the  summer of 1994, many of America’s  large  textile 
firms were responding to NAFTA and the promise of  lower wage and environmental costs, by 
building manufacturing  facilities  in Mexico and shifting production out of  the USA. However, 





Cost  pressures  rapidly  influenced BCC’s  primary  customers,  the  south­eastern  knit  goods  and 
yarn producers, after passage of NAFTA and GATT. As domestic retail brands began receiving 
quotes  for  apparel  from  overseas,  there  was  immediate  price  pressure  on  US  producers  to 
compete. When  foreign  goods  began  to  show up  in  stores well  ahead  of  any  significant  tariff 
decreases, the realization of just how inexpensively foreign textiles could be produced in China 
became readily apparent. 
Commodity  production  and  niche  producers  began  to  rapidly  lose  orders  and  no  niches were 
spared. The flood of imported goods was sinking all boats. The rapid transition to foreign made 
goods  occurred  first  in  apparel  and  spread  rapidly  to  other  segments  of  the  textile  market 
including hosiery and yarns. This was a completely new phenomenon for the domestic industry. 
Domestic  producers  large  or  small,  despite  shorter  supply  chains,  faster  design/production
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With  the  loss  of  another  4,700  jobs  in May  2007,  the  U.S.  textile  and  apparel  manufacturing 
sector now has lost 1,001,100 jobs – a 65 percent loss of employment in the industry – since the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in January 1994. Despite 
these  losses,  the sector continues  to  employ 547,800 according  to data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
Breaking down the numbers, the U.S. textile  industry lost 360,600 jobs (52 percent employment 
loss)  and  the  U.S.  apparel  industry  lost  640,500  jobs  (75  percent  employment  loss)  over  this 
period. 
“The  loss  of one million  jobs  is an outrage.  It drives home the point  that  the current U.S.  trade 
policy  has  failed  and  must  be  changed  now.  An  uncontrolled  flood  of  imports,  often  heavily 













While  NAFTA  alone  caused  only  a  portion  of  the  job  losses  in  the  industry  since  1994,  its 
implementation  was  symbolic  of  a  sea  change  in  U.S.  trade  policy. With  NAFTA,  the  United 
States  either  gave  free  access  or  lowered  barriers  to  imports  of  manufactured  products  from 
Mexico, a country with an economy less than one­tenth the size of the U.S. economy. 
While Mexico with its large supply of cheap labor (pop. 102 million in 1994) could undercut U.S. 




Organization  (WTO 42 )  (WTO),  China  and  Vietnam's  accession  to  the  WTO,  and  free  trade 
agreements like those with Chile, Singapore, Morocco, the CAFTA countries. 






























































In  1999, The Bank  of America  began  to  call  all  financing  agreements  for  any  firms  engaged 
within  the  textile  supply  chain. 43  In  2000,  the  35­year  relationship  between Bank  of America 
(BOA) and BCC ended when a visit  from a young BOA banker from the corporate office gave 
BCC  45  days  to  find  a  new  bank,  even  though  no  loan  violations  had  occurred.  The  “local” 
banking officials from BOA who had been “friends and partners” to the firm during good times, 
did  not  bother  to  attend  the meeting,  as  long­standing  relationships meant  nothing  due  to  the 
depth of the crisis. 
BCC began to  lay off a few employees, something  it had never done in 50 years. BCC had to 
scramble  to  find  an  asset­based  lender,  as most  other  commercial  banks  including Wachovia, 




to  declare  bankruptcy  or  sell  off  assets,  rather  than  to  fight  to  keep  the  firm  open,  as  their 
contracts favored debtor financing in bankruptcy as a way to squeeze more interest and expenses 
from troubled firms with strong balance sheets. 
By  2000,  just  five  years  into  the  ten  year  phased  in  application  of  NAFTA  and  WTO,  the 
company had moved  from being a  leader  in  its  regional  textile business,  highly profitable and 
respected, to a company fighting for its very existence in a dying market. 
41 Spanning the period from 1986­1994 and embracing 110 countries, the Uruguay Round refers to the 8th round of multilateral 









in  this  time  of  crisis?  Could  the  firm  swiftly  develop  significant  revenues  from  non­textile 
markets,  before  it  consumed  50  year’s  of  accumulated  assets  and  goodwill?  Could  the  core 
capabilities  in  sustainability  that  had produced highly  green and differentiated products  for  the 




of BCC. The  incremental  approach  towards market  diversification,  the  strategy  applied  by  the 
board  and management  to  the  situation  from 1995  –  2000, was  not  producing  change  rapidly 






The  reality  facing  management  in  2000  was  that  the  company’s  investments  in  lean 
manufacturing and green chemistry had produced the only technology and organizational assets 
that seemed to  translate from textiles  into new markets. None of  the other manufacturing units 
and  technologies  for dyes and specific  textile chemistries was broad enough  to carry over  into 





BCC was  formed  in  1954 by Samuel Odell Rose. He  started  the  company  reselling Naphthol 




college  in 1955 with a degree  in Business Administration. Through  the efforts of  the  two men 
and their families, the company grew consistently and, in 1963, built a facility in Burlington, NC 
as a warehouse, laboratory and manufacturing site to replace its first home in the family garage. 
Over  the  years,  the  company  continued  to  expand  its  geographic market  coverage  to  include 
most  of  the  south­eastern  USA,  but  the  core  customers  through  the  mid  1980’s  remained 
44 Naphthol dyeing of cotton consisted of inserting a soluble fragment of a dye molecule into the cotton fiber and then coupling it 
within the fiber to form an insoluble dye/pigment that was entrapped. This technology was basically replaced by fiber reactive 








average  of  five  employees,  but  this  number  grew  as  new  services  were  added  including 








chemicals. These objectives were met  in an  incremental manner, and by 1983,  the  investments 
were maturing and the firm was approaching $5 million in revenues and profits remained steady. 
Newly  developed  capabilities,  services  and  product  lines  were  of  increasing  importance  to 
BCC’s growth during the period of 1980­1990. A processing plant was built for textile dyes and 
new  staff  was  hired  for  standardization  of  crude  dyes  made  in  India  and  China  into  finished 
forms for the US market. This process increased the profit margins for the dyes’ segment of the 
market by as much as 100%. The specialty surfactants and softener segment of the market also 
increased,  but  at  a  slower  rate  than  the  growth  in  dyestuffs.  For  both  textile  and  non­textile 
specialty  chemicals,  BCC  was  also  developing  applications  for  a  Solvay  peroxygen  product, 
sodium percarbonate, as an oxygen bleaching agent. 47  Within  its community,  the company was 
also a leader in supporting local and regional chemical emergency management efforts and it was 
active  in  finding  areas  of  synergy  between  environmental  policy  and  its  own  product 
development. 
One  challenge  of  critical  importance  to  BCC  and  the  textile  dyeing  and  finishing  industry  in 
North  Carolina  as  a  whole  emerged  in  the  1980s:  how  to  negotiate  escalating  wastewater 
treatment  and  litigation  costs  due  to  increasing  wastewater  regulations  and  environmental 
activist’s groups. In 1985, over 50% of all the wastewater treated in the state of NC, was created 
by  textile wet  processing  (dyeing  and  finishing  of  textiles).  The  government  and NGOs were 
adopting  a  “polluter  should  pay”  mentality  in  policy  development  and  enforcement,  and  the 











millions  of  pounds  of  percarbonate  in  excess  and  BCC  partnered  with  Solvay  to  develop  new  applications  in  textiles  and 
consumer products. Most notable of the peroxygen developments was the technical development of a consumer product concept, 
(OxyClean) which remains on the market in 2010. The concept was not pursued by BCC, after it was deemed that the costs of 






the company  intentionally  chose  to become  involved with  various  industry  stakeholder groups 
such  as  the  AATCC,  ATMI  and  IHA 48 .  These  industry  associations  were  seeking  help  from 
industry  suppliers  as  key  stakeholders  to  help  their  constituents  address  these  increasing 
pressures  from  wastewater  regulations.  The  US  EPA  and  the  North  Carolina  Division  of 
Environment were also  seeking mutually beneficial  stakeholders  to help  reduce pollution  from 
textile  operations  in  surface  waters,  as  were  NGO  groups  such  as  the  American  Canoe 
Association, Nature Conservancy and NC River Keepers. Because of  the economic  importance 
of  textiles  to  the  region,  policy  makers,  regulators,  and  NGO’s,  the  factory  owners  and  the 
general public, were all seeking resolution to the pollution issues, but they also wanted to keep a 
viable textile industry. 
BCC’s  role  in  this  process  began  by  helping  their  customers  discover  the  sources  within  the 
chemical  processes  that were  the main  causes  of  the  high  BOD  and COD  loadings,  and  high 
levels  of metals  such  as  copper  and  zinc.  This  was  accomplished  by  the R+D  group  through 
source  identification  pollution  prevention  projects  and  then  redesigning  process  chemistries  in 
dyeing  and  finishing  to  reduce  organic,  metallic,  and  nutrient  loads  within  the  processes.  By 
understanding these challenges, BCC strengthened its network connections with the market but 
also  with  environmental  stakeholders  such  as  NC  regulators  and  regional  NGOs.  Managing 
diverse  dialogues  and  stakeholder  relationships  became  even more  important  as  major  policy 
changes tightened environmental regulations. Another benefit became apparent. These chemical 
optimization  processes  also  reduced  chemical  costs  as  well  as  water  and  energy  usage  for 
customers. The  company’s  reputation  in  this  area  began  to  increase  sales  of  new products,  as 
BCC became a preferred supplier for many new customers. 
In the mid 1980’s, the State of North Carolina began a new program to “clean up” and reduce the 
impacts  of  treated  industrial  wastewater  on  the  lakes  and  rives  of  the  state.  This  was  to  be 
accomplished by adding an acute whole effluent toxicity monitoring and acute toxicity limitation 
(WET)  on  treated  wastewaters.  The  second  phase  of  this  policy­making  (1987)  was  to  set 
chronic  toxicity  limits  that  would  limit  the  impact  of  treated  wastewater  discharges  from 
POTW’s on  the  reproduction of  fish and small  crustaceans. These  final  chronic  toxicity  limits 
were 100 times more stringent than the initial acute limitations. 49 
BCC’s response to this crisis within the textile community is reported in the Journal of Cleaner 
Production  in  an  article  co­authored  by  a NC  regulator  (Larry Ausley)  and  this  thesis  author 
(Ausley  and  Moore  2004).  This  article  describes  the  technical  and  organizational  processes 
developed by BCC to respond to these policy decisions, and it also documents  the process and 
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these  new  capabilities  offered,  BCC  formed  a  new  environmental  laboratory  and  consulting 
business. 50 
The  impacts  of  these  activities  on  BCC’s  sales  and  market  share,  as  a  result  of  the 
transformational  greening  of  its  product  line  and  the  stakeholder  engagement  described  in  the 
article,  was  remarkable.  The  approach  of  first  identifying  the  toxic  chemicals  causing  the 
problems  and  then  eliminating  them  and  substituting  new,  low  toxicity  replacements,  allowed 
customers  to  pass  first  acute  and  then  chronic  toxicity  WET  environmental  standards.  By 
performing these projects for customers, BCC helped its customers, but also learned to optimize 
production chemistries and to develop safer, more efficient products. As this cleaner production 
and  process  capability  grew within BCC,  it  was  also  integrated  into  the  product  development 









Anderson  (Anderson  1998)  began  speaking  on  transformation  towards  a  “sustainable 











































1990’s until  it  produced  about 10% of  the  company  revenues. The  challenge  for  this  business 
was  that  it  produced  much  lower  profit  margins  than  the  textiles’  business  and  that  their 
successes were small  in relation to the growth in sales and profits from the textile’s operations. 












of  eco­efficiency,  diverse  stakeholder  engagement  and  intense  customer  dialogue  were 
recognized  and  utilized  throughout  the  firm.  The  management  of  the  firm  and  the  board  of 




NAFTA  and GATT were  not  temporary  restructuring  and  reallocation  of  resources  causing  a 
temporary recession; they were a fundamental destruction and globalization of an entire industry. 
Due in large part to BCC’s history, its rapid success in regional textile markets, and the fact that 
















































been  developed  and  vetted  completely  during  the  period  of  1985­2000,  and  the  company  had 
embraced it as described in the history section. In fact,  it was this thesis author’s experience in 
developing  the process of  integration of  this  lens at BCC  that was  the basis  for  the  intentional 
frameworks developed in this dissertation. 
However,  the  company  had  no  roadmap  or  expertise  for  the  degree  of  change  that  would  be 
necessary  to  reinvent  the  company  as  a  specialty  chemical  manufacturer  from  its  roots  as  a 
textile chemical company. As  the  first  step  in a systematic approach  toward  reinvention of  the 
firm, a change team was formed of key managers to develop the strategy. This team included the 
action  researcher  (this  thesis  author, who was  then  serving  as Vice President  of Research  and 
Development),  the  Chief  Operating  Officer,  the  Vice  Presidents  of  Sales  and  Marketing  for 
Performance Chemicals, Textile Chemicals and Dyes, and the CFO of the firm. 
The  first  action  of  the  Change  Team  (CT)  was  to  hire  an  organizational  behavior/change 
consultant, Dr. Edward Marshall, author of Building Trust at the Speed of Change (Marshall and 
NetLibrary Inc. 2000) to lead team meetings and to add an outside perspective to the process. Dr. 








Dr. Marshall’s  first  actions  entailed  adding  a  few other  employees  to  the CT  to  represent  non 
executive  employees’  viewpoints. Once  this  group was  vetted,  it  began with  several  day­long
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sessions  engaged  in Senge’s Present  State/Future State  analysis  (see Chapter 4). This  analysis 




BCC  to  compete  and  establish  itself  in  other  industries  as  well  as  textiles,  by  managing 
complexity  for  new  customers  in  new markets  via  green  technologies  producing  eco­efficient 
results; they also produced the mission statement shown in Figure 6.6. 
The  second  action  after  consensus was  reached  for  the  new  vision was  to  conduct  a  network 
analysis of the company’s existing markets. For the textile side of the business, this would give 




firm  had  developed  diverse  stakeholders  in  its  regional,  local  and  national  textile  market 
community.  The  complexity  and  chemistry  of  its  product  lines  and  plant  capabilities  were 
comparable with  Sandoz,  Bayer,  Ciba Giegy,  and  other  larger  international  textile  firms.  The 
challenge organizationally was how to recreate this, if possible in other markets. 
The  network  analysis  for  the  performance  chemical  (non­textile)  segment  of  the  business was 
also  enlightening.  It  indicated  a  similar  complexity  on  the  input  side  of  the  network,  but  the 
actual sales of products in the specialty surfactants performance chemicals division, were mostly 
based  on  replacing  or  prototyping  existing  market  leading  technologies.  BCC  was  not  yet 








Montalvo  (Montalvo  2002)  is  clear  that  changes  in  behavior,  in  this  case  a  change  in  the 
utilization  of  assets  from  a primary  focus  on  textile markets  towards  a  primary  or  at  least  an 
equal focus on lubricants, surfactants and toll production, can occur, if the company has the will 
and  capabilities  to  make  such  changes.  In  this  case,  there  was  a  financial  imperative  that 
demanded change. The board and the management team “recognized” this need at every monthly 
board  meeting  as  the  financial  situation  worsened  and  the  lender  applied  pressure.  The  final 
assessment of  the “will” of  the  firm would  lie  in  its  allocation of  financial  resources  into new 
business areas while “creatively” destroying the textile business. The CT recommended that the 
firm  obtain  an  outside  assessment  of  its  technical  and  human  resources  to  determine  what 
capabilities existed within the firm that could be reallocated towards new markets. 
The  board  agreed  to  a  third­party  analysis  of  the  company’s  core  physical  and  technical 
competencies  and  assets  to  determine  which  ones  could  be  leveraged  outside  of  the  textile 
market. An  international engineering consulting and marketing  firm conducted  this assessment
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The  CT,  the  lenders,  and  the  board  did  not  agree  with  the  consultant’s  recommendation  on 
expanding  the  low profit margin  distribution  business  due  to  the  high  cost  of maintaining  the 
transportation  fleet  and  the  regional  overall  decline  in  any  type  of  manufacturing  in  North 
Carolina. This idea was scrapped. 
The report provided enough incentive for the board to adopt the CT’s recommendation to launch 
an ecologically  focused  industrial  lubricants division. This  new  lubricant division would be  in 
addition  to  existing  efforts  in  performance  chemicals  and  distribution.  However,  the  division 
would be highly focused on intense customer and stakeholder dialogues to gain rapid entry and 
to build trust through its unique clean technology. 
A manager at  the VP  level and two chemists were hired. Laboratories were fitted for  lubricant 
research  and  applications.  The  technical  and  marketing  goal  for  the  division  was  to  replace 
petrol­based industrial lubricant additives with plant­based esters. The specific focus was on the 
machine  parts  fabrication  business  segment  in  the  USA,  which  was  under  heavy  pressure  to 
“green”  its  business  and  to  reduce  aquatic  and  employee  toxic  exposure.  Products  were 
developed  and  Trademarked  under  the  Luberos®  (noble  lubricant)  name,  based  on  green 
esterification  chemical  technology.  These  were  green  technologies  that  were  adapted  from 
BCC’s  intellectual  property,  and  technically,  the  products performed well  and were  viewed  as 
innovative by new customers. 
On the financial front, the board of directors was forced by lenders to hire a reorganizational or 


















































































Presentation  of  the  action  plan  to  the  board  of  directors  in  2000 was  received  grimly. Never 
before  in  the  history  of  BCC  had  such  radical  changes  in  direction  and  restructuring  been 
proposed. The Chairman retired heartbroken. Several managers in textile functions pre­emptively 
resigned. Over a period of a few weeks, the CT reduced the number of employees from 150 to 
50.  Morale  was  low  and  the  pressures  on  Performance  Chemicals  and  Luberos  were 








The  COO  of  the  firm  was  able  to  negotiate  the  sale  of  the  assets  of  the  dye  segment  of  the 
business and to arrange for the exclusive marketing rights for BCC textile chemicals to a German 
dye distributor in 2002. This allowed BCC to exit the direct sales of dyes and chemicals to the 
US  market  place,  while  retaining  the  production  poundage  of  surfactants  and  chemicals  for 
textile consumption. 
The  purchasing  firm  acquired  all  dye  inventories  and  assets  and  this  removed BCC  from  the 
textile dyes business. However, under the toll production and product development arrangement 
for  textile  chemicals,  the  gross  profit  margins  that  BCC  would  receive  for  textile  specialty 
chemical sales would be greatly reduced and for the first time in 50 years, BCC would have no 
direct sales presence in the US textile industry. 
The proceeds  from  the sale of assets went  to  the  lenders  to  reduce debt. None of  the proceeds 






























































wastewater  policies  and  the  highly  interconnected  nature  of  the  textile  industry  in  the  South­ 
eastern  USA  provided  a  good  policy  and  market  environment  for  innovations  based  in 
sustainability  during  the  1980’s.  Using  the  tools  from  Gunderson  and  Holling  (2002),  these 
policy shifts produced a circumstance where outside disruption allowed BCC to enter an r­phase 
of development and  to build assets  in  this area,  eventually  giving  them a dominate position  in 
their markets  as  a  “green”  product  producer. During  this  time  period  the  textile  industry was 
financially healthy and important enough to a large number of diverse stakeholders,  to support 












University  with  an  undergraduate  degree  in  Textile  Technology  and  have  20  years 
experience in the textile chemical industry. I also have an MBA from Duke University. The 
last  several  years  have been  the most challenging and difficult of my business  life.  I  feel 
that we have done everything we could possibly do to reorganize the company to survive 
this  force  majeure  within  the  textile  industry  and  the  manufacturing  part  of  the  US 
economy, but it seems like all our efforts were too slow. 
I am really proud of the organization we have built here and proud of the fact that this was 












an  existing  business  that  is  one  of  the  best  in  the world  at what  it  does,  into  something 
entirely  different.  Looking  back  on  the  situation,  I  think  the  only  way  this  group  of 
managers could have  stayed  together would have been  to have sold  the company back  in 
1995  and  taken  the  proceeds  and  started  an  entirely  new  company.  The  power  of 
incumbency,  the  habits  and  comfort  of  the  “good  old  days,”  and  dealing  with  all  the 
uncertainty and risky investments of a start­up situation concurrently, just does not work. It 





We have fired so many good colleagues and gotten so  little support  from customers or  the banks 
that I see little hope for success. Therefore, to save the company money and in reality because I see 
that I can make little further contribution, I have resigned. I feel that I have learned a great deal in 
these  last  few  years  as  a member  of  the CT  and  feel  I  can  apply  some  of  these  things  in  a  new 
situation. I wish everyone here good luck and hope for your success. 52 





created  to  support  them,  were  found  by  consultants  to  be  the  primary,  transportable  value­ 
proposition  and  physical  and  intellectual  assets  of  the  company.  When  these  results  were 








we were  running out of  time and money. Despite many  customer contact hours,  the education 
process  and  developing  the  value proposition  at  the  customer  and  industry  level  could  not  be 
rushed. 
Some of  the  issues we  faced were also due to globalization of  the  lubricants markets and their 




company  that  transcended  the  textile  industry.  The  new  value  proposition was  based  on  eco­ 
efficiency,  stakeholder  engagement,  and  a  perception  that  society  would  continue  to  mount 
pressure for greener manufacturing processes and cleaning products. 






customers was  slow,  success was  infrequent,  and  any  opportunity  to  interact with  any  textiles 
customers was embraced at the expense of focusing on new markets. 
This lesson speaks directly to the value of Christensen’s and Hart’s use of “creative destruction” 
as  an  intentional  change  strategy  for  incumbent  firms  that  need  to  change  (Christensen  1997; 
Hart  1997).  The  challenge  with  this  behavior  was  that  none  of  the  frameworks  used  in  the 
transformation process could forecast this outcome. We believed that the company was working 
in a  good  “sustainability  space.” Consultants  had verified our programs and  the corresponding 




tool.  It  demonstrated  clearly  that  the  reason  for BCC’s  success  in  the  textile marketplace was 
because  the  firm was ensconced within a  very strong and  responsive multi­stakeholder market 







as  hard  to  sell  twice  as  much  and  receive  a  smaller  bonus  and  less  positive  feedback  from 
customers in these new markets. However, the strategy developed by the Change Team and sales 
managers for these new divisions, and verified by the consultants, indicated that prototyping and 
low  cost  entry  products was  the  only way  to  gain  the  short  term  sales  numbers  and  create  an 
audience opportunity with the customers. Credible audiences were necessary to begin to lay the 
foundation for more specialized green chemistries for the longer term. 
The  analysis  of  the  firm’s  core  competencies  and  assets  to  determine  its  ability  and  will  to 
change and meet a new vision, which is the basis for Montalvo’s Behavior framework, provides 
an  excellent  tool  to  fully  understand  the  “how”  and  the  “what”  for  changes  in  organizational 
behaviors. This tool can help identify areas that support or detract from change activities, but it 









using  sustainability  assets  that  enabled  the  firm  to  transcend  its  vision  into  new markets. This 
sustainability lens worked except it could not provide the insights to fully enable the company to 
choose between  an  incremental  approach  of  survival,  or  a  revolutionary  (creative  destruction) 
intentional mechanism of  destruction  of  the  textile  business  and  investments  in  start­up  firms, 
markets or technologies that were in the α to r­phase of development. 
There  is a reason  for  this and it  is based in an aversion to pain. Burlington Chemical chose an 
incremental path because it was psychologically and organizationally easier for the managers and 
the  Board  to  plan  and  enact  a  more  peaceful  and  gradual  transition  than  it  was  for  them  to 
destroy what they had all built over 50 years. 
“A revolution  is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing 
embroidery:  it  cannot  be  so  refined,  so  leisurely  and  gentle,  so  temperate,  kind, 















the Reedy Fork Dairy Farm, a  third generation, 800­acre, 150 milk­cow  family  farm. He had 
taken  over  the  farm  officially  in  1998  from  his  father,  Franklin  Teague.  His  father  had 
successfully managed and grown  the Reedy  Fork  Farm  for  50  years,  starting  with  just  a  few 
acres of tobacco and had realized his dream of being recognized as a leader in dairy farming in 
NC.  Franklin,  now  in  his  mid  80’s,  still  did  some  work  at  the  farm  every  day,  but  the 
responsibility for the family's farm was George’s now, and he felt the load. 
The  heaviest  load  George  and  his  family  had  to  bear,  and  the  one  leaving  them  feeling 
overwhelmed  and  powerless,  was  how  to  prevent  the  failure  of  the  dairy  operation  due  to 
declining milk prices. George had his college degree in agriculture and a lifetime of experience 
in all aspects  of  the  farm’s  operations. However,  since  taking over  the  farm, his  profits were 
declining  year  after  year.  Even  though  production  volumes  were  up  due  to  introduction  of 
Bovine Growth Hormone (BGH), high protein feeds, and the best veterinary care possible,  the 
farm had  little  financial  cushion  left;  there was  little money  in  reserve  after  expenses  and his 





Lying on his back on  the cold ground, knuckles  raw  from working with his wrenches, George 
knew  something  had  to  change.  He  could  not  let  his  wife  continue  to  clean  houses  while  he 
worked 80 hours a week only to get further and further in debt. Land prices were increasing in 
the  piedmont  area  of  NC  and  the  subdivisions  from  Burlington  and  Gibsonville  were  getting 







The Reedy Fork Dairy Farm  has  been  in  operation  in Guilford County, NC  for  over 50  years 
supplying liquid milk to local and national markets from a herd of approximately 125 fresh cows. 



























































































Reedy F ork Farm Expenses be fore Organic T ransi tion (Year 2002). Total 
R evenue duri ng this year was $500,000. Operation loss was almost 
$100 ,000.T hi s loss  w as predicted to be on going due to  high costs  o f 












In 2003, after many discussions with George Teague and his  father about  the  farm situation,  I 






local  demands.  The  high  costs  for  ethically  based  “stewardship”  of  his  animals  and  his  land 
gained him no additional profits verses his competitors, who were not as keen stewards. (Pollan 
2007)  Many  of  his  competitors  were  working  on  rented  land  with  poor  breeding  stock  and 
running  intensive  feed  lot  operations.  These  dairymen  viewed  the  animals  and  the  land  as 
factories, not as a sacred legacy. 


































































with  this ethical dilemma  if  the  farm was making an adequate profit. Over  time, however, his 
feelings grew more pronounced and active as the financial pressures from the failing incumbent 
operations became even more intense in 2003. By 2009, George and Cherry had come to believe 
that  this  underlying  dissatisfaction  would  have  continued  to  grow  even  if  they  had  been 
profitable. 
The  underlying  discomfort  and  feelings  of  resentment  stemmed  from  the  fact  that  the 
pharmaceutical companies, the seed­chemical companies, and the milk processors were making 
all the money, while George was breaking his back for no profits. There was also no recognition 
the  quality  of  his  product  and  his  labors,  his  invisibility  to  the  ultimate  consumer. Worse,  the 












there was a  growing organic segment of  the dairy market  that  reflected  the consumer’s higher 
value and demand for higher quality for organic products. This realization was encouraging for 
George and his wife. Some organic  farmers were getting higher prices  for  their milk and were 
thriving. 




had  the core capabilities and assets  to change. Montalvo’s  framework describes Behavior as a 























I  also  had  unexpected  allies  in George’s  farm  advisors.  Ironically, George’s  “will  to  change” 
towards a more  sustainable business  strategy was amplified by  the opinions of expert  advisors 
from  North  Carolina  State  University,  the  County  Agricultural  Extension  Service,  and  the 
National  Dairy  Board,  who  continued  to  push  for  increasing  investments  in  technology  and 
scientific advances even as expenses  grew higher, prices  for commodity milk grew  lower, and 
returns dwindled. In their expert view, profits  for  the Reedy Fork Dairy could only come from 
higher  and  higher  volumes  of  milk  produced.  The  message  from  such  “traditional”  dairy 
consultants was that “price was out of his control,” so the only thing George could control was 
building  volume  by  seeking  a  greater  and  greater  “efficiency”  (more  production  per  cow)  in 
production practices. 
The more such advice George received, the more it reinforced his doubts about the modern linear 





especially  for  these  tasks,  large volumes of GMO seeds and ag­chemicals,  and  large blocks of 







Under  the  intensive  feeding system required  for ultra high production per cow,  the dairy cows 
were  fed manually  by  the  farmer  in  a  feedlot,  rather  than  allowing  the  cows  to  graze on  their 
own.  North  Carolina  has  10  months  per  year  where  the  cows  can  be  on  pasture  and  feed 
themselves,  if  the  farm  is  organized  for  this  type  of  production.  Because  grazing was  only  a 
small part of Reedy Fork’s feeding practices, George told me many times that “he was working 




During  2002­2003,  these  highly  efficient,  scientific  practices  culminated  in  the  use  of  BGH 
(Bovine  Growth  Hormone)  in  Reedy  Fork’s  herd.  BGH  was  touted  to  be  able  to  artificially 
increase the volume of milk produced per cow. However, in George’s case, it was also final step 
that took the cow from being a farm animal to being a milk factory. 
















































realized  this was  impossible  unless  he made  radical  changes  in  how  he  operated  his  farming 




































investigate  the  possibilities  of  diversification  into  some  new  crops,  post  organic  certification. 
This decision  agreed completely with our analysis of  the  internal and external  situations using 
Hart and Montalvo’s frameworks. 
These  frameworks  had  the  following  impacts:  the  ideas  of  new  crop  production  and/or  milk 
processing and cheese production, before becoming certified as an organic farm were discarded 
due to control  issues,  including marketing hurdles and infrastructures for any new vegetable or 
fruit  crop.  Farmstead  cheese  production  was  expensive  to  enter,  and  would  require 
pasteurization,  new  storage  and  processing  buildings  and  facilities,  and  the  waste  treatment 
infrastructure for whey, which was not available on the farm. 
Becoming certified organic under Hart’s analysis would provide a path that could  lead to such 
investments  and  diversification  in  the  future,  but  the  organic  certification  was  absolutely 
necessary to promote the best and highest used of the current farm assets and capabilities. 
Using  Montalvo’s  toolset  (Montalvo  2002),  a  close  investigation  of  assets,  capabilities, 



















The  business  plan  was  developed,  after  a  careful  SWOT  analysis  had  been  done,  addressing 









The  first decision was  for George  to open discussions with Organic Valley, a  national organic 
milk cooperative whose owners were farmers and milk processors. After investigation of several 
other organic farm cooperatives and franchise opportunities, this seemed to be the best fit  from 




The  Organic  Valley  Family  of  Farms  was  organized  in  1998  by  a  small  number  of  family 
farmers who shared a love of  the  land and a belief  in sustainable agriculture. Now made up of 
more  than  1400 organic  farmers  in  32  states  and  one Canadian  province,  the Organic  Valley 











Fork. This  in essence allowed George to receive payment  for his milk equal  to organic market 
prices  even  though,  by  law,  the  certification  of  his milk  and  farm  could  not be  achieved until 
after 3 years of successful organic practices. This subsidy would also help pay for the additional 
expense of buying certified organic feed and seed during the transition period. 
The  subsidy,  however,  still  left  a  large  funding  gap  that would be necessary  for  the  transition 
from  traditional  to  organic  milk  production  to  pay  for  higher  organic  feed  prices  and 
infrastructure  improvements  in pastures,  etc. This  funding  gap was covered by placing several 
acres  of  land  surrounding  a  tributary  of  the  Reedy  Fork  River  into  a  stream  conservation 
program.  This  provided  approximately  $300,000  in  cash  and  helped  to  provide  the  soil 
amendments and farm infrastructure necessary for conversion to organic. 
George was also able to establish a relationship with a supplier of organic  farm supplies,  feed, 
seed  and  nutrients.  The  firm  Lancaster  Agricultural  Products,  became  the  supplier  of  the 
“certified organic”  inputs  that were necessary  for Reedy Fork’s operations, However  since  the 
owners of  that  firm quickly  realized  that George  and his  farm were  in a  great  location  to help 
them to expand their business, they invited George and Reedy Fork Farm to become a distributor 







































































































A post change network analysis of  inputs and outputs  revealed a significant change  for Reedy 
Fork  Farm.  Inputs  and  the  suppliers  associated  with  inputs  are  down  significantly,  while  the 

























and  feels  he  is making a contribution  that  is appreciated  locally and  regionally. Many  tours of 
students and other farmers studying Reedy Fork’s transition come by every month. 
In  an  interview  in  late  2009, George  said  that  even  though  they  had  not  returned  the  farm  to 
profitability, the cash flow gap was closing and there was a clear path to the future that could be 
resolved  simply  by  getting  the  50  additional milk  cows  in  the  herd. No  longer was  there  any 
doubt about his path, his place in the world, his vision for the future or the future of the Farm. 
7.5  Lessons Learned 
At  the  initiation of  this action  research project, George Teague, owner/operator of Reedy Fork 
Farm, was practicing land and livestock stewardship, but was receiving no financial value for it. 













control over  it at all. Furthermore,  the network analysis also  showed while most of  the  inputs 
were paid out  in  local dollars,  the  final product, “milk,” was a national commodity and had no 
local  links. This made  the  family  feel  insignificant. Not only were  they  not making money on 
what  they  sold,  no  one  could  link  the  Teagues  and  their  good  stewardship  to  their  product 
because it was not identified as created locally. 
In  networking  terms, while  there was  rapid  and  continuous  feedback  from  local  and  regional 
regulatory  authorities  and  his  farm  practices  were  judged  locally  by  his  peers  and  the  NC 
Agricultural Extension services, his animal husbandry and land stewardship was invisible in the 
price  he  received  for  his  product.  This  isolation  between  the  economic  performance  of  his 
operations  and  the  quality  of  his  management  allowed  for  artificially  low  milk  prices  and  a 
disassociation with his most important stakeholders: his customers. 
Therefore,  the  sustainability  lens  that  was  applied  to  his  situation  by  a  mapping  his  business 
network  inputs  and  outputs,  indicated  a  severe  disconnection  that  could  only  be  corrected  by 
finding  a  new  market  network  where  the  value  of  his  products  could  be  reconnected  to  his 
customers. 
It  is  clear  that  connecting  and  defining  stakeholder  values,  shrinking  his market  network  back 
from a national to a regional geography, and reconnecting the farm to its customers through the 
marketing programs of Organic Valley, has created a new vitality for this business and for he and 
his  wife.  When  the  farm  went  through  its  transition  from  “traditional”  to  certified  organic 
production, a new set of skills were learned and developed. Decades of “modern scientific” farm 
practices were discarded. George developed new traffic patterns to and from the pastures for the 
cows,  which  are  still  evolving.  New  sources  of  organic  feeds  and  a  whole  new  business  of 
commercial  feed  distribution  were  developed  and  these  resulted  in  an  entirely  new  source  of 
income and a new class of customers. As of January 1, 2009, when the price for commodity milk 
was $13.30/CWT, George was receiving over $30.00/CWT. 
























healthy  prices  paid  to  organic  farmers  today  declines,  again  it  is my  projection  that  the  farm 
would  be  sold  if  the  land  values  continue  to  escalate  in  the  region.  In  short,  without  the 
sustainability  lens  and  a  commitment  to  a  structured  strategy  development  process,  this  farm 
would be out of business today. 
A  formal  educational  process  to  discern  a  foundation  and  definition  for  sustainable  enterprise 
cannot be overlooked. Sustainable Development, of course, implies a balancing of present value 
and  future  value  in  three  value­categories:  financial,  environmental,  social  responsibility.  The 
presentations of  the business case  for  sustainable enterprise are critical  in moving  feelings and 
sensibilities  into  strategy  and  actions.  In  this  case,  the  family  had  environmental  and  social 
ethics. Because  the  family  owned  the  land  and  the  common wisdom  in  rural  areas  is  that  one 
“does not piss in one’s own drinking water,” or “kill the goose that lays the golden egg,” caring 
for the land and the animals was just part of “normal” operations in this organization. What had 
been  lacking  was  the  realization  that  sustainability  does  indeed  mean  balancing  economics, 
environment and social responsibility. The owners had to realize that an imbalance in  financial 
returns was due  to a  fundamentally  flawed strategy, and even more  importantly,  it was  a  flaw 
that could be resolved. 
In  many  published  cases,  the  enterprise  studied  has  financial  success  and  is  lacking  in 
transparency  and  investment  in  social  or  environmental  stewardship.  The  enlightenment  or 
education  on  sustainability  (such  as  the  Natural  Step,  for  example)  links  environmental  and 
social stewardship and stakeholder groups to long­term innovation and a prolongation of profits. 
This case was just the opposite. The owners were doing the “right thing,” but doing it in a market 
that could not measure or pay  for  the value of  these activities  in  the price  they were paid. So, 
they had no choice but to change markets. 
7.6  Addendum: The Economics of Dairy Farming 56 
Milk  is  priced  by  the  hundredweight  (cwt)  nationally  by  the  United  States  Department  of 
Agriculture. In 2003, farmers received an average price of $12.50 per cwt, or $1.08 per gallon 
before expenses. Next year, preliminary estimates  indicate  that  the price will  rise  to $1.14 per 
gallon. 
56 Based on information from: Marcel, J., The economics of dairy farming: milk prices, Vermont Business Magazine 












put  it  in  the warehouse and wait, DiMento said. Milk has to be in a processing plant 12 to 24 
hours after  it  leaves the farm. Because of  the perishability of  the product,  the farmers have no 




Nationally,  demand  has  slackened,  and  supply  has  outpaced  demand,  DiMento  said. 
Unfortunately  for  Vermont  dairy  farmers,  the  price  is  based  on  the  national  supply/demand 
situation for milk. No regional considerations are taken into account. 
The big problem for New England dairy farmers is the consolidation of the processing industry 





fought  us  on  the  dairy  compact. We've met with  opposition  from many  of  the  processors,  but 
Dean  Foods  in  particular  has  always  been  against  our  efforts  to  increase  prices.  When  they 
bought everybody out, how much competition was  there  in  the market  for  farmer's milk? Very 
little. 

















If  milk  is  in  short  supply  nationally,  prices  rise,  Moyer  said.  And  if  it's  not  flush  nationally, 
prices plunge. Because the government's base price drives the industry; and because that price is 
set nationally, states are pitted against each other. Vermont has to compete with Western states 











The water  supply out west  is  the monkey wrench  that basically  screws  things  up, and has  for 




As  a  liquid, milk  is  generally  sold  regionally.  The  value­added  end  products  of milk,  like  ice 
cream, cheese, butter and dried milk powder, have a longer shelf life and can be sold nationally. 




which  they've  done many  times  in  the  past,  that  increase  is  a  greater  volume  than  the  entire 
output of the state of Vermont, Moyer said. A lot of that California milk gets manufactured into 
value­added  products.  You  don't  see  a  lot  of  California  cheese  and  ice  cream  here  in  the 







and  there  are  bad.  Unfortunately,  if  you  look  at  the  last  10  years,  the  good  times  are  both 
















passage  of  NAFTA  and  the  formation  of  the  WTO,  but  had  managed  to  keep  most  of  their 
employees  by  dropping  prices  and  taking  additional  jobs  printing  socks  and  shopping  bags, 
rather  than  high  end  t­shirts  and  name  brand  apparel.  However,  these  routine  sportswear 
printing  orders  from  major  US  sportswear  and  apparel  brands  were  the  foundation  of  their 
screen  printing business.  They had  seen orders  decline as  they  lost  customers,  but nothing as 
callous and drastic as this. 
This fax, which stated that a billion dollar company, would not honor its purchase orders for the 









All  of  these  factors,  however, made no  difference  in  the  larger  scheme  of  things. Despite  the 
efforts  spent  by  both  firms  over  the  last  decade  to  develop  the  “relationship  and  the 
partnership,” the reality was that the lowest price was really the only thing that mattered. And 
so, without any advance notice, all further orders and all contracts were cancelled. 
A phone  call  to  their  contacts at  the  company  yielded  little  information.  The only  explanation 
their  liaison officer offered was  that  their costs were  too high and  the supply chain was being 
moved to China. 
60 Since, more than either of the other two cases in this dissertation, TSD has used social media and the Internet to document its 




















The  Rehance®  printing  technology  produced  a  very  soft,  indestructible  print  that  customers 
liked  very  much.  Rehance  also  produced  a  large  reduction  in  toxic  material  inputs  verse 
Plastisol  (PVC)  based  printing  processes  which  were  the  industry  standard  and  contained 
phthalates and other harmful chemicals. 
The grand strategy was to improve the Rehance printing technology and get it commercialized. 
The  first actions were,  to print  the  technology on other  company’s  t­shirts  to demonstrate  the 
higher quality and unique properties of Rehance. This would get the message out about the new 
technology and  introduce  it  to consumers and the major  retail brand. The second stage of  the 
plan was for TSD go become an apparel producer,  introducing a new organic t­shirt of TSD’s 
own design with an organic cotton yarn and eventually a  local cotton  fiber  supply chain. This 
new strategy  included producing organic cotton  t­shirts  in a  local  factory and  then eventually 
sourcing locally grown cotton  to encourage  job production and reduction  in carbon footprints 
from shipping and creating local jobs and local supply networks. 
However,  this  technology and  their new green business models were only in development, and 
introducing new technologies and a new business model was slow work. TSD had expected the 
phased in tariff reduction rules of NAFTA and WTO to provide them with several more years of 
protection  for  their  incumbent  business  in  order  to  help  them  avoid  total  disruption  (Robert 
2000). The market and  the banks however, were not waiting  for  these phased  tariff  reductions 
before discounting the value of US textile manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, with this one fax, immediate change became a necessity. TSD did not have the cash 
flow  without  this major  customer,  to make  a  gradual  transition  from a  custom printer  into  a 
“green”  apparel  manufacturing  company.  TSD was  financially  leveraged  as  far  as  the  bank 
would allow and with the lack of any significant profitability since 1997, there was a real threat 









The  only  problem  was  that  Plan  B  did  not  yet  fully  exist,  because  everyone  had  thought  the 











natural  progression  to  seek  “practical”  application  advice  from  the  very  successful  screen 
printing operation just down the street. 
Eric  Henry,  the  President  of  TSD,  immediately  saw  in  this  technology  a  way  to  set  a  new 
technical paradigm for “green” screen printing apparel. Eric perceived that this technology could 
differentiate TSD from competitors and was a conversation starter for an industry that seemed to 
always be looking  for new ways to differentiate  fashion products. However,  the  first couple of 
years  of  working  together  on  this  project  proved  that  the  transformation  to  the  Rehance® 









procedures, etc., were controlled. BCC and TSD worked  together on making  the  transition  for 
Rehance from a laboratory development into a commercial product. Slowly the process began to 
be  commercialized  and  proven  at  TSD  for  apparel  screen  printing  and  garment  dyeing.  BCC 
62 See http://tsdesigns.com/about/history/ 
63 While  the patents  describe  the  technology adequately,  it  is  important  for  the reader  to understand that  the Rehance process 
turned the traditional screen printing process on its head by applying the print chemistry before  the shirt is dyed and finished, 
allowing  designs  to  emerge  during  the  dyeing  process,  much  like  instant  photography.  Traditional  textile  printers  found  it 
difficult to understand Rehance because, in traditional screen printing, putting the Plastisol ink on the apparel was the last step in 







for  the US  textile  industry  changed,  as  the  impacts  of NAFTA  and  adoption  of GATT Trade 
Accords  rocked  the  US  textile  industry.  There  was  radical  reorganization  of  the  industry 
occurring and the  industry was seeking ways to use innovation to off set  the low labor rates  in 
the developing economies where textile production was moving. TSD managed the early gradual 










Eric Henry  had a vision  that  the Rehance®  technology, with  its extraordinary  lack of material 
impact  and  low  ecological  footprint,  could  be  a  major  point  of  differentiation  for  TSD. 
Conversely,  BCC,  after  extensive  industry  trials  in  the  larger  textile  printing  market,  did  not 
believe  that Rehance  technology would  have  a major  impact on  their  financial  success  in  this 
rapidly  deteriorating  market.  Therefore,  after  five  years  of  R&D  investment  BCC  no  longer 




As  the Rehance  process was  developed during  the  period of  1996­2002,  the  decline  in TSD’s 
business was  gradual  enough  that  the  changes,  while  very  difficult,  were  evolutionary  and  in 
sync with other rates of change within the industry. The company maintained its revenues within 
margins  that  were  normal  for  the  company  (see  Figure  8.1).  TSD  managed  itself  within  the 
paradigms  of  its  historical  business  strategy  as  a  contract  screen  printer  of  textile  apparel. 
Production  in  the early 90’s consisted of  totes  socks, panty  hose and  large contract  sportswear 
and apparel accounts. 
The late 90’s saw declines begin due to the effects of NAFTA. During 2000 and 2001 there were 
declines  in  core  contract  customers  as  well  as  a  recession  during  the  aftermath  of  the  terror 
attacks  of  September  11,  2001.  The  circumstances  in  2002,  therefore,  demanded  creative 






















joining  the discussions and meetings, but  there was  no clear connection of  these efforts  to  the 
customers of his business. 
As  this  action  researcher  became  engaged  with  TSD,  first  through  the  Rehance  development 
project and finally as a strategic advisor,  the two owners’ deep ethics emerged strongly,  in  this 
thesis  author’s  assessment,  as  the  primary  guiding  forces  for  the  future of  the  company. Both 









was  lacking  was  connecting  these  investments  and  sensibilities  to  the  financial  and  market 
performance of the company. TSD needed a vision and strategy to produce the business case for 
creation  of  a  sustainable  enterprise.  This was  the  primary  role  of  the  action  researcher  in  this 
project, to help TSD find the correct sustainability lens connecting the environment and products 
of the company to its financial success. 
Furthermore,  the  abrupt  cancelation  of  orders  created  an  urgent  need  for  action  and  the 
immediate  development  of  a  new  strategic  vision  and  action  plan.  So,  after  a  brief  education 




case  in  Chapter  6  of  this  thesis),  Eric,  Tom,  and  this  thesis  author  had  many  casual  and 
eventually  structured  conversations  about  the  impact  of  sustainability  on  BCC  and  the  textile 
industry. Tom and Eric eventually asked this thesis author run an educational program for their 
managers and a few key customers to describe the concepts of “sustainable enterprise.” 
What  was  needed  was  a  new  paradigm  that  could  remove  TSD  from  the  vicious  commodity 


































After  these sessions, both Tom and Eric,  for  the first  time, began to connect  the  idea that  their 




exercises  to produce a picture of  the present  state of  the company  and  the US  textile  industry 
(Senge 1990; Senge 1999; Senge 2004). After there was clear agreement between Tom and Eric 
on  the  present  state  of  the  textile  industry  and  of  their  firm,  the  exercise  was  continued  to 

































































producer  of  screen  printing  services  could  not  save  the  company.  There  could  be  no  gradual 
evolutionary  change.  As  quickly  as  possible,  all  incumbent  operations would  have  to  be  shut 






Using Hart’s  and Milstein’s  value matrix  as  a  guide, we mapped  the  anticipated  strategy  (see 
Figure 8.4). 
Figure 8­4 Mapping the Strategy for TSD According to the Hart and Milstein Model 
Adoption  and  development  of  the  Rehance®  printing  process  for  organic,  local  and  recycled 
fibers  provided  present  internal  value  to  TSD  by  pollution  prevention,  risk  management  and 
waste  reduction  by  elimination  of  PVC  and  phthalate  as  raw materials.  This  also  produced  a 
quality  print  with  a  soft  handle  unequaled  in  the  market.  Shifting  to  an  organically  certified 
cotton increased attraction of  the products  to new LOHAS stakeholders, who became fans and 





Soon  after  that  fateful  day  in  2002,  it  was  necessary  for  the  firm  to  immediately  shed  all 







staff  were  let  go.  Creative  design  staff  were  maintained  and  educated  in  the  new  print 
technology. Within three months,  the number of employees was down to less  than 50. The sad 
reality  was  that  over  50  good  employees  were  released.  The  positive  aspects  of  this  for  the 


















print  chemistries  and materials  of  construction were  not  important.  Prints  only  had  to meet  a 
minimum quality criterion for color fastness, color intensity, and placement of print. The design 
of  the  garments,  such  as  fiber  selection,  cut  and  fit,  etc.,  was  the  customer’s  responsibility. 
TSD’s job was to print and ship. This would not be the case within the new paradigm. 
In  the  new business model, TSD would  care  about  and  be  responsible  for  all  these materials, 
















However,  the  quality  of  the  final  product was  remarkable  and  the  customers  loved  them. The 
production process and quality issues were eventually resolved by designing and manufacturing 
organic  cotton  shirts with  chemical  inputs  in  alignment with  the Rehance  process  and  having 




As  Rehance  was  introduced,  it  soon  became  clear  that  the  major­brand  customers  did  not 
appreciate, nor did they desire to develop the marketing skills to educate their customers on the 








USA. Beginning  in  2002,  he  introduced  the  new paradigm of  printed  apparel  that  did  not use 
PVC, Phthalates, or solvents at alternative energy festivals, Earth Day festivals, music festivals, 
organic  food  festivals  and  green  grocery  store  chain  events,  outdoor  retail  shows,  etc.  To 
introduce  their Rehance  t­shirt, TSD became  sponsors  at  these  events,  sold  shirts  at  booths  or 
provided  shirts  to  the  event  sponsors,  and  reached  out  to  NGOs  who  sold  t­shirts  with  poor 
environmental  profiles,  pointing  out  their  liabilities  if  their  traditional  Plastisol  printed  shirts 
were  examined  for  toxics  and  their  environmental  footprints.  Rehance  apparel  offered  an 
excellent  resolution  to  those problems with  a  product  quality  that was  readily  apparent  to  the 
consumer. 
In addition to stakeholder outreach through direct calls and “events”, the company also began to 
use  the  Internet and social media  to advertise  its  investments  in  its  facilities and community. 69 
Beginning  in 2002,  in addition to the fundamental re­tooling of  the business of TSD, they also 
developed an onsite bio­diesel production cooperative,  installed a solar power system, replaced 
water­based  toilets  with  water­less  systems,  developed  company  gardens,  and  implemented  a 
grey­water  reuse  and  rainwater  harvesting  system.  Additionally,  they  implemented  waste 
recycling systems and worked with local, social groups to employee  less fortunate members of 
the local community. (See “Banking Green” Insert). 
The shirts began  to  sell  in  lot  sizes of 200­500 per customer  to a wide diversity of customers, 
including  several  co­marketing  firms  such  as  Green  Label Apparel, 70  which  sought  TSD  as  a 
product partner.  Such  co­branding  relationships  helped  to  increase  turnover while maintaining 
the integrity of the product and the message. 
In  TSD’s  old  business  model  (pre  2002  custom  Plastisol  printing)  less  than  ten  customers 






68  The  largest  order was  provided  to NIKE, where  the  company’s  famous  trademark was  printed  using Rehance  technology. 
These shirts were placed on the shelf next to Plastisol printed shirts of the same color and design without any explanation to the 
customers.  The  test market was  deemed a  failure  by NIKE when  the  customer  did  not  recognize  the  difference without  any 
special labeling or education. It was at this time that the change team realized that we would have to educate these customers and 
that they needed to find customers who cared about the social and environmental responsibility of this product and who would 






Success  in  the  old  model  was  based  on:  efficient  purchasing  of  inks  and  printing  materials; 







help  reinforce  this  message  to  the  hundreds  of  customers  and  stakeholders  that  were 
visiting  their  production  site  each  year.  See  http://tsdesigns.com/about/virtual­map­of­ 
tsd/ and click on the solar panels to see the installation. 
They had asked  their accountant  to  take  into consideration  the current  tax rebates and 
power  purchases  from NC Greenpower 71  and  calculate  the  payback  to  justify  the  loan 










However,  after  the  two  hour  meeting  and  reviewing  the  accountant’s  numbers  and 
projections, and gaining a better  idea of how  this  linked  the company’s  facilities  to  its 









































Judging  from  an  “Assessment  of  Organizational  Capabilities”  perspective,  control  over  the 
change strategy  indicated  the  firm had  the basic  skill  set  to  run  the business  from  the printing 
process  forward  to  dyeing,  shipping  and  logistics,  but  they  lacked  expertise  in  the  garment 
production  processes.  Therefore,  new  supply  chain  partners  were  sought  to  produce  internal 
present  value  and  also  to  bring  in  new  stakeholders  into  the  company  that  would  eventually 
supply  a  “newly  defined  and  designed”  t­shirt  made  especially  for  use  of  the  Rehance 
Technology.  This  required  inventing  or  entering  new  supply  chain  networks  that  consisted  of 
other SME textile  firms. A vertical knitter with a cut and sew operation was found in NC, and 
this was a critical link towards success as production of shirts was essential if TSD was to have a 
“unique”  product  style  to  go  with  its  special  printing  and  dyeing  processes.  An  organic  yarn 
spinner was purchased from Turkey after a search of US equipment producers failed to find the 




that  had  the  environmental  and  social  ethics  necessary  to  recognize  that  there was  a  growing 
segment  of  the  population  that was  concerned  about  the  environmental  and  social  impacts  of 
textile  and  apparel  production  and  was  willing  to  pay  for  it.  The  use  of  Senge’s  Present 
State/Future State planning tools allowed the firm to find a vision. Then Hart’s matrix was used 
to connect  that new vision to anticipated financial returns  from the resulting activities. Finally, 






















In  2009,  the  company  slipped  again  into  a  slight  loss,  but  the  robustness  of  the  new business 
model had proven itself and the firm adjusted by introducing new marketing approaches and new 
products  in  locally  produced  cotton  fabrics  and  in  recycled  polyester/cotton  products.  As  the 
company  entered  2010,  it  still  faced  challenges  to  continuously  redefine  what  sustainability 
means  in terms of  its business, but  the company  is  in a much more stable situation than it was 
prior to 2002, due to its paradigm shift in vision and strategy. 
The strategy for incorporating a sustainability lens into TSD followed the flow process diagram 





burst  out  of  the  bottle.  Energy  flowed  from  frustration  built  up  from  years  of  working  with 
major­brand  customers who had  no  vision  or will  to develop  and  to  implement  a  path  toward 














Innovations  such  as  these  and  the  introduction  of  solar  and  wind  power,  a  company  garden 
complete with  a  few  chickens,  a  company  kitchen  and  a  biodiesel  production  facility  have  all 
sprung from this initiative and the energy of this company. A renewed sense of mission grew out 
of the discovery that satisfaction, efficiency and resilience all increased when dealing with like­ 
minded  customers  and  innovative  practices  that  were  ethical  as  well  as  sustainable.  Personal 
satisfaction helped salve the transition years when personal economic returns were minimal. 
Things have changed since the “good old days” of managing a few large customers. Now TSD 
partners with  hundreds  of  customers  in  a  business model  that  is  focused  on  sustainable  local 
production, and equitable supply chains. 
What began as a  line of  locally­produced, organic­cotton t­shirts has diversified into a network 
of  local,  recycled,  organic  offerings? 72  In  2008­2009  TSD  obtained  Oeko­Tex  Standard  100 
certification 73 for its organic t­shirt line, based upon verification by a third part that their products 
were free of toxic substances. Also in 2008, TSD became transparent with its social initiatives by 
endorsing  and  becoming  certified  as  a  B  Corporation. 74  It  should  be  apparent  to  anyone 















region  of NC  in  the  1900’s,  came  about  as  a  result  of  studying  other  agricultural  appellations 
such as special wine growing regions in California and France. Cotton of the Carolinas was also 
highly  influenced  by  Shuman’s  (Shuman  2006)  ideas  about  “local”  value  creation  and  what 
made viable was the intentional creation of a local network that  included the cotton farmer, the 
gin  operator,  the  yarn  spinner,  the  knitter  and  cut­sew  operation  and  TSD,  the 
printer/dyer/marketer of the final t­shirt. 
This concept for cotton became a viable concept for creation of a highly differentiated product, 





value  for  everyone  in  this  supply  chain,  connecting  people  to  products  produced  by  their 
neighbors. The idea was summarized by the slogan of “dirt to shirt” within 750 miles. 
Cotton  of  the  Carolinas  is  a  radical  departure  from  the  traditional  “trade  secret”  mentality 
concerning textile supply chains, and a significant measure of how far TSD  is willing to share 
success. From the beginning the concept was for all stakeholders within the supply chain to share 














of  the  successful  models  developed  at  TSD  for  local  cotton  production,  and  good  success  of 
other food coops in the region, Eric has  led their  local  stakeholders to embrace this concept of 
local  agriculture  jobs  creation  to  food  production.  Company  Shops  Market  COOP  is  now 
building  their  own  grocery  store  to  sell  products  from  local  farmers  within  a  cooperative 
organizational model. We  can  be  sure  that  TSD printed  products will  be  featured  at  this  new 
retail location along with local foods. 




separations  between  their  private  and  business  values.  The  ideals  and  concepts  of  balancing 
ecology, society and profitability to create abundance for as many stakeholders as possible, has 
set  them free to innovate on many  levels with many different stakeholders in all facets of  their 
lives. The TSD of 2009, while still in the textile apparel printing business, is not the same TSD 
that this thesis author began working with in 1998. The reinvention of this firm due to embracing 








about  in  small  piles  here  and  there, make  it  look  like  every  other  textile  office  in  the world. 
Numerous awards and pictures cover the walls, most of them the color green. 
However,  the most  indicative  feature of  the  office  is  a  long  strip window  that  provides  a  180 







the  greater  outdoors  and  brought  it  inside.  This  is  a  perfect  metaphor  for  how  this  company 






generally  out  in  the  mill  keeping  the  printing  presses  moving,  or  on  the  grounds  building 
something or working in the company gardens. Eric, the salesman and the green front man, was 
usually  out  with  some  group  of  stakeholders,  selling  his  vision  and  products  for  a  local, 
sustainable economy. There is also a new collection of young people, interns and new employees 
who  have  sought  out  the  opportunity  to  work  at  TSD  and  bring  their  computer  and  social 
networking skills, enabling ever further growth of their stakeholders. 








directions will motivate  this  firm  in  the  future  remains  to be seen. There are plans  to help  the 
farmers producing Cotton of  the Carolinas  to continue  to reduce  the ecological  footprint of  its 












lens  as  part  of  their  strategy  planning  process  provided  unique perspectives  and  opportunities 
that would not have been available to them without this perspective. 
Burlington Chemical was  very  successful  for 20 years by using  the  tools of greener chemistry 
and  pollution  prevention  to  manufacture  a  line  of  “green”  textile  chemicals.  As  this  core 
competency developed, the company revenues grew from six million dollars to over sixty million 
and  the  company moved  beyond  being  an  upstart,  disruptive  innovator  within  the  US  textile 
industry  into  a  more  “mature”  manufacturing  firm  with  vertical  manufacturing  and  over  200 
employees  to manage.  Assets were  accumulated  and  strong  customer  connections were made 
producing great efficiencies that translated into high profits reinforcing these behaviors. During 
this  same  period,  using  the  analysis  techniques  described  by  Holling  (Gunderson  and Holling 
2002),  it  is clear  that  the textile  industry was in a fully mature “conservation” K­phase and the 
industry,  as  a  whole,  was  doing  everything  politically  and  financially  posible  to  protect  its 
market  and  incrementally  increase  profitability.  There  was  a  very  slow  and  mature  rate  of 
technological  innovation,  productivity  increases  due  to  automation  had  flattened  and  were 
incremental,  and  therefore,  when  globalization  allowed  the  Far  East  and  Central  American 
markets gained access to the garment market  in the US and Europe through large retail brands, 
the availability of low paid garment workers disrupted incumbent markets. 
BCC’s  lack  of  ability  to  transcend  the  collapse  of  the  US  textile  industry was  due  to  a  poor 




earlier  in  the  business  cycle.  Therefore,  in  some  respects,  their  resilience within  the  domestic 




The  consequences  of  over  resilience  is  discussed  by Gunderson  and Holling  and  described  as 
“maladaptive  consequences”  to  short­term  success.  Goerner,  et  al  would  describe  it  as 
“brittleness”  (Goerner, Lietaer  et  al.  2009). My  own observations 77  after  some  time  and more 













markets  that  seemed  to  “fit”  the  business  paradigms  it  was  comfortable  with.  We  leveraged 
existing  assets;  financial,  intellectual  and  infrastructure,  to  find  incrementally  profitable  sales 
increases.  Had  the  company  sought  a  path  that  enabled  new  voices  and  an  intentional 


















by  focusing  on  industrial  chemical  and  consumer  products  thru  its  performance 
chemical sales division. Sam expanded his sphere of influence thru his participation in a 
number of  trade and  technical  associations and  technical committees. His expertise  in 
the industry was recognized and appreciated. 
This  technical  approach  expanded  over  time  into  what  we  now  know  as  the  green 
chemistry era. Emphasis on renewable resources facilitated a migration from petroleum 




role. (Interview conducted by Sam Moore, August 30, 2010) 
In planning for the future at Reedy Fork Dairy, the key insight that came from the inclusion of 
sustainability was  the understanding  that  investments  in environmental  stewardship and  ethical 
treatment of animals, areas of high cost for the dairy, must be aligned with the price paid for the 





they  could  realize  returns  from  their  investments  in  stewardship  and  good  animal  husbandry. 
This was a very radical and brave decision for the Teague family. Again, in a post analysis, the 
dairy  industry  is  fully mature and  in a Conservation K­phase cycle,  except  for  the “local” and 
“organic”  segments of  the market. Interestingly, because the speed of  transition to “organic”  is
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controlled by  government policy and  the steps  to achieve organic certification  is controlled by 
the National Organic Program, Reedy Fork Dairy is not disruptive to the incumbent market, but 
is participating in a speciality niche that will slowly roll back up the hill toward its K­phase. The 
challenge  for  Reedy  Fork  moving  forward  will  be  how  quickly  the  “organic”  dairy  niche 












challenges.  Then  we  looked  into  organic  milk  production  which  Sam  and  I  thought 
might be the best fit.  Converting the farm to Organic was the right way to go to make 
our farm sustainable and to lead us in the future. Now my son and nephew are back on 
the  farm  to  take  the  farm  to  the  next  generation.  Seeking  sustainability was  the  right 
approach for us. (Interview conducted by Sam Moore, August 29, 2010) 
For TS Designs, full adoption of sustainability and the realization that incremental improvements 
in  their Plastisol custom­printing  services would never allow  them  to compete with printers  in 




TS  Designs,  more  than  either  of  the  other  two  cases,  had  the  fewest  assets  to  cushion  its 
transition.  This  forced  adaptive  change  rapidly  and  put  them  into  the  role  as  a  disruptive 
influence  within  the  T­shirt  market.  TS  Designs  intentionally  targeted  “green”  potential 
customers  because  many  NGOs  who  espoused  sustainability,  were  selling  cheap  plastisol  T­ 
shirts that contained PVC and solvents. TSD discussed this with the industry and they knew that 
these types of products did not “walk the talk” of sustainable development. Besides they also had 
a  clear  technical  advantage with  their  printing  process  and  the  opportunity  to  reinvent  a  local 
market for cotton textiles that had, on paper at least, sustainable TBL efficiencies. Currently TSD 
continues  to  experiment  in  how  to  reinvent  the  T­shirt  market  using  sustainability  as  their 
primary strategy driver. 
In a 2010 interview, Eric Henry, the President of TSD, verified these results: 
Sam  introduced  the  idea  of  a  triple  bottom  line  or  sustainable  business model  to  our 
company  in  the  mid  1990s  when  we  were  in  the  throes  of  NAFTA,  which  was 
destroying  our  very  successful  textile  screen­printing  business  that we  had  started  in 
1977.  This  [help  with  TBL]  was  in  addition  to  the  technology  he  had  developed  at 
Burlington  Chemical  Co.  as  REHANCE  printing,  the  patented,  water­based,
Samuel B. Moore, Erasmus University 
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global  commodity  market  of  ever  cheaper  screen­printing  prices  without  this  radical 
change to our business model. In these times of Wall Street meltdowns and disasters in 
the Gulf of Mexico I think more and more people believe a business should be run on 
more  than  just  the  bottom  line.  The  realization  of  a  sustainable  strategy  has  provided 
our  company  a  path  forward.  Without  it,  we  would  not  be  here  today.  (Interview 
conducted by Sam Moore, July 29, 2010) 
In  sum,  the  diversity  of  efforts  that  arose  in  all  three  firms  from  TBL  strategies  focused  on 
profits,  people  and  planet was  really  quite  remarkable.  In  all  three  cases,  the  insertion  of  the 
sustainability  perspective  and  the  integrated  approach  to  educate,  analyze,  strategize,  and 
iteratively modify behavior within this perspective adapted to a fairly standard strategic planning 
framework, was  successful. When  important managers  and  owners  of  these  firms were  asked 
about  the  importance  of  sustainability  for  the  success  of  their  firms,  the  reply  in  all  cases 
indicated that these companies would not exist today had these efforts not been undertaken. 
Mike  Scott,  President  of  Burlington  Chemical  stated  in  a  meeting  in  2002:  “Using  our 





George Teague, manager of Reedy Fork Dairy:  “Going Organic saved  this  family  farm.  It has 
provided me a way, as the third generation of this family to put my mark on this place that I was 
never able  to do before.  I would be out of  farming  if we had not made  this decision  (from an 
interview in December of 2009). 
In  the  final chapter of  the dissertation,  this author examines,  in more detail  the answers  to  the 
research  questions  and  analyze  the  usefulness  of  the  various  frameworks  and  approaches  that 
were developed during the seven years of this research and where there is a need for additional 







medium  sized  businesses.  Since  SMEs  comprise  over  80%  of  all  global  enterprises,  it  was 
important to understand the potential results of adopting such strategies in “real world”, working 
in circumstances that are discontinuous, disruptive, and highly competitive. 
Once  some  understanding  of  how  a  sustainability  lens  might  work  and  the  business  case  for 
sustainability  was  better  understood,  it  was  the  further  objective  of  this  research  to  develop 
frameworks  to  incorporate  such  strategies  into  SMEs  in  a  normative  process  to  determine  if 















Burlington Chemical  in  the  1980’s was  the  catalyst  for  this  thesis. The  author  saw  that, when 
alignment  was  achieved  between  economic  performance,  social  and  environmental  value 
creation,  truly  impressive  efficiencies  and  innovation were  produced  throughout  the  company. 
This  experience  produced  the  realization  that  environmental  and  social  investments  were  not 
counterproductive, but  in  fact  synergistic with  financial  success. This was  the  keystone  to  this 
entire research effort. 
This researcher was also motivated to explore how SMEs and SME networks might contribute to 















However,  the  result  of  these  efforts was  action  research  into  how  to motivate SMEs  to  adopt 
intentional  strategies  for  developing  socially­  and  economically­sustainable  enterprises  and 
networks that create abundance, while remaining within the limits to growth. 






equity  is  becoming more  rightly  understood  (Capra 2002). Even  the most primitive  aboriginal 
people  know  you  do  not  “mess  your  own  nest”  and  resources  must  be  equitably  distributed, 
leaving  some  for  future  generations.  But,  at  the  heart  of  all  of  the  studies  on  how  to  create 
“sustainable enterprise” is the conundrum of the “tragedy of the commons” (Harden 1968) and, 
as more recently stated by Ostrum (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994; Ostrom 2005), 
the  “common­pool  resource  allocation  challenge,”  meaning:  how  can  equity  be  achieved  in 
managing limited resources? 
Montalvo (Montalvo 2002) summarizes the underlying issue on a final page of his book: for our 
planet,  our  economies  and  our  civilization  to  survive,  companies  have  to  consider  the  greater 
good  as well  as  the  bottom  line;  unfortunately,  evidence  suggests most  businesses  act  only  in 
response  to  short  term profit. Paraphrasing Darwin  via Theodore Sturgeon, Montalvo sees  this 
rule implicit in Darwin’s law: 
Implicit in this [Darwin’s] law was humanity. With it, the base of survival emerged, a 




species  is  manifest  suicide.  Here  is  the  essence  of  good  and  of  greed,  and  the  well 
spring of justice for all of mankind. (Montalvo 2002, p. 197). 
Many  groups  throughout  the  world  that  are  struggling  to  respond  to  this  “sustainability” 
challenge, of course, but most  focus on symptomatic  relief, not underlying business dynamics. 
Lester  Brown,  for  example,  advocates  for what  he  calls,  “Plan B”  (Brown  2003)  (more wind 
power,  eating  lower  on  the  food  chain,  etc.),  and  researchers  in  the  EU  are  calling  for 
“degrowth.” 78  Perhaps  these  efforts  will  eventually  yield  a  paradigm  shift  in  economic  and 






equity  or  prosperity  because  it  ignored  the  power  and,  indeed,  the  seduction  of  capitalism  for 
entrepreneurs who demonstrate every day how passion ignites productivity. 
In  contrast,  this  author’s  experience  at  BCC  suggests  that  SME  networks  organized  around 
Triple Bottom Line sustainability principles might provide a more effective resolution to today’s 
sustainability challenge by producing realistic but efficient human boundaries on markets. Why 
SMEs? Based on data  from  the  literature  review, SMEs  represent over 80% of all  tax­ paying 
enterprises  and  their  numbers  continue  to  grow  along  with  the  global  market  economy.  The 
literature  review  also  suggested  some  significant  differences  between  large  and  small  firms  in 
speed to innovation, ability to bring disruptive innovation into the marketplace, and the ability to 
achieve  returns on R&D  investments. This explains  the “niche”  that  smaller  firms  fill  in  local 
and regional economies. There are emerging insights from ecological science, which support the 
idea that “small is beautiful” and also critical to systemic resilience. There may simply be a size 
limitation  to  efficient  markets,  which  protects  the  commons  based  on  how  many  diverse 
connections can be maintained. 
This  author’s  additional  focus  on  building  effective  SME  stakeholder  networks  grew  out  of 
several  concepts  and  trends  he discovered  concerning SMEs’  role  in  the  global  economy,  and 
how  they  behave,  form  and  work  dynamically  within  networks  throughout  the  world.  For 
example,  thanks  to  vast  improvements  in  global  communications,  the  Internet  and  other 
technology­driven  resources  that  allow  SMEs  to  network  and  offset  certain  advantages 
traditionally held by larger firms, smaller firms have greater opportunities to compete in global 
and  local markets  than  ever  before. Consequently,  a  positive  trend  is  now emerging  of SMEs 
working together, joining in networks to produce value in a market that favors speed to market 
and  innovation  within  shorter  and  shorter  innovation  cycles.  It  is  most  heartening  to  see  the 
revitalization of local foods and production clusters of SMEs in the USA and the globalization of 
the  “Slow food” movement,  not  to  replace global supply chains  for economic  reasons, but  for 
broader social and ecological ones that are based upon deep community development issues. 
At  the  same  time,  when  it  comes  to  competing  for  resources,  small  firms  face  the  same 
competitive pressures and limits to growth as large firms, but they have to navigate an even more 




In  summary,  this  dissertation’s  premise  is:  If  SME  firms  can  consciously  recognize  the 
organizational efficiencies and strengths of joining in networks, and truly discover sustainability 
related efficiencies, their own viability and profitability will be greatly strengthened along with 
the  health of  the planet and  local  and global communities  and economies. Conversely,  if  such 
strategic  directions  and  advantages  are  not  realized,  then  the  synergistic  effects  of  efficiently 



































Inspired  by  the  growing  concern  over  the  currently  changing  dynamics  between  enterprise, 
environment  and  society,  this  author  studied  the  literature  critically  and  then  applied  an 
integration of his discoveries in the action research cases. 
The first discovery was that much of the research within the field of sustainable development and 
sustainable  enterprise  has  been  performed  only  on  large  firms. 79  The  literature  review,  for 
example,  uncovered  several  scholars who had produced  strategic  frameworks  for defining  and 
achieving sustainable enterprise using sustainable strategy development, organizational behavior, 
and change management in larger firms (Senge 1990; Montalvo 2002; Willard 2002; Hart 2005; 

















In  order  to  allow  SMEs  to  use  a  sustainability  lens  to  develop  their  own  unique  competitive 
strategies, this thesis author took the “basics” from several scholars working with large firms and 
integrated  them  into  a  more  simplified  approach  appropriate  for  SMEs who  want  to  insert  a 
sustainability lens into their strategy planning process. Over a period of five to seven years, this 
framework  was  applied  to  three  SMEs  located  in  the  piedmont  area  of  North  Carolina: 
Burlington Chemical Company,  Inc.  (a  textile chemical manufacturing company owned by  the 
author’s  family),  Reedy  Fork  Dairy  Farm,  and  TS  Designs,  Inc.,  a  contract  screen  printer  of 
apparel. 
The  research  methods  were  based  on  the  techniques  of  action  research,  a  social  science 
investigation  and  intervention method  in  which  the  bias  of  the  researcher  is  transparently  the 
“cause” for the change being induced, which is clearly known from the inception of the project 
(Argyris, Putnam et al. 1985; Argyris 2009). In honor of this need for  transparency,  this action 
researcher openly promoted  the agenda  that  incorporation of a  sustainability  lens will provide 
value to SMEs by broadening the strategy of the firms through inclusion of as many stakeholders 
as  possible  with  the  ultimate  goal  of  creating  value  and  abundance  for  as  many  of  these 
stakeholders as possible. The process applied is shown in Figure 10.1. 












economic performance  to  their  social and  environmental  investments, but none had a  laissez­ 
faire attitude towards business success at the expense of society or the environment. 
At  BCC,  the  discovery  that  low  toxicity  chemistry  could  be  translated  into  a  competitive 
advantage  (through  production  of  greener  chemistries  and  textile  dyeing  processes)  was 
recognized  as  an  important  key  to  growth within  a  healthy  US  textile market.  But,  there was 
never complete commitment at the management or board level that this could be an asset which 
could  transfer  beyond  textiles,  as  measured  by  the  capital  ventured  for  investment  for  this 
change. As  discussed  previously,  the  company  was  too  efficient  within  its market  to  change. 
Like the grand railroad companies at the dawn of the automobile age failing to see themselves as 
“transportation” companies, BCC continued  to  innovate within  the  traditional  textile dye arena 











the  disconnection  between  their  external  and  internal  investments  in  “green”  things  and  their 
incumbent  business.  Instead,  like  the  Reedy  Fork  Dairy,  it  took  a  crisis  in  their  incumbent 
markets  to  force  radical  change.  The  major  retail  brands  that  were  their  main  customers  for 
contract  screen­printing,  would  not  pay  for  sustainable  technologies  and  TSD  could  not  be  a 
global  low cost producer of  screen printed  t­shirts. This circumstance  forced TSD to  find new 
markets that were more aligned with their technologies and capabilities to survive. 
Especially  in  the  TS  Designs  and  Reedy  Fork  cases,  the  owners  already  held  personal 
sensibilities and beliefs in the positive benefits of value creation beyond maximizing short­term 
shareholder economic returns. The challenge was to redefine their philanthropy into a vision of 
profitable  changes  towards  “sustainable  enterprise.”  This  was  accomplished  though  education 
and introduction of new metaphors and business paradigms that they did not know existed or had 
not examined fully in the context of business. 
For  all  three  companies  studied,  the  initial  education  process  had  to  include  a  step  by  step 
approach  towards  linking  the  concepts  of  sustainable  enterprise  and  advancing  stakeholder 
engagement  to  produce  a  healthy  long­term  economic  return  for  the  firms.  The  difference 
between  enterprise  and  sustainable  enterprise  had  to  be  “rightly  understood”  and  described  to 
SME  owners  and managers.  There  had  to  be  a  personal  and  a  business  case  linked  together 
because SMEs more closely represent their owners than is true with larger firms However, there 
was no single metaphor or concept that would allow for breaking through existing mental models 
in all  cases.  Instead,  the  tools used  in  the  early  strategy and education sessions were a critical 
step in the process for all three cases. 
The  integration  of  Hart,  Montalvo,  and Willard’s  concepts  and  toolsets  proved  to  be  highly 
useful. As the first decade of the 21 st century ends, tools and concepts are emerging that I would 
incorporate into the toolbox. The tools for building sustainable business will continue to develop 
and  diversify,  but  in  order  for  them  to  be  useful  for  SMEs,  they  must  be  “simple  and 
straightforward”. 
Above  all,  these  useful  tools  had  to  link  improved  financial  performance  to  investments  in 
environmental and social issues. Demonstrations were given on how larger firms were achieving 
improved financial performance using the tools of Senge, Hart, Montalvo and Willard to connect 
sustainable  business  practices  to  solid  value  creation.  Eventually,  one  or  more  of  these 
frameworks always resulted in the formulation of several approaches for creating a more stable 
and profitable business. These sessions created the “A­ha” moment for all of these entrepreneurs. 







strategy  based  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  seek  balanced  returns  in  all 
investments, including ecological and social investments, is important. Teaching firms to expect 
financial  returns  from  investments  in  ecological  and  socially  responsible  activities  is  in 




All  three  firms  inherently  understood  the  value  environmental  and  social  investment  had  for 
producing  a  reputation  of  being  a  good  community  and  network  member.  Compliance  with 
regulations was  important  therefore,  and, once  the  link  to  improved business performance was 
made,  such  a  compliance  ethic  was  the  foundation  for  further  investments.  Moving  beyond 
compliance  and  including  previously  excluded  stakeholders  into  consideration  for  strategy 



























teaching  the  customers  about  the  complexity  and  importance  of  these  products.  By  finding 




the USA provided  a perfect  example of  how a  successful market  network worked. Burlington 
Chemical,  a member of  the  south­eastern  textile  network,  had  successfully  operated within  its 
boundaries  in  a  highly  efficient  manner  for  over  50  years.  Feedback  was  rapid,  producing  a 
highly  innovative and competitive  network of  textile producers  that was bounded by  the  trade 
policies of the US government and regional social and environmental regulations. This formed a 
virtuous  cycle  of  innovation  that  included  basic  labor  and  environmental  protections  via 
regulations,  which  in  turn  produced  repercussive  effects,  both  positive  and  negative,  when  a 







to  relate  the  concepts  of  network  science  (Hopkins  and Wallerstein  1996;  Strogatz  and Watts 
1998; Strogatz 2001; Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2003; Strogatz 2003; Watts 2003; Rogers 2004; 
Wheeler, Mckague et al. 2005; Goerner, Dyck et al. 2008) to small business networks. However, 
it  is  clear  from  all  three  case  studies  that  recognition  of  the  importance  of  networking  and  an 
intentional process to analyze and select  the appropriate network  is a  significant new tool. The 
cases  clearly demonstrate  that mapping stakeholder networks provides  significant  insights  into 
the diversity of a firm’s network and its opportunities for improvement. 
The most important issues remaining unresolved after this research concern the effects that size, 
structure, complexity and  types of boundaries  have on an SME’s behavior and  its  relationship 
with  its  stakeholder  network.  For  example,  while  it  seems  clear  that  SMEs  tend  to  be  more 
responsive  and  innovative  because  smaller  and  more  interconnected  networks  tend  to  create 












the  Organic  Milk  network  run  into  one  of  its  fences  (accidently  violates  a  rule),  then  the 
feedback is likely to be rapid and firm; the SME learns not to do that again because it has a direct 
impact  on  its  own  and  the  network’s  value  proposition.  “Sustainability”  boundaries  create 
particularly powerful  incentives for “self­modifying” behavior while simultaneously supporting 





the  large consumer brands, TSD was continually  being bombarded with detailed contracts  that 






form of  international  regulations  for environmental and social performance  that  set  the critical 
boundaries to provide a uniform operational ethic that is equitable. 
Network mapping  allowed  the  use  of Hart’s Matrix  for  sustainable  value  creation  (see Figure 
10.3)  and  helped  all  three  firms  to  recognize  how  important  a  diversity  of  stakeholders  is  in 
launching  into  a  vision  that  envelops  sustainability.  In  all  three  cases  regulations  and  quality 
principles were a norm of behavior for each business. This meant that pollution prevention and 
































of  the  SME  will  expand.  If  we  are  to  avoid  the  multitude  of  problems  that  arise  from  an 
economic model based on value by scarcity, then creation of value for SMEs through realization 
of  business  as  an  “infinite  game”  can  only  be  realized  through  adoption  of  sustainability  as  a 
major synergy within business networks. Sustainability, as a common strategy,  is an imperative 
if  SMEs  are  to  survive  and  provide  economic  stability  within  the  markets  of  the  world.  As 




All  of  the modern media  and  social  networking, which  continue  to  improve  both  in  numbers 
connected and the bandwidth of the communication, will also speed this transition. As the cases 
have  shown, most  firms  should  benefit  in  some way  from  including  a  sustainability  lens  into 








The  cases  indicate  that  utilization  of  the  paradigm  of  sustainable  enterprise  produces  highly 
positive results both for internal and external operations of the SME. For adopting SMEs, the act 
of  incorporation  produces  new  competencies  in  eco­efficiency,  stakeholder  communication, 
























Once  the  conversion  was  achieved,  using  the  tools  of  Hart,  Montalvo,  and Willard  within  a 













was clear  that  the owners must be intrigued, and then the will  to change had to be engaged by 
linking financial value creation to investments in sustainability, and then the whole process must 
be  reinforced  through  success.  Effective  policy  and  consumer  recognized,  third­party  quality 
certifications were also helpful. 
When the system failed to produce ready success in the transformation of Burlington Chemical 
from  a  general  textile  chemical  company  into  a  specialty  green  surfactants  and  lubricants 


























There  is  an  excellent  opportunity  for  future  research  to  explore  how  sustainable  SME 


















corporation  is  to  “create  the  customer  through  innovation  and  marketing”  (Drucker  1954). 






ever  emerge  from  their  “underclass”  status.  However,  as  with  all  major  economic  shifts, 
globalization has had unintended consequences beyond lowering the price for consumer goods in 
the  West.  Whole  sections  of  the  USA  have  been  deserted  as  steel,  textiles  and  automotive 
industries have moved to chase lower costs. Communities are disrupted and destroyed. Are the 
costs  and  the  loss  of  regional  enterprises  and  their  tax  base  truly  reflected  in  the  economic 
balance sheets of our communities ― or only  in  the profit  and  loss  statements of global  firms 




These  last  seven  years  of  research  and  effort  suggest,  as  environmental  and  social  norms  are 
threatened,  consumers  will  react  to  create  opportunities  for  firms  that  will  protect  the 
opportunities for generations to come. The consumer  is very powerful, more powerful  than the 
media gives it credit for. Having the opportunity to work with large multinational firms through 
York University’s  “sustainable  enterprise  academy” while  also working with  these  three SME 
firms,  has  shown me  that  there  is  passion  for  sustainability  at  both  ends  of  the  size  spectrum. 
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Abstract
The textile industry led the world into the industrial revolution and is leading the movement towards global manufacturing.
During the period of 1980–1995, the textile industry in the United States was flourishing. It was during these times, that increased
regulatory pressures initiated aquatic toxicity testing of wastewater discharges from publicly owned treatment works. Resolution of
problems identified by these tests required the development of new toxicity assessment tools, and the use of systems thinking and
community/industry/regulator dialogues. The case for the beneficial use of these tools is presented as an example of how to increase
productivity through greener (environmentally conservative) production induced by cooperative stakeholder actions.
 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since the 1995 passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreements (NAFTA) and the increase of glo-
balization, much of the United States textile industry has
moved to other regions of the world. From 1996 to 2001,
over 500,000 textile jobs have been eliminated from the
USA, and 414 textile plants have closed. [1] The econ-
omic impacts on the textile producing regions have been
great, as these communities try to adapt to the loss of
their traditional industry. The losses include factories
that performed the textile processes of dyeing and fin-
ishing i.e., wet processing of textiles. This has reduced
the importance and the burden of textile wet processing
wastewaters on public wastewater treatment systems in
the USA. Consequently, environmental research on tex-
tile wastewater problems has also been declining dra-
matically.
The decline of visibility of the environmental impacts
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 800 672 5888; fax: +1 336 584
3548.
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of dyeing and finishing processes, due to the movement
of this industrial segment from the developed world to
less regulated regions should not lead to the assumption
that these problems do not continue. It is important for
textile producers, and the communities in which they
operate to understand the aquatic toxicity problems asso-
ciated with traditional textile wastewater. It is also essen-
tial to understand that solutions to many of these prob-
lems were found and developed as a result of regulatory
pressures and industry conditions that existed in the US,
Europe, and Japan prior to globalization.
This paper provides a general description of textile
wet processes and the details of a cleaner production
framework developed to reduce the aquatic toxicity and
environmental effects of textile chemicals in the south-
eastern USA. Particular emphasis is placed on the situ-
ation in the State of North Carolina from 1980 to 1995.
It offers evidence of how the application of the principles
of dialogue and systems thinking provides a win-win
situation for both the ‘textile production chain’ and cor-
porate stakeholders. Throughout this paper, systems dia-
grams are used to describe the importance or usefulness
of systems thinking towards the resolution of these
problems.
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Fig. 1. Textile Production. Textile production is based on the conver-
sion of polymers, natural or synthetic, first into fiber and then into
bundles of fibers called yarn. Yarn is then converted into fabrics, a
largely two-dimensional surface, where it is used for apparel, indus-
trial, home furnishings and many other uses.
2. Textiles and the environment
Industrial development is one approach to increasing
the quality of life in densely populated, less developed
regions of the world. The potential benefits of develop-
ment can be greater prosperity, followed by better health,
and lower birth rates. However, many choose to disre-
gard the darker side of industrial development: pollution
caused by ignoring the principles of cleaner production.
The business of the textile industry is production of
value-added products from fiber, often through intensive
hand labor (Fig. 1). High labor costs in the USA have
led to the transfer of the textile industry into the less
industrially developed regions of the world, where less
expensive labor and less stringent enforcement of
environmental regulations results in lower production
costs, at least in the short-term.
Fiber sources can be petroleum hydrocarbons
(synthetic, non-renewable) or agricultural (natural,
renewable). Fig. 2 lists many of the known textile fibers.
Fig. 2. Common Textile Fibers. These are the fibers that are utilized
in textile production. The ‘natural’ fibers are derived from vegetable
or animal sources and the ‘synthetics’ are man-made organic polymers,
most from petroleum sources. The synthetic fibers are mostly named
after the predominate chemistry of the polymer from which they are
made.
“Textiles and their end products constitute the world’s
second largest industry, ranking only below food pro-
ducts. At least 10% of the world’s productive energies
are devoted to this activity and a huge segment of the
global population earns it living and obtains its creative
satisfaction from the same source” [2]. Industries includ-
ing retail apparel marketing, construction, agriculture,
machine tools, automobiles, petrochemical, carpet, and
recreation all rely upon the textile manufacturing indus-
try for raw materials.
Wet processing is the segment of the textile pro-
duction that involves cleaning, bleaching, dyeing and
finishing of textile fibers and yarns in aqueous solutions.
Most fabrics, regardless of their end use, go through one
or all of these wet-processing steps. There is a detailed
description of the steps employed in traditional wet pro-
cessing in Section 3. Wet processing is different from
fiber forming and fabric forming systems, which are
‘dry’ processes that do not use water as a major pro-
cessing compound.
Wet processing is an ancient craft that was automated
during the industrial revolution. Modern dyeing and fin-
ishing facilities are highly mechanized and capable of
producing millions of yards of fabrics per year. Despite
over 100 years of process improvements, the prep-
aration, dyeing, and finishing of textiles continues to util-
ize large volumes of pure, clean water.
Chemicals are added to perform a variety of functions
during wet processing, however, these chemicals pro-
duce large volumes of toxic wastewater as a by-product.
Textile process wastewater must be treated before it can
be released safely into rivers, streams, and lakes. There-
fore, the movement of the textile industry into largely
under developed regions of the world with inadequate
waste treatment presents the opportunity for large-scale
negative environmental impact.
Because of the complexity of textile wastewater,
waste treatment plant operators are faced with difficult
challenges to produce clean, non-toxic effluents. They
must treat and remove broad classes of wet processing
wastes, including surfactants, dyes, pigments, resins,
chelating agents, dispersing agents, inorganic salts, etc.
Many of these chemicals are complex organic molecules
with long commercial histories [3]. A listing of the dyes,
pigments and chemicals used in textile wet processing
can be found in the Annual Buyers Guide, published
yearly by the American Association of Textile Chemists
and Colorists. Over 1000 dyes and chemicals are listed
in the Guide for the year 2001 [4].
A typical wet processing facility has a drainage sys-
tem that transports wastewater from the wet processing
facility (dye house) into a collection basin that equalizes
pH and flow. The water flows from this collection (or
equalization) basin to chemical and biological waste-
water treatment facilities. There is little segregation of
waste streams within the textile manufacturing oper-
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ation; therefore, the wastewater contains intermingled
chemicals from the preparation, dyeing, and finishing
steps. The composition of the wastewater is not the same
day-to-day or even hour-to-hour, for it is completely pro-
duction-dependent. See Fig. 3 for a typical schematic.
The textile wastewater treated by North Carolina’s
publicly owned waste treatment plants, (POTWs) from
1980 to 1995 was a mixture of wastewater from both
batch and continuous wet processing. Waste was present
from all three textile wet processes: preparation, dyeing
and finishing. Cotton was the single largest type of fiber
processed by volume, but all fiber types were rep-
resented. The chemical composition of the wastewater
was dependent on fiber and fabric type, dye types, and
finishing materials used.
Current trends indicate that the US textile industry is
moving into the Far East, South America and Africa.
Lower labor costs in those regions are important in low
cost textile production. These regions commonly lack
extensive industrial wastewater treatment infrastructure.
3. A textile wet processing primer
Wet processing methods have not changed much since
ancient times. Water is used to clean, dye and apply
chemical finishes to fabrics, and to rinse the treated fib-
ers or fabrics.
An explanation of the preparation, dyeing, finishing
and rinsing steps follows:
Preparation is the step where unwanted impurities,
either natural or man-made, are removed from the fabric
prior to dyeing. The fabric may simply be cleaned with
aqueous alkaline substances and detergent, or impurities
may be removed with enzymes. Many fabrics are then
bleached with hydrogen peroxide or chlorine-containing
compounds to whiten them. Optical brightening agents
Fig. 3. A “typical” flow diagram through a Textile Mill. Wastewater
is generated by the processes of dyeing and finishing, collected via a
piped collection system to a basin, where it can be pretreated before
discharging to a treatment system. Generally, testing of the wastewater
for regulatory purposes is done after treatment and before discharging
to the environment.
are often added if the fabrics are to be sold white rather
than dyed.
Dyeing is the aqueous application of color, mostly with
synthetic organic dyes, to fiber, yarn or fabric. In this
process, dye and auxiliary processing chemicals are
introduced to the textile to obtain a uniform depth of
coloration with color fastness properties suitable to the
end use. Different fastness requirements may apply
depending on the intended end use of the textile.
Examples might include swimsuits that must not bleed
in water and automotive fabrics that should not fade fol-
lowing prolonged exposure to sunlight. Different types
of dyes and chemical additives are used to obtain these
properties.
Dyes can be applied to textiles by various forms of
continuous pad applications, or exhaust dyed in batch
processing equipment. Knit fabrics are dyed by exhaust
techniques in batch equipment and woven fabrics are
most often dyed continuously.
While there is renewed interest in rediscovering and
improving vegetable-based dyeing of fabrics, vegetable
dyes are not an important factor in the world’s textile
market. All essential classes of textile dyes are made
from petroleum sources. In fact, textile dyes were the
first important class of synthetic organic chemicals and
were the prototypes of the modern industrial chemical
complex.
Finishing involves application of chemical treatments to
enhance the value of the fabric. Permanent press treat-
ments, waterproofing, softening, antistatic protection,
soil resistance, stain release, and microbial/fungal pro-
tection are all examples of fabric treatments applied in
finishing.
Preparation, dyeing and finishing can all occur as
either continuous or batch processes. In continuous pro-
cessing, heat and steam are applied to long rolls of fabric
through a series of concentrated chemical solutions. The
fabric, in the dyeing and finishing steps, retains the
majority of the chemicals while rinsing removes most
of the preparation chemicals. Each time fabric is drawn
through the solutions; an amount of water equivalent to
the weight of the fabric must be used. See Fig. 4 for an
example of a continuous dyeing range.
In batch processing, a ‘batch’ or roll of fabric, is pro-
cessed in the presence of diluted chemicals in a closed
machine such as a kier, kettle, beam, jet, or beck. See
Fig. 5 for an example of a jet batch dye machine. Rather
than being drawn through various baths through a long
series of equipment segments, fabric stays on one piece
of machinery, which is alternately filled with and drained
of water at each step in the process. Each time the fabric
is exposed to a separate bath, it uses five to ten times
the fabric’s weight in water. Batch processing a
polyester/knit fabric uses a minimum of six machine
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Fig. 4. Continuous Processing of Textile Fabrics. In continuous dyeing and finishing, the fabric is pulled through various processes or chemical
treatments from the beginning, to the end. The fabric begins on a roll as un-dyed fabric and a roll of dyed fabric is the result. These production
lines run ‘continuously’ as there is no starting and stopping of the process.
Fig. 5. Batch Processing Dyeing Machine. In batch processing, the undyed fabric is loaded into the dye machine, sewn together and a loop is
created. The machine is then filled with water and various chemicals and the fabric loop is processed as a ‘batch’. The dyeing process has a
beginning and an end to the cycle.
loads of water for each of the following steps: prep-
aration, rinses, dye, soap, rinse, and finish.
Wet processing of textiles, whether continuous or
batch, produces large volumes of chemical-laden waste-
water that became important sources of problems as
regulators began to focus on industrial activity as a point
source of pollutants.
4. Markets and environmental pressures stimulate
change
The period of 1985–1995 was one of profitable growth
and investment for US textile wet-processors [5]. See
Fig. 6 for Gross Domestic Production information from
1987 to 2000. It was also a period of refinement and
focus on the environmental effects of textile wastewaters
by environmental regulatory authorities [6]. Regulatory
actions in the United States that directly affected textile
processing were driven by two stages of regulatory con-
trol. The earliest regulations dealt with reduction of ‘con-
ventional’ pollutants and forced reductions of waste-
water solids and loads of oxygen-demanding substances.
Fig. 6. Textiles, The GNP Contribution from 1987–2000. The North
American Trade Agreements (NAFTA) and the formation of the WTO
in 1994–1995 began the decline of the US textile market. Since 1995,
over 400,000 textile jobs have been lost to globalization and over 60%
of the US textile mills have closed.
The second stage, initiated by 1972 amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, focused on toxic
substances. For the textile industry, specific regulatory
controls on chlorine discharge (bleaches) and on whole
effluent toxicity played particularly significant roles in
treatment strategies. Further discussion of whole effluent
toxicity measurements as a primary driver towards cle-
aner textile production can be found in Section 5.1.
This climate of mutual gain and the nature of WET
testing produced novel solutions to the environmental
problems created by wet processing operations. It
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encouraged the development of new wet processing
equipment that reduced the amount of water required to
process fabrics, thereby reducing the volume of waste-
water and production costs. Pollution control and man-
agement systems emerged from formalized quality con-
trol programs such as ISO 9000. Rather than applying
the historical treatment-based approaches to wastewater,
these new tools were designed to prevent environmental
problems through pollution prevention and waste minim-
ization, i.e., greener and more efficient production. The
movement of regulations towards meaningful perform-
ance based standards, whole effluent toxicity, as opposed
to less meaningful concentration limits demanded that
the whole system of industrial production and efficient
waste treatment be examined as a system, rather than as
isolated unit processes [6–8].
In summary, increased regulatory pressures made
older, inefficient textile processes and non-optimized
chemical systems both less profitable and more suscep-
tible to environmental enforcement [9]. It was this com-
bination of a profitable business climate and increased
regulatory pressures that created an atmosphere wherein
environmental investments were encouraged, mandated,
and seen as a good investment by a sound and profit-
able industry.
4.1. Whole effluent toxicity
The aquatic toxicity of effluents from textile-wet pro-
cesses was a major focus of regional pollution reduction
efforts by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA), especially in the southeastern US in
the state of North Carolina.
North Carolina was one of the first states in the US
to require whole effluent aquatic toxicity testing (WET)
of all complex waste treatment systems discharging into
its surface waters. A good explanation of the use and
methods of aquatic toxicity testing can be found in a
document published in 2001 by the North Carolina
Division of Water Quality [10].
The initial results of this new WET testing indicated
that on-site waste treatment plants handling significant
volumes of textile wet process wastewater produced
toxic effluents that were difficult to treat in municipal
biological waste treatment plants. Initially, identification
of the toxicants in these effluents was very complex, as
was determining their source(s).
Predictably, when new regulations were implemented,
many stakeholder disputes developed around WET
issues. Some were technical arguments concerning the
validity of the tests, but many were related to how to
address the root causes of the toxicity. Resolution of
these disputes required communities, textile companies,
universities, and regulators to adopt new ways of view-
ing and negotiating resolutions. Good sources of infor-
mation on the resolution of technical issues and conflicts
on WET can be found in the Codification of the Federal
Register, [11] USEPA documents, [12] and Ausley et
al., [13]. These approaches describe a process by which
careful and deliberate investigation of the causes, as well
as resolution of toxicity by the discharger are rewarded
by short-term enforcement relief so that expenses can be
applied to problem solving rather than punitive fines.
The disputes were based in arguments that considered
nuances in the scientific relevance of WET methods and
the validity of WET results verses concentration-based
limits for permitting purposes. These issues were com-
plex, but the scientific validity of WET methods was
gradually proven by improvement in water quality. WET
analyses, tests based on observed biological response,
provided a more realistic prediction of toxicant avail-
ability than did conventional regulation of single chemi-
cal compounds. The question that was answered by the
WET methods was: “What is the impact of this effluent
on the life in this water body?” rather than “Was the
concentration of a particular pollutant above or below a
numerical limit?”.
In the mid 1980’s, whole effluent toxicity testing of
NPDES (direct wastewater discharge) permittees in
North Carolina indicated that 25% of facilities tested
were discharging wastewater predicted acutely toxic at
in-stream dilutions [14]. In 1987, North Carolina began
placing whole effluent toxicity limits in NPDES dis-
charge permits of all facilities with complex waste
streams. Compliance with these limits, even using the
more sensitive sub-lethal chronic endpoint of repro-
duction of Ceriodaphnia dubia, continued to improve
over the next decade, to the point of current compliance
rates that routinely exceed 95% of discharges tested (NC
Division of Water Quality, unpublished data).
It is essential to understand the impetus for resolving
the technical and regulatory disputes concerning WET
methods. Resolution occurred because both the textile
industry and the local environment were important to the
community, and success or failure would impact each
stakeholder. This is the central lesson that was learned.
If any of the stakeholders had become disenfranchised
with either the environmental compliance issues or the
importance of a viable textile industry, the favorable
result gained by the win-win consensus-based process
would not have transpired [15]. Further insight into the
regulatory climate can be found in Appendix A.
5. Systems thinking
During the period of 1980–1995, regulatory, market-
ing, and testing changes in textiles were concurrent with
the development of the social disciplines of systems
thinking and win-win consensus negotiation on environ-
mental matters. Systems thinking is described by Senge
[16] and applied to sustainable industrial development
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by Laur and Schley [17]. By systems thinking, Senge
means a discipline for seeing the ‘structures’ that under-
lie complex situations and discerning high from low
leverage change. Systems Thinking is the shifting of a
mindset from seeing parts to seeing wholes, from seeing
people as helpless reactors to seeing them as active parti-
cipants in shaping their reality. This was a particularly
effective approach to solving aquatic toxicity problems
because there was very little data to indicate a linear
relationship between removal of traditional pollutants
and reduction in aquatic toxicity.
The ‘Limits to Success’ systems diagram depicted in
Fig. 8 are derived from the work of Senge, Laur, Schley,
and Kim [16–18]. They describe the system mechanisms
proposed for more sustainable development. A complete
description of systems diagramming can be found in
Senge’s and Kim’s work [16,18] but in brief, its purpose
is to illustrate non-linear relationships in complex sys-
tems. It is clear from Fig. 8 that reduction of the volume
and toxicity of textile wastes reduces the impact of pol-
lution, which, in turn, enhances the benefits of industrial
activity to a community or society [17].
Whole effluent toxicity testing measured the impact
of treated wastewater on the biota of a receiving body
of water, not a subjective concentration of a single pol-
lutant. Thus, a direct correlation between the pollutant
concentration and stream health was not possible.
Aquatic toxicity was found to be a problem that was a
sum of the effects of all the pollutants in a waste stream.
This understanding promoted the application of systems
thinking to the industrial processes that created the prob-
lem, rather than an end of pipe engineering solution,
because the removal of one or two pollutants may not
reduce the toxicity.
Susskind and Ury also describe consensual, dialogue-
based, approaches to negotiating environmental disputes.
These ideas also adapted and included the principals of
systems thinking [15,19,20]. Such consensual problem
solving approaches are characterized by envisioning fav-
orable future outcomes that benefit all the stakeholders
in a given situation. If stakeholders are identified and
their interests pooled into a resolution for a given dis-
pute, the outcome is more satisfactory for everyone
involved.
This combination of a dialogue-based approach to
problem solving and systems thinking applied to the
problems of toxicity reduction helped both textile manu-
facturers and their stakeholders make improvements in
the following ways.
 Greater stakeholder involvement including communi-
ties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regu-
lators, and industries. All were involved in resolution
of environmental problems so that the ‘whole picture’
was clear to every stakeholder.
 This created resolutions to disputes that were win-
win, with every stakeholder making some progress
toward their objectives.
 Non-systematic, knee jerk reactions to problems were
minimized, allowing high leverage changes in process
and systems to be made.
6. Process consultation
Some important new organizational tools resulted
from this process of resolving the aquatic toxicity issues:
 The development of a formalized, dialogue-based
communication process that involved members of
local communities, regulators at the local, state and
federal levels, textile company leaders, and their sup-
pliers.
 The application of the principals of systems thinking
to analyze issues and clarify areas of dispute and of
agreement. These included finding areas of common
purpose, understanding, and enlightened common and
self-interest, which are fundamental parts of sys-
tems thinking.
 The development by toxicologists and process engin-
eers of standardized, reliable, and inexpensive testing
and evaluation protocols for textile chemicals. This
allowed environmental decisions to be made as part of
the purchasing process by textile managers and their
chemical suppliers.
 The development and application of environmental
impact evaluation methods and standard nomencla-
ture to allow textile mill operators to include environ-
mental impact in their process development and
chemical purchasing decisions. Prior to these devel-
opments, cost and mill performance were the only
determining factors in purchasing decisions.
The first two items were related to a management
framework called ‘process consultation’ [21], as opposed
to scientific, regulatory or technical issues. Using dia-
logue as a process consultation tool, together with the
establishment and utilization of an environmental testing
protocol focused on toxicity reduction, fundamentally
changed the stakeholders’ ability to address wastewater
non-compliance situations. These tools identified that the
best opportunity to reduce aquatic toxicity was by optim-
izing manufacturing processes and chemical usage. This
was in contrast to the older belief that inadequate waste
treatment was the primary key to improving water qual-
ity from textile operations, and that this was an engineer-
ing problem that was out of industries control.
This significant change in the process of solving a
non-linear problem such as the cause and effect of
aquatic toxicity of treated wastewaters, focused on pol-
lution prevention and industrial ecology, rather than on
engineering additional treatment. It also created an
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atmosphere of communication and openness that
resulted in more effective testing and management of
textile chemical usage and selection. This, in turn,
resulted in the reduced toxicity of the waste streams from
wet processing operations and concurrent increases in
textile plant production efficiency.
Fewer chemicals were used per unit of fabric pro-
duced. Lower-impact textile chemicals were found by
testing. It was found that very cost effective savings
could be obtained from optimization within the textile
mill.
The stakeholders realized the following additional
benefits of the process:
 Industry discovered cost savings from process optimi-
zations within the textile factory. In 10 cases from
1980 to 1995, there was a 20% or more reduction
in process chemical usage resulting from the toxicity
reduction process.
 Communities received more effective wastewater
treatment. Toxic chemicals that were previously dis-
charged by the textile firms were adversely affecting
the biological efficiency of the wastewater treatment
systems. Improved treatment resulting from toxicity
control through use optimization meant that toxic tex-
tile wastewater was either being eliminated, or at the
very least, discharged in greatly reduced quantities.
 Better communications and alignment among indus-
try, members of local communities and regulators
towards mutually acceptable objectives built stronger
inter-relationships. Success bred better communi-
cations.
7. Measuring the environmental impacts of Textile
Auxiliaries (TA)
Due to their complexity and the variety of compounds
in use, textile auxiliaries, (TA’s) are an interesting subset
of the broader category of industrial. Because TA’s, as
well as many other industrial chemicals, are sold, com-
mercially, in a wide range of solution concentrations and
components, one of the first steps in developing a tox-
icity screening protocol was to establish exactly what
was being measured. In order to do this, two basic
characteristics of TA’s had to be determined.
 The TA must be either water-soluble or water-dis-
persible.
 The concentration of water in the TA must be known
in order to determine the relative effects of the active
ingredients (actives).
‘Active ingredient’ is defined as any component found
in the TA aside from water. Therefore, a simple water
determination could be performed on the product, wher-
eby the percent activity was defined as the percentage,
by weight, of the mixture that was made up by the com-
pound.
Measurements of the environmental properties of the
TA could be made once it was established that the TA
was either water-soluble or water-dispersible, and the
activity was determined. All environmental assessments
were made solely based on the weight-percentage of
active substances in the product, thus eliminating con-
centration as a variable. This allowed all TAs to be com-
pared equally and independently of the concentration of
active ingredients in the commercial product.
Standard testing protocols for determining the
environmental properties of chemicals were available
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) [22] . Three screening tests were
chosen to be included in the model for textile chemicals.
These tests determined:
 The impact of a TA on waste treatment plant biomass
(ASRIT); (OECD 209).
 The rate of biodegradation; (OECD 301D).
 The acute aquatic toxicity. (OECD 202).
These tests were chosen because no elaborate laboratory
equipment was required for analysis, and because they
were inexpensive compared to more sophisticated test-
ing methods.
The test results were used to develop a composite
score based upon the interrelationship of these values to
the aquatic toxicity of treated wastewater. These inter-
relationships were found to be significant to the oper-
ation of biological treatment plants and the aquatic tox-
icity of the effluents from these plants. As a result, the
composite score for the active ingredients of any product
could be compared with the composite scores of other
chemicals to ascertain its relative impacts.
7.1. Analysis of the test data and development of a
graphical reporting method
After conducting the individual tests on the active
ingredients of a TA, a Composite Score for the tested
product is determined based upon the interrelationship
of the values found by the tests.
The formula used to calculate the Composite Score is
based on a curve-fitting technique derived from empiri-
cal data developed in Toxicity Reduction Evaluations
(TRE) over a 5-year period by Burlington Research, Inc.
(BRI), a contract laboratory and consulting firm located
in Burlington, NC. BRI obtained a US Patent for the
software and the interrelationships between the test
results [23].
The broad assumptions used in development of the
algorithm were the ranking or weighting of the factors
found most important in post-biological treatment
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aquatic toxicity. These are biodegradation rate, followed
by the ASRIT value and finally, aquatic toxicity. The
significance of these determined values, Biodegradation
rate, ASRIT and aquatic toxicity was to provide stan-
dardized information that encompassed over the entire
universe of TA’s.
Composite Score  ASRIT Score  LC50 Score
 Biodeg Score
ASRIT Score  ((2.6) (ASRIT Value0.4))1
LC50 Score  ((4.5) (LC50 Value0.5)
(0.05) (LC50 Value))
Biodeg Score  ((3)(Biodeg Value0.775)2
Empirical data based on extensive observations
revealed that when TA’s rapidly biodegraded, they had
little toxic impact on the biomass and were fully treated
in the POTW. This meant that the compound did not
enter the environment, thus, the risk of toxicity was low.
When biodegradation rates were slower, both ASRIT
and the aquatic toxicity of the untreated compound
became more important, as the opportunity for discharge
of intact product increased. The worst case was poor
biodegradability of compounds with biomass and
daphnid (Crustacea:Cladocera:Daphnidae) toxicity. It
was almost certain that products with poor ratings would
negatively impact the POTW effluent toxicity (Table 1).
One of the great advantages of these biological
activity measurement methods is that they allow for the
assessment of the effects of degradation by-products as
well as parent compounds. In cases where degradation
products display greater toxicity than parents (e.g.,
branched chain alkyl phenol ethoxylate surfactants),
chemical measurements alone tend to under-predict the
biological effects of treated chemicals, assuming that
treatment detoxifies the parent product.
An example of how the process is utilized in the tex-
tile dye house is found in the following example of two
nylon-dyeing additives, Agent A and Agent B.
The manager of the dye house evaluated each product
in production and found that each was equally capable
of meeting the plant’s performance expectations. The
Table 1
Test values and representative scores. These were used in the aquatic toxicity impact model, per US Patent 5,827,679, developed by Burlington
Research Inc to calculate Toxicity Targeting Values. The production of the scores enables calculation of a single numeric value, which can be
used to produce a toxicity target graphic such as in Fig. 7
ASRIT EC 50 Score Daphnid LC50 Score Biodegradability Score
1–10 mg/l 1 0.1 mg/l 1 20% in 28 days 1
11–250 mg/l 5 0.1–1.0 mg/l 5 20–35% in 28 days 5
251–500 mg/l 10 1.1–10.0 mg/l 10 36–50% in 28 days 10
501–1000 mg/l 20 10.0 mg/l 20 51% in 28 days 20
1000 mg/l 50 100 mg/l 50 60% in 28 days 50
Fig. 7. Toxicity Target Graphic. This computer graphic is generated
to compare the environmental performance between textile chemicals
per US Patent 5,827,679. The values from Table 1 are utilized per the
algorithms developed by Burlington Research Inc., and a toxicity score
is calculated. This graphic enabled dye house managers to interpret
complex toxicological results to less aquatic toxicity impacts.
products were used at equal concentrations in the dyeing
process, and each was 40% active. Both were highly
water-soluble.
 Dye Leveling Agent A was tested and found to have
an ASRIT value of 34 mg/l, a daphnid LC50 of 1.0
mg/l, and a Biodegradability of 20% in 28 days. This
would produce a toxicity targeting Score for Dye
Leveling Agent A of ‘47’ when calculated by the
model described.
 Dye Leveling Agent B was tested and found to have
an ASRIT value of 1000 mg/l, a daphnid LC50 of
62 mg/l, and a Biodegradability of 7% in 28 days.
This would produce a toxicity targeting Score for Dye
Leveling Agent B of ‘109’ when calculated by this
model.
The results are shown graphically as a ‘Toxicity Tar-
get’. This target graphic is a simple representation of the
relative response to the three OECD tests, related by the
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model described (Fig. 7). This was developed to facili-
tate graphical comparison of zones of environmental
impact, ranging from very high impact to low impact,
with each zone comprising a range of composite scores.
For example, the zones may be graphically represented
as a circular graph with a zone indicating very high
impact at the center of the graph, annular zones pro-
gressing away from the center, which indicate dimin-
ishing impact scores; the outermost zone representing
lowest impact. The comparative scores, for diverse
chemicals, can be positioned on the graph to visually
illustrate their relative environmental impact.
8. The importance of this tool in helping to solve
aquatic toxicity problems due to wet processing
Textile dye house managers are not toxicologists or
wastewater engineers. The toxicity-targeting tool used
standard screening tests and produced a toxicity target
graphic that communicated the relative impacts of any
TA. It did not require highly skilled scientists to under-
stand the data. As a basis for documenting the available
choices in TA environmental performance, it worked
very well. Existing products could be tested and new
products compared for performance in the textile mill
and in the environment. The goal was always to move
towards better mill efficiency, coupled with lower
environmental impact. This tool allowed all stakeholders
to understand the desired results of toxicological testing
without having to be toxicologists.
9. The applications of ‘systems thinking’ and group
dynamics in resolving environmental issues between
the community and the textile industry
In the early 1800’s, the textile industry in the United
States began in New England and led all other industries
into the industrial revolution, producing wool fabrics
along the numerous streams and rivers that supplied the
power for production machinery.
After the US Civil War, the textile industry was
moved into the southern US, benefiting from the cheap
labor and proximity to the cotton fields. This was part
of the reason for the infiltration of northern businessmen
who exploited the newly freed slaves, as well as the
depressed economic conditions that existed in the South
after the Civil War.
Towns sprang up around textile operations all over the
South. In fact, North Carolina towns such as Haw River
and Kannapolis existed entirely due to their proximity
to water for power and processing. These towns were
home to the Cone Mills and Fieldcrest-Cannon corpora-
tions. In many cases, several generations of families
worked at the same textile enterprise and lived in the
same town or community.
The historical link between the textile enterprises and
the communities in which they operated was an
important one. It established a community bond among
the stakeholders. The NC Division of Water Quality
(NCDWQ), the state water quality authority, was also a
part of the community, due not only to its role as regu-
lator, but also because the state provided funding for
water and other community services. These stakeholders
were joined together by community infrastructures such
as water and sewer services, as well as job creation, pro-
perty tax base, etc. The fates of the towns and the com-
panies were intertwined. What was good or bad for one
affected the other in a similar fashion. A list of common
stakeholders in the debate on wet processing effluent
toxicity and their ranked interests is shown in Table 2.
The common objective of all stakeholders was to com-
ply with regulations and to do so at the lowest possible
cost in order to ensure growth, or at least sustainable
health, for the community and the industry. It could also
be assumed that if regulatory limits were successfully
met, a cleaner environment would lead to increased rec-
reation and commerce in area rivers, streams and lakes.
Prior to the adoption of WET testing in regulatory
strategies, when compliance issues were based entirely
on pollutant concentrations, the common response to
violations was to identify the industry that discharged
the pollutant to the POTW and have the municipality
develop a treatment strategy. There were clear lines of
responsibility. Either the industry would have to absorb
the cost of building a pretreatment facility, or the com-
munity would have to pay for an increase in the size,
design or efficiency of the POTW. Historically, the treat-
ment technologies to remove common, domestically
generated pollutants were well known, but the treatment
Table 2
Textile Industry Stakeholders and Motivations. As a number of Tox-
icity Reduction (TRE) projects were completed, the similarities in
stakeholders and their motivations became apparent. Development of
the dialogue process to enable expression, validation and alignment of
motivations for all stakeholders was an important step in achievement
of the TRE goals
Stakeholders Primary motivations
Local water authorities operating Compliance and costs
POTW
North Carolina Division of water Compliance, improve water
quality quality
USEPA Complicance, improve water
quality
Discharging industry Compliance and costs
Supplier to discharging industry Increase sales and profits
NGO Improve water quality
Citizens Retain industry and jobs,
improve water quality
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of industrial pollutants, especially textile waste, was con-
sidered an engineering specialty.
Toxicity compliance however, was rarely straightfor-
ward. Industrial wastewater pretreatment programs or
enhanced POTW treatment did not always remove or
reduce toxicity. The toxicants were not easily identified
nor was it obvious how to modify conventional treatment
facilities or processes to achieve a non-toxic effluent. In
many cases, reducing toxicity using these enhanced or
tertiary waste treatment methods proved very costly to
the POTWs because most were designed to treat simple
domestic wastes, not toxic industrial ones.
Therefore, once it could be reasonably presumed that
effluent toxicity was due to industrial wastes, the burden
was placed on industry to prevent these problems. It
became the obligation of industry to demonstrate that
their process wastes were treatable to a non-toxic state
in the effluent receiving stream of the existing POTW.
For the first time, industry was responsible to the munici-
pality for the aggregate effect ‘toxicity’ of the waste it
discharged for treatment, in addition to the effects of
specific pollutants. This motivating factor provided the
logical economic incentives for evaluating the environ-
mental effects of textile chemicals based on their biodeg-
radability rate and aquatic toxicity. This process pro-
vided a new approach for choosing which textile
chemicals should be used, and what actions could be
taken to improve effectiveness through pollution preven-
tion (Fig. 8).
Consultants found that when a POTW was in signifi-
cant violation of its aquatic toxicity permit limits, the
State regulatory authorities would issue a non-com-
pliance notice. This notice instructed the community
wastewater authority that operated the POTW to develop
a plan to identify and remove the toxicity. The POTW
would then hire a consulting firm to conduct the Toxicity
Identification Evaluation (TIE) and Toxicity Reduction
Evaluation (TRE) [24–26]. These were processes to
identify the toxicants and their source(s) and to eliminate
Fig. 8. Limits to Success for Toxicity Reduction by Product Substi-
tution. Toxicity reduction requires high quality and accepted test data.
Without high quality data, such as that supplied by the chemical evalu-
ation methods, the toxicity reduction process would be severely lim-
ited. This figure shows this as a systems archetype [16].
the toxicant(s) via process optimization, treatment,
and/or pollution.
As the aquatic toxicity experts in the TRE process,
the consultant’s role was to conduct the technical portion
of the Toxicity Identification Evaluation, TIE. This
required sample effluent collection as well as chemical
and biological analysis of the various samples. BRI also
acted as the lead facilitator during the entire toxicity
elimination process. Because these TREs could be
expensive to the community, costing as much as
$100,000 USD per year, many functions of the TRE such
as stakeholder education and conduct of the TIE
occurred simultaneously.
The consultant was firmly committed to the ideals of
greener production and industrial ecology in the resol-
ution of toxicity problems for a community’s industries.
The firm’s management believed that the root cause of
the toxicity was industry’s uninformed choices of indus-
trial chemicals and inefficient industrial processes. In
most cases, communities had many different industries
besides textile manufacturing however, the textile-wet
processor traditionally was the highest volume industrial
process water discharger. This is why so much focus was
placed on understanding textile processes and chemical
systems.
The consulting leadership believed that no additional
treatment option should be considered until all waste
minimization and pollution prevention options had been
exhausted, unless there were known engineering-related
problems at the POTW. If there were POTW engineering
issues, these were resolved either before or during the
toxicity reduction program. This approach was in con-
trast to the thinking of earlier times, when all pollution
questions were answered with the construction of larger
wastewater treatment facilities.
Once the State and the consultant found a toxicity
problem, they would set the TRE process into motion.
The first step was to work with the regulatory authority
(NCDWQ) to develop relief mechanisms (consent
orders) prescribed by regulation that would allow
expenses to be placed in problem resolution rather than
penalties. The next step was to educate all local stake-
holders on what could be causing the toxicity, and to
listen very carefully to the input from all the stakeholders
involved. More than once, practical observations from
an industry or community member allowed the problems
to be readily reduced. After listening, the consultant
would explain the role of each stakeholder in the process
and, in particular, counsel the industrial leaders on what
their company’s role might be. Industry was informed
what information they would be required to gather con-
cerning the amounts and types of chemicals discharged.
In this process it was vital for there to be effective dis-
cussions among the regulators, community representa-
tives, industrial members, and the water authority per-
sonnel. The consultant’s crucial role was to make sure
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that all stakeholders understood the obligations and
responsibilities for every other stakeholder in the pro-
cess. If the regulatory authority would not agree to
reasonable investigative processes, punitive fines or
other unreasonable enforcement actions could in fact
hinder the productive process of toxicity reduction. In
areas where regulators are not familiar with ecotoxicity
control and reduction, significant effort should be made
to educate them near the beginning of the process.
The consultant’s approach was to conduct an open,
transparent dialogue with all interested stakeholders in
an effort to avoid common systems-archetypal problems
[18]. It was the company president’s opinion that pre-
vious efforts to produce compliance via waste reduction
and greener production had failed because wastewater
engineers had previously been the lead facilitators in
resolving environmental non-compliance, and an engin-
eer’s main source of income is designing and building
wastewater facilities. Consultants had no incentive other
than to resolve the toxicity problem as rapidly as poss-
ible (Fig. 9).
To avoid stakeholder disputes within this process, it
was very important for everyone to understand that tox-
icity characterization and control processes might not be
simple, quick or inexpensive. It was also very important
for all stakeholders to realize that if this dialogue-based
process failed, regulatory enforcement actions would fol-
low due to lack of action. The agreed-upon TRE project
deadlines had to be met. Irresponsible behavior or inac-
tion on any stakeholder’s part would endanger the low-
cost solution to the toxicity problem. The following
questions were evaluated as possible limits within every
Toxicity Reduction Evaluation:
 Are all stakeholders clear on the costs associated with
solving this problem with waste minimization tech-
niques versus building additional treatment capacity?
Fig. 9. Engineer Sees Non Compliance as an Opportunity to Build—
Not Change Regulatory Compliance. The root motivation for engineers
is to solve problems utilizing their engineering expertise. To achieve
the goal of regulatory compliance, both engineering skills and edu-
cation on greener and cleaner production was necessary. If engineers
were in control of projects, loop R1 would grow larger as R2 shrinks
relatively. Engineering alone could not solve toxicity problems as read-
ily as the combination of greener production and engineering com-
bined.
 Is it possible that after all waste minimization and
process optimization efforts have been implemented
that enhanced treatment will still be necessary?
 Is it clear to the leaders of all industries discharging
to the POTW that each is responsible for producing
an effluent that can be demonstrated to be treatable
to a non toxic form by the existing POTW?
 Is it clear to the community that if all industries dem-
onstrate that, their effluents are treatable and non-
toxic, or if the current POTW is not operating cor-
rectly or is not sufficient, the community is then
responsible for the cure?
 Does every stakeholder in the community desire the
same outcome: acceptably clean water at the lowest
possible cost? Is there a possibility that organizational
and personal agendas could produce a ‘Tragedy of the
Commons’ [17]?
It was imperative for an external consulting engineer
to audit the POTW to determine that it was operating
correctly, and that its operations did not change signifi-
cantly during the TRE.
In summary, the process consultant, had to earn credi-
bility from each stakeholder. The stakeholders had to
believe not only that the consultant had the ability to
determine the source of the toxicity, but also to reduce
it. This credibility was achieved by using USEPA and
OECD-approved test methods and procedures, coupled
with absolute honesty and clarity about the test results.
There were, of course, disputes of findings that required
repeated demonstration of trends, but ambiguities were
eliminated at every possible step to diminish any distrac-
tions from the goal: toxicity elimination in the most cost-
effective and rapid fashion.
The consultant assisted each industry found to be con-
tributing toxicity, by using the toxicity-targeting model
to work with their suppliers to substitute greener alterna-
tives. The goal was to reduce or remove the source of
the toxicity without adversely affecting the profitability
of the operation. In many cases, the scrutiny of process
chemicals also allowed for optimization of the process
itself. In almost every case, this chemical optimization
procedure saved the company money. Thus, the TRE
process paid for itself many times in savings to indus-
tries and to the communities. Fig. 10 shows a typical
flow chart of the dialogue process.
To ensure full disclosure and cooperation with all
stakeholders, it was made clear from the beginning that
no industry would be publicly disclosed as the culprit
unless progress was not being made in the project. This
led all stakeholders to view the problem as an issue for
the entire community, rather than an industry-versus-
community issue. Care was taken to ensure that press
information from these meetings remained positive as
long as progress was being made. It was the job of the
consultant to make sure that all of the stakeholders were
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Fig. 10. Inclusive Process for Aquatic Toxicity Resolution. This
flowchart depicts the methodology that was found most successful in
multiple stakeholder toxicity reduction projects that involved the tex-
tile industry. This flow chart was used a great deal to benchmark pro-
gress and to document areas of concern within a diverse group of
stakeholders working on the projects. The ability to flowchart the pro-
cess and document it, made the dialogue based toxicity reduction pro-
cess acceptable to legal and regulatory authorities. Without a standard
template of the process, it was easy to be sidetracked by the diverse
goals of multiple stakeholder groups.
seen in the press as leaders and forward thinkers, looking
out for the welfare of the entire community.
10. The results of systems thinking, consensual
dialogue and the greener production approach to
reduction of aquatic toxicity for textile wet
processors and their communities
In every case examined from 1985 to 1995, this dia-
logue-based, systematic approach to the TIE/TRE pro-
cess produced positive results. The process made it clear
to all that diverse stakeholders could communicate and
cooperate in a highly regulated, technical environment.
It demonstrated that there could be measurable improve-
ment in aquatic toxicity and POTW treatment efficiency,
driven by the goal of increased industrial productivity
and reduction of aquatic toxicity by industry. This kept
the stakeholders out of costly litigation while improving
environmental quality.
As consultants, the textile industry, regulators, and
communities gained experience in understanding how
the chemistry of TAs affected their environmental per-
formance, this information could be used earlier in sub-
sequent TRE projects. A general knowledge base was
developed on surfactant chemistries, biocides, cationic
polymers, and inorganic salts. This information was inte-
grated into the initial stages of projects, so that the time
frame and the costs associated with the TREs declined.
The NC Division of Pollution Prevention and
Environmental Assistance (NCDPPEA) helped manage
this information. This group acted as a clearinghouse for
information and provided additional consultants to aid
industry and municipal governments to forward the pol-
lution prevention process.
Even though a systematic process of dialogue, testing,
and changing was developed over time, difficult facili-
tation problems developed. Here are a few examples:
Problem: Chemical suppliers would not conduct the
necessary testing, as required by the purchasing industry,
in a timely fashion. Some even refused to conduct the
testing.
Result: Find a new supplier. This was not always easy
to do. Local, state and regional regulatory pressures
increased market incentives for suppliers to develop this
information and even use it as a competitive advantage.
Problem: Industrial leaders did not follow through on
voluntary testing and process optimization obligations.
They ignored the benchmarks and reporting deadlines
agreed to in the meetings.
Result: The POTW or State regulators fined industries
or applied other enforcement tools to encourage partici-
pation and action.
Problem: The POTW operators could not resolve oper-
ational issues. There were organizational and staff train-
ing issues within the municipal organizations that “could
not be resolved”.
Result: State authorities fined the POTW or applied
other enforcement tools to leverage positive outcomes.
New operators and engineers might receive penalties
within their organizations.
Problem: Engineers wanted to build additional treat-
ment plants as a fail-safe plan to eliminate toxicity
before the greener production processes could be
implemented.
Result: Careful understanding of the costs/benefits of
industrial ecological solutions had to be presented and
the regulators had to grant the time, without penalties,
for the TRE programs to be implemented. The under-
standing was that additional treatment plants would be
constructed if the TRE did not provide results within
a year.
The primary goal of the TRE could neither be ignored
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nor forgotten: achieve compliance at the lowest possible
cost. This had to be discussed at every meeting.
11. Conclusions
The value of systems-thinking techniques, as well as
the adoption of the principles of greener production and
industrial ecology, was apparent in the 1980’s, even
though many of the formal terms and processes had not
been fully recognized in the literature. The adoption and
enforcement of new regulations was a primary motivat-
ing factor for these environmental improvements,
although, these cases differed in their consensus-based,
rather than their confrontational approach to all the
stakeholders. The technical and legal details of a con-
frontational approach to toxicity reduction would have
overwhelmed the budgets of the stakeholders and
improvements would have been much slower, harder
fought, and more expensive. The development of a cost-
effective approach to toxicity reduction that improved
both financial and environmental performance for indus-
try and community provided the win-win opportunity
that encouraged cooperation rather than confrontation.
The evolution of a stakeholder dialogue that addressed
the problem of aquatic toxicity in wet processing efflu-
ents created a safe experimental space in which creativ-
ity was fostered. The ability to aggressively experiment
within the framework of the TRE without the fear of
unwarranted legal and regulatory repercussions allowed
for mistakes to occur, which in turn promoted a rapid
learning environment. Within this framework, estab-
lishing trust allowed all stakeholders to learn. Communi-
cation of the approaches within this space allowed the
stakeholders to see different ways of addressing the root
causes of the problem. Documentation of the results of
the dialogues provided regulators with the information
assuring them that progress was being made in resolving
the toxicity issues.
In almost every case, the root toxicity problem for the
textile industry was found to be process inefficiency and
a poor understanding of the life cycle of textile chemi-
cals. Improvements occurred when the industry began to
use the new tests to benchmark environmental perform-
ance of the textile chemicals. The test results created the
goal and the dialogue-based process was effective in
engaging the textile industry, technical consulting com-
munity and regulators. It was the cooperative linkage of
these groups that delivered the desired results of rapidly
reducing aquatic toxicity from textile operations.
The importance of the test results and the dialogue-
based process became clear very early within the first
two or three projects. It was evident that this approach
was very time and cost effective because the stake-
holders could see the improvement in toxicity testing
results from waste treatment plant as changes were made
because the process was transparent. As the knowledge
base grew and the information was disseminated to the
textile industry through publications and the NCDPPEA,
other stakeholders began to use the information to
improve product chemistries and industrial processes.
The textile industry, its suppliers and the communities
were truly ‘learning organizations’ during this time of
focus on the aquatic toxicity challenge [16].
When the project was completed, a management sys-
tem and process was put in place to offer long-term
benefits in control and regulation of industrial discharges
for the municipal authorities operating the waste treat-
ment facilities. The systems were also used by other
industries who had never approached an environmental
problem in this manner before. The NCDPPEA also
gained important trend information that could be com-
municated inside and outside the North Carolina [6]. The
approach resulted in the textile industry supply chain
developing greener water-soluble industrial chemicals.
Therefore, the effects of this work were felt well beyond
the communities where the studies were done. The
whole textile wet processing industry benefited, as the
results were communicated by regulators and industry
trade groups [23].
The removal of aquatic toxicity by using greener
chemistry and processes was very gratifying to everyone
involved in the process due to purposeful stakeholder
inclusion. The systematic nature of the process and the
difficulty in communication of the details of technology
avoided entanglement in unrelated technological and
legal details, keeping the stakeholders involved. The
relatively low cost of the process, as compared to build-
ing more wastewater treatment facilities, kept everyone
focused on making it work. The power of consensual
dialogue was demonstrated, even in an area with such
complex legal and technical details as environmental
regulation. The importance of technically realistic regu-
latory programs staffed with competent practitioners to
the success of this approach cannot be over-emphasized.
Regulatory programs that rely solely on punitive fines
to combat non-compliance do not recognize the realities
of commerce, economics, or science. Money spent effec-
tively toward resolution of problems is money spent
more wisely than in ineffectual and often prolonged liti-
gation without realized environmental benefits.
As globalization of the wet processing industry con-
tinues, it is clear that the textile industry can continue
to ‘green’ its processes and chemistries. The communi-
ties in which these industries relocate can work together
to provide an optimum situation where industrial growth
and prosperity can be maximized without a negative
impact on local water quality. The best news is that it
can work, not only by using sophisticated toxicological
and chemical technology, but also by dialogue and com-
monality of purpose.
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Appendix A. The regulatory environment in the
USA, 1980–1995, with a focus on the State of North
Carolina
Prior to 1972, most local governments or State auth-
orities set pollution limits for wastewater treatment
plants. In 1972, the US Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (referred to as the “Clean
Water Act” or CWA). The CWA is the primary set of
federal regulations that governs water quality issues in
the United States. The 1972 CWA, as well as its 1977
amendments, set strict water-quality standards and insti-
tuted a system of permits for direct industrial discharges
to water. These laws demanded the use of specific treat-
ment methods to ensure water quality compliance.
The US Congress enacted changes in the CWA in the
1980’s that allowed the states greater freedom in
determining compliance with standards. This was one
of the factors motivating the State of North Carolina to
implement the use of whole effluent toxicity tests (WET)
as a primary indicator of effluent quality. These toxicity
tests were sensitive indicators of real-world responses to
the effects of water pollution. The adoption of these tox-
icity analysis methods was a major initiative for improv-
ing the water quality of North Carolina’s surface waters.
These more flexible requirements resulted from the
desire to improve the surface water quality of streams
and rivers in the US, which were deteriorating due to
growth in the industrial use of water, as well as the over-
all population. During the period of 1980–1995, it is esti-
mated that 50% of the water treated by North Carolina’s
POTWs came from textile wet processing operations [7].
However, WET testing was performed in addition to
the large volume of physiochemical testing already leg-
ally required to limit the discharge of pollutants into sur-
face waters. This made WET testing an additional cost
to the operators of waste treatment plants. This cost was
seen initially as another burden to industry.
WET methods were adopted in response to a debate
among industry and environmental groups concerning
the effectiveness of existing physiochemical pollutant
measurements. Adopting WET methods reduced the
debate over the applicability of a concentration-based
limit on ultimate surface water quality. Using WET
methods, if the permitted concentration limit of a pol-
lutant was exceeded and the WET test demonstrated
toxic effects, then it was clear that the toxicant was bio-
available and could impact the water body. If the con-
centration-based limit was exceeded and there was no
impact on the test organism in the WET test, then there
was room for debate with the discharger on the predic-
tive accuracy of the concentration-based limit. Thus, the
WET test became a powerful water quality indicator for
the State of North Carolina.
The first toxicity tests utilized test populations of
small fish (Pimephales promelas) and water fleas
(Daphnia pulex) that were exposed to multiple concen-
trations of treated wastewater. The endpoint of the tests
was impairment or mortality of the organism after 24 or
48 hours of exposure. A variety of statistical analyses
determined the LC50, or the concentration of wastewater
that was lethal to 50% of the test organisms. This LC50
value was then compared to the percentage of a water
body’s flow that was made up of water discharged by
the POTW. For example, a discharge permit for a POTW
whose water output was equal to 10% of the receiving
stream’s water flow during a statistically determined low
flow period, would state that there could be no mortality
at a concentration of 10% treated wastewater and 90%
control dilution water; therefore, it adequately rep-
resented the impact of the POTW discharge on the
receiving stream [26].
The second phase of regulation occurred when the
toxicity tests evolved to the point where sub lethal,
chronic toxicity of the treated wastewater could be
assessed. Chronic toxicity is a more sensitive measure-
ment than acute toxicity, as it measures the test organ-
isms’ inhibited reproduction over a longer period, gener-
ally 7 days for Ceriodaphnia dubia. The sensitivity of
this chronic test can be significantly greater than the
acute exposures of the same test organism. Thus, the
WET limitation found in a discharge permit for the
described POTW would allow no significant mortality
or inhibition of reproduction rate at a test concentration
of 10% treated waste water and 90% control dilution
water [27].
Implementation of these regulations brought immedi-
ate results. Some POTW’s, which had never been in
violation of their permits for metals, oxygen demand,
solids, or priority pollutants, failed these new toxicity
tests. There also was a strong correlation between
POTW’s that contained high volumes of wet processing
waste and test failure. Obviously, there were a great
many possible pollutants in these effluents that were not
individually controlled or measured as part of the permit-
ting process, not to mention the combined effects of
the pollutants.
These public waste treatment facilities (POTWs) were
owned and operated by municipal governments, but
regulated by the North Carolina Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources as well as the Federal EPA.
Both the regulators and the municipalities wanted to
know the source of toxic agents and wanted the sources
eliminated as quickly as possible. An elaborate series
of ‘fractionation/characterization’ and ‘treatability’ tests
were devised to identify and quantify the toxicants in
these treated wastewaters [24,25].
Various toxicity reduction evaluations in North Carol-
ina, conducted between 1985–1995, found certain reoc-
curring compounds that were identified as the toxic
agents. Many of these compounds were related to wet
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processing. A short, non-exhaustive list of such toxic
compounds follows in order of importance:
 Tri-butyl tin oxide (TBTO)—Used as a biocide on
hosiery and fabrics.
 Nonionic surfactants—Used as detergents in textile
preparation and dyeing.
 Cationic surfactants—Used in textile dyeing and fin-
ishing.
 Sodium chloride—Used in textile dyeing of cotton.
 Sodium sulfate—Used in textile dyeing of cotton.
 Copper—Used in textile dyeing of cotton and poly-
amide. In its elemental, non-complexed form, it is
toxic.
 Cyanide—Found as an anti-caking agent in salt.
Once identified, specific, identifiable compounds such
as TBTO could be removed from the discharge waste
stream or replaced with less toxic alternatives. Other,
non-chemically specific compounds were more difficult
to trace and eliminate.
Nonionic surfactants were a particular problem. Sur-
factants that were slow to degrade caused acute and
chronic toxicity effects. Understanding their rate of biod-
egradability was a key factor in their treatment, as the
only available options were either longer treatment times
or substituting more rapidly degradable surfactants. It is
estimated that there are over 500 unique nonionic surfac-
tants used in textile processing, and environmental fate
data are scarce for these compounds.
Sodium chloride and sodium sulfate, which are used
in dyeing cotton, also presented a particular problem.
These inorganic salts were toxic to fresh water organ-
isms at effluent concentrations exceeding the test organ-
isms’ thresholds. These substances were particularly
problematic in areas where the natural flows in the
receiving streams were very small in relation to the dis-
charge flows of the POTW. There still remains no practi-
cal treatment to remove these salts from textile wastewa-
ters and thus far, the only way to resolve the issue has
been to dilute these two compounds.
Copper was found in many blue and black dyes with
the ‘free’, non-complexed copper acting as the immedi-
ate toxic agent. The screening and development of cop-
per free dyes was encouraged because of these findings.
After many specific toxic compounds were found and
eliminated, there still remained a large group of textile
chemicals called wet processing auxiliaries. These ‘name
brand’ products are composed of complex mixtures of
surfactants, softening agents, solvents, chelating agents
and water-based polymers. Most of these products are
mixtures designed to perform a certain task in the prep-
aration, dyeing or finishing of textiles. Because of both
the huge variety and different concentrations of chemi-
cals that can be used in these products, there were sig-
nificant difficulties in identifying the components of
these mixtures. This problem was exacerbated by the
producers’ insistence upon keeping the ingredients a
trade secret. The lingering question was how to deter-
mine the relative environmental impacts of these pro-
ducts so that the end user, the textile industry, could
choose greener products and improve the environmental
quality of the water being discharged from the textile
facility.
The implementation of aquatic toxicity based dis-
charge limits, as well as the process that developed to
deal with those issues, led to development of a toxicity
targeting model. This model used the biodegradation
rate, biomass toxicity (microbial respiration inhibition),
and aquatic toxicity test results to determine the relative
effects of one textile chemical as compared to any other.
Both the tests and the model were designed so that the
results were independent of chemical composition or
concentration of the textile chemical.
Appendix B. Toxicity targeting test descriptions
The following description briefly summarizes these
tests. The full test procedures are readily available from
the OECD.
The Activated Sludge Respiration Inhibition (ASRIT)
Test, OECD Guideline for Testing of Chemicals 209,
adopted Apr. 4, 1984, indicates the quantity of chemical
that can be received by a treatment plant without impact-
ing the viability of the plant’s biomass. The method
described in this guideline assesses the effect of a test
substance on microorganisms by measuring their respir-
ation rate in the presence of different concentrations of
the test substance. The method is based on methods
described by ETAD (Ecological and Toxicological
Association of the Dyestuffs Manufacturing Industry), in
which activated sludge obtained from a sewage treat-
ment plant is used as the microbial source. The purpose
of this test is to provide a rapid screening method of the
substances that may adversely affect aerobic microbial
treatment plants. This test can also be used to identify
and indicate suitable, non-inhibitory concentrations of
test substances to be used in biodegradability tests. The
respiration rate is the oxygen consumption of aerobic
sludge or wastewater microorganisms generally
expressed as mg O2 per liter per h.
In the test, the respiration rate of activated sludge fed
with a standard amount of synthetic sewage nutrient
medium is measured after a contact time of 30 mins, 3
hrs, or both. The respiration rate of the same activated
sludge in the presence of various concentrations of the
test substance under otherwise identical conditions is
also measured. The inhibitory effect of the test substance
at a particular concentration is expressed as a percentage
of the mean respiration rates of two controls. An EC50
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value is calculated from determinations at different con-
centrations. Laboratory-bred daphnids, not more than 24
h old at the beginning of the test and apparently healthy
and with a known history (breeding method,
pretreatment) are used in this test.
The Acute Immobilization Test and Reproduction Test,
OECD Guideline for Testing of Chemicals 202, Part I,
adopted Apr. 4, 1984, is used to indicate the effect of
untreated chemicals on the fish and small crustaceans
inhabiting natural freshwater ecosystems. Effects meas-
ured include survivability and inhibition of reproduction
or growth. Ceriodaphnia dubia and Daphnia pulex are
the preferred species for testing, as they are the daphnid
species most prevalently used in NPDES permit effluent
acute toxicity monitoring. Twenty-four hour EC50 is the
concentration estimated to immobilize 50% of the
daphnids after 24 h of exposure.
In the acute immobilization test, a range of substance
concentrations exerts different degrees of toxic effects
on the swimming capability of daphnids under otherwise
identical test conditions. Certain concentrations result in
certain percentages of daphnids losing the ability to
swim at 24 h. The test can be extended to 48 hrs if
desired.
The Ready Biodegradability Test, OECD Guideline for
Testing of Chemicals 301D, adopted Jul. 17, 1992, is
used to determine the biodegradability of chemicals. In
this procedure, a dissolved or suspended test substance
in a mineral medium is inoculated and incubated under
aerobic conditions either in the dark or in diffuse light.
Allowance is made for the endogenous impact of the
inocula by running parallel blanks with inocula minus a
test substance, although the endogenous impact of cells
in the presence of a chemical will not exactly match that
in the endogenous control. A reference compound is run
in parallel to check the operation of the procedures.
In general, indicator parameters such as Dissolved Oxy-
gen concentration (DO), CO2 production and oxygen
uptake help predict degradation efficacy. Measurements
are taken at sufficiently frequent intervals to allow the
identification of the beginning and end of biodegrad-
ation. Automatic respirometers allow for continuous
measurements. Dissolved organic carbon (DOC) is
sometimes measured in addition to other parameters, but
usually only at the beginning and end of the test. Specific
chemical analyses can also be used to assess primary
degradation of the test substance, as well as to determine
the concentration of any intermediate substances formed.
Normally the biodegradation test lasts for 28 days, but
the tests could be ended sooner if the biodegradation
curve had already reached a plateau for at least three
determinations. Tests may also be prolonged beyond 28
days when the curve shows that biodegradation has
started but that the plateau has not been reached by day
28. In such cases, the chemical would not be classed as
readily biodegradable.
In the test, a solution of the chemical in a mineral
medium, usually at 2–5 mg/l, is inoculated with a rela-
tively small number of microorganisms from a mixed
population and kept in completely full, closed bottles in
the dark at constant temperature. Degradation is fol-
lowed by an analysis of dissolved oxygen over the 28-
day period. The amount of oxygen used by the microbial
population during biodegradation of the chemical, cor-
rected for uptake by the blank inocula run in parallel, is
expressed as a percentage of ThOD [Theoretical Oxygen
Demand (mg), i.e., the total amount of oxygen required
to completely oxidize a chemical, expressed as mg oxy-
gen required per mg test compound] or, less satisfac-
torily, COD [chemical oxygen demand (mg), i.e., the
amount of oxygen consumed during oxidation of a test
compound with hot, acidic dichromate, expressed as mg
oxygen consumed per mg test compound]. All chemical
mixtures in the foregoing procedures were tested on a
percent actives basis. If the product is not amenable to
Karl Fisher, percent actives can be conducted based on
a total solids determination (USEPA Method 160.3).
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Sustainability strategies create many synergistic effects for SMEs working collaboratively, as well as
systemic benefits for the commons. After setting forth the business case for sustainable SMEs, and
considering SME sustainability advantages in contrast to MNEs, this paper discusses several different
incentives for SMEs to optimize sustainability: (1) becoming valuable sustainable investment targets for
larger firms; (2) creating highly competitive networks of sustainable SMEs in market spaces where large
enterprises are less successful; (3) becoming highly efficient suppliers in global supply chains through
sustainable practices.
While several successful models of the sustainable SME are evolving, it may be that networks of SMEs
will become essential for addressing the systemic problems that underlie industrial ecology, enterprise
resilience, and global supply chain sustainability. SMEs represent the majority of all enterprises, and
rapidly evolving communication technologies allow for various routes of network formation.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, environmental and social factors have become
increasingly important strategic considerations for enterprises of
any size. Emerging 21st century market conditions are now creat-
ing truly new lenses through which the world must be viewed [1].
By ignoring the ‘‘hidden connection’’ between business and the
environment, business is missing many new sustainable de-
velopment (SD) opportunities that may prevent the threat of an
inevitable collapse of society [2]. As more companies recognize our
‘‘Common Journey’’ [3], which underscores the necessity of creating
sustainable development, firms worldwide are intentionally de-
veloping strategic plans to make their companies competitive
sustainably. Hart and Milstein have insisted that creating a sus-
tainable enterprise should be viewed as just another factor in the
modern business environment and should be addressed as such
within the planning process by 21st century business strategists
[4]. However, even this view may no longer be adequate.
Modern business plans should include both ‘‘the limits and
opportunities’’ presented by changes in global social and environ-
mental circumstances, as limitations of future growth may occur if
the global and environmental perspectives for sustainable societies(S.B. Moore), manring@elon.
All rights reserved.are ignored. Paradoxically, the global economy grows more rapidly
as companies become more resource efficient. Ecological footprint
analysis indicates that with this ‘‘rebound effect’’ [5], humanity’s
ecological demands already exceedwhat nature can supply [6]. This
‘‘ecological overshoot’’ means that we are depleting the stock of
natural environmental capital rather than ‘‘living off the interest’’
[6]. In spite of limits to growth, just as is true for all living organ-
isms, business enterprises need to grow at least enough to keep
pace with the economy, but defining growth and the ways and
means of ‘‘growth’’ need to change [7]. Sustainable enterprise
resilience is the ‘‘capacity for an enterprise to survive, adapt, and
grow in the face of turbulent change,’’ and at the same time, ‘‘to
increase shareholder value without increasing material through-
put’’ [5]. Sustainable enterprise resilience within the framework of
industrial ecology creates multiple business opportunities through
green technologies, reduction of raw material and energy use, and
‘‘discovering innovative pathways for recovery and reuse of waste
streams in place of virgin resources’’ [5]. This redefines growth in
a more sustainable context, a context that is not foreign to SMEs,
who have been operating for centuries within the context of limited
local markets, and adapting to those conditions successfully [8].
The strategy of a sustainable enterprise has been defined as ‘‘the
process of aligning an enterprise with the business environment to
maintain a dynamic balance’’[9]. By adding a sustainability lens
within the framework of SME strategic planning, SME development
seeks to balance resilience and growth so as to align the creation of
abundance: economically, environmentally, and socially, and to
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tainability into their competitive strategy, and thereby obtaining
greater profitability for SMEs through adoption of intentional
sustainable strategies, can help them to optimize their rate of
sustainable change.
‘‘It is becoming apparent that voluntary, incremental environ-
mental improvements by individual companies will be in-
adequate to significantly offset the growth of the global
economy, and that the rapid growth of China, India, and other
Asian economies will likely exacerbate this problem’’ [5].
Sustainability strategies createmany synergistic effects for SMEs
working collaboratively, as well as systemic benefits for the com-
mons. After setting forth the business case for sustainable SMEs,
and considering SMEs sustainability advantages in contrast to
MNEs, this paper discusses several different scenarios for SMEs to
optimize and use sustainability to create competitive advantages
rather than simply focusing on reducing unsustainability [5]:
 become valuable sustainable investment targets for larger
firms;
 create networked SMEs in sustainable market spaces where
MNEs are less successful;
 become sustainable suppliers in global supply chains.
Through this exploration, there is a critical underlying question,
which will require fuller investigations; which of these scenarios,
or combinations of scenarios, can provide the best alignment for
SMEs with the principles of industrial ecology, enterprise resil-
ience, and global sustainability?2. Why do SMEs need to articulate and use SD business plans
for integrating factors of globalization within social and
ecological limits to growth?
Ignoring the possibilities offered by sustainability can produce
an artificially narrow vision, with even small firms being con-
strained as they attempt to operate in a global marketplace, if an
expanding vision of sustainability is not included in planning and
benchmarking performance [11,12]. SMEs have a vital role to play in
managing limited global environmental and social resources. A
broad, multidimensional, multi-stakeholder perspective that is
formed based on emerging ideas and trends should be the basis of
a system approach towards an intentional, proactive situational
analysis. A thoughtful, situational analysis, as the basis for de-
veloping enterprise strategy, must incorporate new global stake-
holders and should not be stagnant or reactionary [13]. Such
analyses can culminate in development of scenarios leading to
sound strategic plans, based on foreshortened learning cycles that
benefit from the time and efforts spent in the planning process [14].
Recognition of the use of sustainability to promote expeditious
planning dialogues to create competitive advantages are described
by Senge et al. [15]:
People creating together work in different ways. They are
anchored in the future rather than in the past, drawn forward
by images of what they truly want to see exist in the world.
They learn how to work with a distinctive source of energy
that animates the creative process, the creative tension that
exists whenever a genuine vision exists in concert with people
telling the truth about what exists now. They learn how to let
go of having to have everything worked out in advance and to
step forth with boldness into immense uncertainty. The
organizations that truly lead in the profound (sustainable)
changes starting now to unfold around the world, who do not
get stranded in just being ‘‘less bad’’, will be those whoconvert sustainability challenges into compelling strategic
opportunities.
A number of forces underscore the emerging opportunities
[16,17] for SMEs to become proactively involved in sustainable
practices:
 accelerating cycles of technological innovation;
 rapid globalization of networked communications;
 extended and interconnected supply chains;
 rapidly changing markets.
A further important factor to bear in mind is the fact that at least
80% of all global enterprises are considered SMEs, having less than
250 employees [18]; SME’s constitute 85þ% of USA business [16];
99% of the European Union business [19]; over 99% of enterprises in
the UK [20]; and SMEs account for at least 70% of the world’s
production [21]. Possible scenarios of the future should be part of
any lens for incorporating sustainable development within a plan-
ning process [13,22–25]. Such lenses have led to the conception of
‘‘sustainable enterprises’’ [26]: i.e., enterprises that are robust and
resilient in face of anticipated and unanticipated economic, envi-
ronmental and social challenges [27]. Scenarios anticipating future
market conditions predict that a sustainable enterprise growth will
be enhanced by: (a) adapting to and diminishing the risk of ex-
ceeding social and environmental limits, and (b) meeting currently
unmet market needs for the 2þ billion potential consumers that do
not currently participate in the global marketplace [28–34].3. Differences between large and small firms that result in
sustainability advantages to SMEs
A major facet of corporate planning among leading manufac-
turers in every industrial sector is the emphasis on sustainability in
‘‘internal business processes, external stakeholders and investor
relations, and customer value propositions’’ [5]. It appears that
global multinational enterprises are taking actions towards be-
coming more sustainable and they feel strongly enough about the
importance of their efforts to report on their progress through
various avenues [29]. An entire lexicon and specific techniques
have been developed to define and measure ‘‘sustainability’’ [35].
The following indicators of MNE’s strategic plans and actions
towards sustainability reveal that the concept of the sustainable
enterprise as a successful business paradigm has become a reality:
 The development of theWorld Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) [26], the Sustainable Enterprise Acad-
emy (SEA) [36], and other consulting organizations whose
purpose is to train and inform business leaders on sustainable
enterprise.
 The creation of sustainable stock indexes such as the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index (DJSI), which are designed to measure the
economic performance of sustainable enterprises, enabling
comparison to indexes which do not measure any aspect of
sustainability.
 The growing number of paid advertisements and web sites
encouraging and reporting on sustainable efforts as a compet-
itive advantage.
 The audited sustainability reports of hundreds of leading firms
that have utilized the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as their
guide in preparing their reports.
The benefits of sustainable strategic plans for SMEs are different
from those offered to MNEs. With their large asset bases, MNEs can
invest and spread the costs of product development over a large
and diversified global market. For large firms, if a strategic plan or
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in some market half way around the globe, it will be. This re-
alization of greater returns from RþD has generally been perceived
as an advantage for larger firms, as they are incumbent in global
markets. The limits and advantages of smaller firms are well de-
scribed by A´cs [37], in particular the limitations which are based on
a historically defined, geographically limited market scope for non-
networked SMEs; however, SMEs are also able to act more nimbly
to fill local or specialized market and technology niche markets
[15,37,38] through being less encumbered by existing organiza-
tional structures that predate sustainability as a factor in enterprise
performance:
Industries that are capital-intensive, concentrated, and adver-
tising intensive, tend to promote the innovation advantage in
large firms. The small firm innovation advantage, however, tends
to occur in industries in the early stages of the life cycle, where
total innovation and the use of skilled labor play a large role, and
where large firms comprise a high share of the market [15].
An organization’s resilience and ability to ‘‘integrate, build, and
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly
changing environments’’ are critical success factors in coping with
shifting markets and for responding to disruptive innovations and
change [39]. Rothaermel andHess [40] suggest that the antecedents
to build these organizational capabilities can be found at the in-
dividual, organizational, and network level. At the organizational
level, two major hurdles to effectively manage disruptive in-
novations and change are higher in larger firms and lower in smaller
firms.
3.1. Streamlined organizational processes and business models
One hurdle for larger organizations to surmount is that while
they usually have adequate human capital assets and other re-
sources, they are often caught facing the challenges of disruptive
change with inappropriate and ineffective organizational processes
and business models [41]. An organization’s capacity to meet the
challenges of disruptive change is affected by its resources, pro-
cesses, and values. Initially, organizational resources determine the
firm’s capabilities. As the firm matures, organizational processes
become well-defined, and once the firm’s business model becomes
clearly defined, organizational values are articulated. These factors
– resources, processes, and values – are the building blocks of the
organization’s culture. Christensen and Overdorf [41] argue that
changing a company’s processes, business models, values, and
ultimately its culture is difficult, if not impossible, for large,
established companies; and yet, this is precisely what must happen
in order for a firm to deal with disruptive innovations and major
changes. Smaller organizations can leverage their capacities for
entrepreneurial innovations and organizational change, thereby,
learning to achieve advantages over larger organizations [42].
3.2. SMEs exposure to competitive forces
A second hurdle is that while larger organizations may do well
initially with technological developments, their capability to
ameliorate competitive constraints insulates them so that they are
likely to become weaker competitors over time, compared with
smaller organizations that cannot escape the rigors of technology
survival contests [43]. When disruptive innovation and change are
driven by competition contests, larger organizations tend to have
significant survival and competitive advantages [43,44]. However,
when a larger organization succeeds in neutralizing the constraints
of competition, the organization’s perceived invulnerability serves
as insulation from critical sources of continuous organizational
development. Hence, strategies that isolate organizations fromcompetition may actually backfire, such that larger organizations
become weaker competitors in the long run [43]. These implica-
tions suggest that since smaller firms cannot effectively constrain
competitive forces nor shield themselves from these external
forces, the organizational development processes of smaller firms
may also constitute a built-in engine for addressing the challenges
of disruptive innovation and change.
4. SMEs as a laboratory-sandbox for developing sustainable
strategies and technologies which are then integrated into
MNEs via acquisition
SMEs have traditionally been entrepreneurial businesses that
grow through internal financing. The leap to external financing or
acquisition becomes necessary when growth outpaces the ability of
the SME to finance that growth, or if an SME’s technology or market
segment becomes of special interest to investors [8]. Small firms
can fulfill the desire to grow larger by raising capital in public
markets, or they can become attractive acquisition targets for larger
firms [37]. Large firms seeking investments or acquisitions in small
to medium sized enterprises typically use traditional strategies to
improve profitability by:
 acquiring SME technology and market share [45];
 achieving ‘‘roll-up’’ efficiencies through elimination of re-
dundant expenses [46];
 de-fragmenting markets through consolidation of SME com-
petitors [47].
The benefits that SMEs bring to larger firms may be otherwise
unreachable by larger organizations. However, there are hurdles in
seeking to integrate smaller firms into larger organizations.
Roughly 50–80% of mergers and acquisitions, depending on whose
research is cited, fail to deliver anticipated benefits [48]. Regardless
of whether the focus of an acquisition is on the issue of strategic fit,
or organizational fit, or the acquisition process itself, failure rates
remain consistently high [49]. Two meta-analyses of empirical
studies called for a ‘‘greater recognition of the process and organi-
zational dimensions of acquisitions’’ that are increasingly recog-
nized in thebehavioral literature [50,51]; for example, inappropriate
decision-making, negotiation and integration processes can lead to
inferior acquisition outcomes [52–54]. Additional industrial ecology
criteria [5] for gauging the success of an SME acquisition should be
whether the acquired SME helps an MNE reduce its degrees of
unsustainability, or increases MNE capabilities to fundamentally
strengthen the systemic underpinnings of sustainability [55].
Despite the risks for larger firms, being acquired is an interesting
option for SMEs, financially and organizationally, since acquisition
can free the founding entrepreneurs and their capital, to continue
to develop new firms and to pursue other synergistic alternatives.
5. Network advantages for SMEs utilizing the effects of
creative destruction and information technology
One of the apparent reasons for the increasing number of
smaller firms globally is the acceleration of ‘‘creative destruction’’
effects caused by rapid technology transitions within global
markets [41,56]. This factor has persisted despite the breadth of
advantages inherent to larger firms [31,57]. Moreover, globalization
of communication technology is facilitating the formation of SME
networks. These inter-organizational networks, which are strategic
partnerships or alliances among SME stakeholders, introduce a new
organizational form into A´cs’ assumptions [37], as networked SMEs
can behave in the marketplace as a single larger firm, thereby
achieving market penetration through synchronized competency
building [58–60].
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leveraging the ‘‘force multiplier’’ advantages of stakeholder net-
working [61]. The continuous updating of organizational learning
and knowledge bases through networking is a significant way for
SMEs to achieve both positional and performance advantages in the
face of disruptive innovations and change. The involvement of
former and new business, government, and NGO collaborators
creates communities of sustainable-knowledge networks similar to
the open-source participation model that is ‘‘lumpy with small
groups and clustered with coalitions’’ [60], rather than clearly de-
fined roles with linear reporting hierarchies [20]. For these many
reasons, SMEs are evolving to play a significant role within the
modern global economy. If judged solely by the percentage of all
employees working in them, it may be said smaller firms are really
the backbone of the modern market. Therefore, SME’s behaviors
and characteristics are important in the evolution towards resilient,
sustainable enterprises. If over 95% of all global enterprises are
SMEs, and there is a growing mandate to create sustainable en-
terprises, then developing and implementing strategies for pro-
moting SME investments in sustainable business practices is
paramount in making progress towards sustainability [62]. The
growing competitiveness and importance of SMEs in the general
economy are linked to the growing influence of networking these
firms to meet the demands of growing populations participating in
global markets [57,63,64].
Axelrod indicated that the results from experimental game
theory, where games are developed that mimic market behavior,
show that linking individuals through networks develops in-
terdependence, and that interdependence makes cooperation
muchmore efficient than adversity and conflict [65]. Comparing the
role and influence of large trans-national enterprises and SMEs in
the world of the 21st century is, in reality, comparing the influence
of fluid and nimble decentralized networks of numerous SMEs
seeking mutually efficient transactions, vs. fewer (albeit mega-
sized) global multinational firms, seeking monopoly. It is very
similar to comparing mainframe computers to networked PCs [66].
6. The end game of the comparison of large and small firms is
the triple bottomline
Kerr concludes that SMEs should develop strategies that in-
corporate sustainable development, and that the resulting skills
would guide them to act in a sustainable way [62]. Acting and
leading in sustainable ways that acknowledge the global commons
are premised on multiple ethical, social, and environmental im-
peratives. However, significant research findings which cannot be
ignored indicate that a primary survival driver for SMEs (or for any
size firm) to invest in sustainability must increase opportunity for
profits and/or to avoid threats to profitable growth [1,11,33,67]; i.e.,
firms will not value a global commons unless a connection to
profitability is made.
Will larger firms or networked SMEs produce the most rapid
returns on investment in a global market scenario where sustain-
able development must occur? Will the highest returns from in-
vestments in sustainability be achieved within a rapid transition to
networks of sustainability driven SMEs, or through an evolution of
MNEs transitioning towards sustainable behavior? Inevitably,
whichever avenue produces the most rapid returns on investment,
this will depend on situational market environments and organi-
zational capabilities, will yield improved competitive advantage,
and will become the preferred structure for a particular situation.
In situations that require long term, very large financial in-
vestments in infrastructure and R&D, MNEs with large market
capitalizations may remain the most efficient organizational form.
Their diversified sources of income and ability to efficiently pene-
trate global markets should maximize their returns. However, asSMEs become more firmly networked and investors become com-
fortable with networked structures, combining assets of networks
could provide equal sources of market capital and access. There is
also the additional evidence that the market capital of MNEs will
most likely be utilized for investments that are aligned with in-
cumbent MNE activities, rather than unaligned opportunities that
are disruptive to existing business activities [57]. Herein is another
advantage for SMEs: the ability to connect unaligned opportunities
by becoming sustainable suppliers in global supply chains.
7. SMEs as sustainable suppliers in global supply chains
Firms of all size are increasingly being confronted by multiple
external stakeholders to demonstrate a commitment to corporate
social and environmental responsibility (CSR/CER). One response is
‘‘supplier management for risks and performance’’ that takes
a minimalist approach to incorporate environmental and social
criteria to complement what are essentially economic-based sup-
plier evaluations [16]. The second strategy, ‘‘supply chain man-
agement for sustainable products’’ goes beyond mere compliance
with legislation and regulations; it demands the ‘‘definition of life
cycle based standards for the environmental and social perfor-
mance of products’’ that are implemented by certified companies
upstream and downstream in the supply chain [16,68,69]. For ex-
ample, one of the ‘‘leading-edge efforts to incorporate sustainable
systems thinking into the design and development of new energy
and mobility solutions is Well-to-wheels life cycle modeling’’ [5].
Vachon and Mao established a link between sustainability in-
dicators and supply chain strength (defined as the availability,
quality, and interactions among organizations in the supply chain)
at the country level [70]. Their findings indicate that no trade-off
exists between sustainability and economic development and
wealth creation; i.e., ‘‘a positive link between supply chain strength
and natural environment is possible’’ [68].
While SMEs may acknowledge their often significant environ-
mental impacts (in the UK, for instance, SMEs could be responsible
for up to 70% of all industrial pollution) [20], SMEs may tend to
focus their CSR/CER behaviors on internal stakeholders, rather than
on stakeholders in the supply chain [19]. The high costs and re-
source demands make it difficult for SMEs to adopt CSR/CER
practices and monitor their transfer along the supply chain.
Meeting these demands is all the more difficult for SMEs operating
in developing countries, and it is generally pressure from customers
or supply chain partners in developed countries that is the primary
driver for SMEs in developing countries to adopt CSR/CER behaviors
[19]. Much of the literature to date considers the role of SMEs
primarily as suppliers of larger companies. When SMEs produce
unique sustainability technologies or processes, they can use their
innovation potential to move their customers in the supply chain
towards more sustainable directions [20]. SMEs need also to be
considered as buyers from upstream suppliers, and by acting as
buyers, SMEs can exert more pressure for ‘‘sustainable supply chain
management,’’ defined as the ‘‘management of SCs where all the
three dimensions of sustainability, namely the economic, envi-
ronmental, and social ones, are taken into account’’ [19]. Ultimately,
what determines the success of SMEs in sustainable SCM is
a combination of their relative unique product positioning in niche
markets and the personal CSR/CER values of the owner/entrepre-
neur [19]. This is precisely the commitment that is needed to evolve
towards a systems approach to sustainability.
8. SME sustainability and resilience
It seems that rapid growth and disruptive innovations are being
achieved by SMEs from core competencies derived from a focus on
entrepreneurial sustainability. Why are small firms innovating in
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reason for this differential may be due to the nature of sustain-
ability itself. Hart and Milstein [4] introduced a strategy framework
which describes how firms can analyze investments through the
lens of ‘‘sustainable enterprise’’ with the goal of increasing profit-
ability synergized through increasing sustainability. Their frame-
work directs investments that profitably resolve tensions created
by the following global conditions:
 increasing human population;
 approaching the limits of the available environmental
commons;
 apparent limitations to growth due to limited availability of
energy and raw materials;
 globalization of trade and economic development;
 social issues (war and terrorism) that disrupt global trade.
Hart and Milstein’s framework is shown in a 22 matrix that
analyzes returns on investments in sustainability which can pro-
duce ‘‘present’’ and ‘‘future’’ value within internal operations of the
firm and externally in the broader market (see Fig. 1). While larger
firms seek paths to increased profits through innovations within an
existing ‘‘sustainability space,’’ the appreciation in value for MNEs
is largely achieved through maximizing opportunities found in
lower quadrants of Hart’s strategic matrix, i.e., incremental im-
provement in existing operations through pollution prevention and
by finding sustainable efficiencies. Larger, incumbent firms first
must ‘‘fix’’ perceived challenges in present operations, before they
begin experimenting in new markets [31].
A reviewof business cases indicates that SMEs can bring skill sets
to bear on disruptive opportunities quickly and more competitively
than existing MNE firms [17,28,33,71]. These cases, ranging from
health care and communications to apparel and manufacturing, all
have similar narratives: SMEs, founded and structured using a lens
of sustainability, can focus on new innovations without the dis-
tractions of having to ‘‘fix’’ existing operations. These SMEs, focused
on sustainable opportunities, do not have an existing history of
‘‘compliance only’’ investment and infrastructure to overcome.
SMEs can invest in leading edge efforts in sustainable enterprise,
without risking or dealing with entrenched expectations internally


























Fig. 1. The Hart–Milstein matrix for assessing the value of sustainabilitySeventh Generation (‘‘green’’ cleaning products), Plug Power
(hydrogen fuel cells), Zip Cars (transportation services), Grameen
Bank (micro-credit), etc., produced strategies working throughout
all quadrants of the Hart–Milstein matrix, but most of the value
(growth) has occurred in the upper half of the matrix. These are the
areas of innovation and repositioning for green technology de-
velopment, efficient resource utilization, socially aligned business,
and meeting the needs of the base of the economic pyramid [33].
9. Conclusions
As SMEs succeed in integrating social and environmental sus-
tainability performance into financial projections and strategic
business goals, they will expand opportunities for innovation by
increasing their opportunities for rapid learning. This paper has
made the business case for SMEs investing in sustainability while
exploring various scenarios: being acquired by an MNE; becoming
networked with other SMEs; playing a major role in creating and
maintaining sustainable supply chain management.
Whether larger firms wishing to venture into new sustainable
business segments will find it less expensive to enter these markets
through investment or acquisition of adroit SMEs, or whether they
will build capability internally, is still an unanswered question and
may relate to the perceived importance of sustainability within the
existing management of MNE firms. As ‘‘new’’ business units at-
tempt to compete for resources within larger firms, organizational
hurdles arise, if these new units compete with or are in conflict
with incumbent activities. As rates of change are accelerated by
global environmental and social conditions, new disruptive paths
will be necessary to answer these challenges, even if they are not in
alignment with current missions. Disruptive ‘‘skunk works’’ may be
forced to develop outside MNE structures. Such a situation is
documented in ‘‘The NIKE World Shoe Case’’ where NIKE was un-
successful with an inexpensive, sustainable ‘‘world shoe’’ that was
designed for developing markets, because it was in conflict with
existing brands and company missions [72].
Smaller firms can often develop without such competitive fric-
tion and expectations. Therefore, MNEs may find that by adopting
new sustainable strategies, through SMEs, they can more quickly
evolve technologies and markets that are disruptive, rather than
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within an organization’s strategic plan, from Hart and Milstein [4].
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strengthens an open-system approach to global sustainability [5].
Networked SMEs provide much financial and organizational
efficiency that enable development of technologies and markets
essential to achieve ‘‘sustainable development.’’ Many of these
developments are new and disruptive. While larger firms have
organizational barriers that may slow innovation in more revolu-
tionary technology and market spaces, SMEs are not as large and
therefore, do not have as many organizational inertia effects. Ex-
actly how important individual SMEs will be to a sustainability
driven local or global marketplace and how disruptive their accel-
erating rate of entry and exit into and out of markets could be on
their economies, may depend upon their speed and efficiency of
networking so they can act in congress [59]. Networking should
mitigate the disruptive influences generated by individual SMEs
and should help to produce progress towards sustainable de-
velopment. This can only occur if cooperation on the challenges
facing society and ecology clearly favor the competitiveness of the
networked companies and if stable business communities are
formed [65,73]. The connection to Corral’s insights should be clear
[67]: to be sustainable, SMEs must network in order to obtain the
size and efficiencies needed to compete. Through the success of
such networks, the individual SMEsmust believe that the success of
the whole is paramount to individual SME successes.
Developing networked SME strategies for sustainable supply
chain management also seems to offer opportunities for better
economic performance in market spaces that are foreign to MNEs.
As creative destruction effects accelerate within an increasing
global marketplace, the gravitational effects from existing in-
cumbent operations may not allow large firms to take full advan-
tage of clean technologies, resource efficiencies, including raw
materials and new energy sources, and the needs of emerging
populations of consumers. SMEs have demonstrated the ability to
thrive in these new spaces. Perhaps, new networked organizational
structures, including sustainable supply chains involving SMEs and
MNEs, will emerge, with MNEs supplying much needed in-
frastructure and capital, and SMEs providing the sustainability
driven innovation engine that MNEs desire. While more than one
successful model of the sustainable enterprise is evolving, collab-
oration, with the ‘force multiplier’ of networks will remain essen-
tial for addressing the systemic problems that underlie industrial
ecology, enterprise resilience, and global sustainability. Real and
lasting systemic changes can only be achieved through coordinated
global efforts, and this will necessitate collaborative participation
from public, private, and non-governmental organizations.
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Abstract
The utility of applying a virtual learning network model for illustrating successful triple bottom line transitionsdone that integrates the
ecological, economic, and social dimensions of cleaner productiondis illustrated by a successful approach to promote ‘‘green chemistry’’ in
the North Carolina textile wet-processing industry. This case is unique in demonstrating the quality of this process to develop cleaner production
methods; it shows how reducing aquatic toxicity and harmful environmental effects in a ‘‘real world’’ situation depends on successful efforts to
build, manage, and maintain an inter-organizational network of multiple stakeholders. This network included industries in the textile production
chain, their local and provincial communities, regulators and policy makers. The utilization of cases such as this in the business school pedagogy
expands understanding of the role of sustainable practices in enterprise management. The value of this specific case in promoting the understand-
ing of such networks was demonstrated in a recent MBA experience when students trained in these areas linked diverse stakeholders and applied
the triple bottom line perspective in traditional business simulation exercises in an MBA capstone course. Such cases can also effectively prepare
students for actual challenges facing managers in the rapidly changing business environment.
 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Stakeholder management; Networks; Learning organizations1. Introduction
Effective sustainable industrial development requires the
building, managing, and maintaining of inter-organizational
networks. These networks are comprised of the diverse stake-
holders that are necessary for a triple bottom line approach to
development. This includes the use of techniques that create
economic success for business enterprises by meeting social
and environmental objectives. Adopting sustainable business
practices generally involve changing institutional visions
and operations on many levels. These changes include
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(S.B. Moore).
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doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2005.11.033coordination and formation of networks of organizations
(public, corporate, and environmental) to act as strategic stake-
holders representing specific issues.
Given the number of institutional and administrative chal-
lenges associated with sustainable industrial development
and production methods, there is an ongoing need for concep-
tual models that increase understanding and clarity about the
various forms of inter-organizational collaborative partner-
ships among stakeholders (Hawken [1]). A number of re-
searchers have referred to the network phenomena in public
administration since as early as 1978 in terms of: issue net-
works (e.g., Heclo [2]; implementation structures (e.g., Hjern
and Porter [3], Trist [4]; inter-organizational policy systems
(e.g., Milward and Wamsley [5]); advocacy coalitions (e.g.,
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith [6]); policy formation and imple-
mentation (e.g., Rainey and Milward [7], Mandell [8], Marin
892 S.L. Manring, S.B. Moore / Journal of Cleaner Production 14 (2006) 891e899and Mayntz [9], Bressers, O’Toole, and Richardson [10],
Agranoff [11], O’Toole [12]); and self-governing institutional
arrangements (e.g., Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker [13]). There
is emerging evidence that the application of network structures
and learning organizational models, when placed within the
broader context of sustainable development and production,
can be very productive (Wheeler [14]). Wheeler noted the
case of Shell in Nigeria, where the inability to form productive
networks among diverse stakeholders dramatically slowed oil
production and cost the lives of many people.
The differences between ‘‘traditional’’ and network-based
structures can be shown graphically as depicted in Fig. 1. In
this figure, ‘‘A’’ is a traditional organizational structure. The
‘‘dots’’ symbolize departments, units of operation, factories,
shareholders or even stakeholders, all within a traditional orga-
nization. Notice that these units are enclosed and aligned by
the framework or structure of their organization. They may
be connected but they can connect only within their organiza-
tional framework (inside the box), and unless the size of the
framework is increased, there is a barrier that must be over-
come to include units that are not inside the box. Metaphori-
cally, this framework creates alignment inside, but can also
be seen as a barrier to units trying to work outside the frame-
work, or to units outside the framework trying to connect in-
side. In this manner, traditional organizational structures
inhibit diverse connections.
There are significant costs associated with developing and
maintaining organizational structure overhead (it requires en-
ergy to build and maintain a wall), as well as the costs for con-
necting outside of the box (you have to dig under, climb over,
drill through or destroy the wall). These are the challenges of
traditional organizational structures in a dynamic global econ-
omy that is driven by the forces of ‘‘creative destruction’’ and
rapid change (Hart and Milstein [15]).
‘‘B’’ in Fig. 1 graphically represents a connected network
structure. The links or edges between the units or vertices
are forged as needed. There is no expenditure for maintenance




Fig. 1. Traditional organizational and emerging network structures.exit. The only energy required is to find connections to the net-
work. In the dynamic global economy, removing the barriers
to swift change is clearly a major asset.
This paper demonstrates the utility of applying an inter-
organizational network (ION) model that incorporates dimen-
sions of a network structure with a virtual Web organization.
As the network acquires the properties of a learning organiza-
tion, by generating multiple feedback loops to the stake-
holders, the emerging shared perspective enables increased
productivity through the adoption of sustainable development
and production methods. The challenges of a networked
structure, which are addressed in this paper, include how to
forge the connections and achieve alignment among those
connections (Dorogovtsev and Mendes [16]).
The model presented here is practically illustrated by an
analysis of the process that promoted ‘‘green chemistry,’’ to
reduce aquatic toxicity and harmful environmental effects, in
the North Carolina textile dyeing and finishing (wet process-
ing) industry during the late 1980s. This case illustrates that
an ION structure provided a framework that was flexible
enough to involve diverse stakeholders as resources in
problem solving, even inside of traditional business enter-
prises. This occurred because the traditional business organi-
zations were treated as a single member of the network and
the network provided the governance and structure to the dia-
logue and process, not the businesses. The ION was also
effective in enabling stakeholders to resolve environmental
regulatory non-compliance issues at minimal economic cost
to the stakeholders involved.
2. Background on North Carolina’s aquatic toxicity
situation2
The wastewaters discharged into the rivers of North Caro-
lina are regulated by federal (USEPA), State (NCDWQ), and
local Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) authorities
as a tiered regulatory approach under the Federal Clean Water
Act (CWA). The treated wastewaters are tested to ensure that
the levels of organic and inorganic pollutants fall within a com-
pliance limit that is based on the characteristics and ‘‘best
use’’ of the water body receiving the treated wastewaters.
Since the advent of the CWA, wastewater treatment facilities
have been under increasing pressure by stakeholders of the
common resource to lower the concentrations and toxicity of
the treated wastewater being discharged.
In 1982, the USEPA and the NCDWQ implemented
a change in water quality testing that, for the first time, was
based on aquatic bioassays. Bioassays take the treated waste-
water and test it for acute toxicity and reproductive inhibition.
During this period of 1985e1995, over 50% of the wastewater
being treated by POTW facilities in North Carolina came from
textile dyeing and finishing operations. As the NCDWQ began
to test POTW discharges that contained large amounts of
textile dyeing and finishing process waters, it found a large
2 A complete description of this case can be found in [17].
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produced discharges that were not suitable for reproduction of
aquatic life (Ausley [17]).
When the POTWs were found to have failed the toxicity
compliance test, engineering firms were called in to give esti-
mates on what changes in treatment plant design would be
necessary to achieve a compliant, non-toxic wastewater. Costs
to improve treatment plant designs were very large, estimated
in the tens of millions of dollars, and it was unclear if the de-
sign changes could produce nontoxic treated effluents. Since
budgetary constraints dictated that new treatment facilities
were too costly, it was obvious that another approach was nec-
essary. It was also clear that these engineers, working within
the mental models dictated by the framework of corporations,
did not have the answers to resolving these challenges.
Because of the nature of environmental regulations,
NCDWQ was required to send notices of violation to the
POTWs, with fines levied. To avoid the fines, the POTW
had to produce an action plan, which when accepted by the
technical compliance branches of NCDWQ, produced a period
of grace for the POTW while it resolved the problems, either
by plant construction or by some other method. Since plant
construction was not a viable economic option for many
communities, ‘‘some other method’’ had to be devised. This
resulted in opening dialogues with stakeholder groups,
biologists and chemists, which were outside of the ‘‘normal’’
engineering based waste treatment conversations.
Historically, the implementation of the 1974 Clean Water
Act resulted in the engineering of additional filters on waste
treatment facilities. These filters were costly to develop, pro-
duce and maintain and importantly, were not economically pro-
ductive investments. As integrated approaches to pollution
management matured, it became apparent that there was an al-
ternative to additional treatment for industrial waste streams,
‘‘Pollution Prevention.’’ Pollution Prevention (P-2) is the con-
cept and approach that emphasizes rather than use wastewater
filters, it is more prudent to redesign industrial processes to pre-
vent the production of pollutants at their sources, in the first
place. With the advent of environmental management systems
in the mid 1990s, P-2 efforts became formalized and recognized
as additional tools for pollution abatement and were also called
‘‘Cleaner Production.’’ An example of the evolution of policy,
P-2, and globalization can be found in an associated case of
the textile industry in Demark. This case demonstrated the ef-
fects of reengineering processes, factories, and the chemicals
used in textiles and the invention of new waste treatment
methods. The case also demonstrated, sadly, that some of the in-
dustry left Denmark and moved into less regulated countries to
avoid environmental costs of any kind (Sondergard [18]).
In the parallel North Carolina situation, historically and up
to the mid-1990s, the textile industry was very important to the
economic well being of the area. The challenge was to design
an ad hoc inter-organizational network structure that included
all the stakeholders to operate and supervise the P-2 effort and
retain the industry as a viable economic force in the state. The
network had to be designed to include controls and bench-
marks that would allow NCDWQ to convince USEPA thata ‘‘grace period’’ could be allowed while the alliance of indus-
try, POTW, NCDWQ, consultants, and stakeholders diagnosed
the problem and developed the environmental management
system. This involved elevating the level of confidence in
a closely monitored dialogue-based process to the same level
of respect given to the construction of additional waste treat-
ment facilities.
3. The nature of the inter-organizational network in
promoting sustainable development
An inter-organizational network (ION), such as the one re-
quired for North Carolina’s Toxicity Prevention program, is
a strategic partnership or alliance among the stakeholders
who come together to collaboratively address and resolve mu-
tual concerns regarding sustainable development and produc-
tion methods. The ION is both larger and greater than the
individual stakeholder organizations that comprise it, and the
structure and processes of this superordinate entity directly
impact stakeholder collaboration and consensus building
efforts. For instance, the network that connected the various
institutional stakeholders to NC’s P-2 program had no hierar-
chical power and authority; it was a loosely coupled, dynamic
political system, rather than a tightly bonded, homogeneous,
hierarchically controlled system, however, critical stake-
holders included the USEPA, NCDWQ, the local POTWs,
NGOs, the public, the textile industry, and the textile industry
supply chain.
Inter-organizational networks such as this one behave more
as a group of affiliates than a traditional supply chain network.
They are like an organizational sandbox, where shifting roles
and structures can be experimental. Furthermore, effective ne-
gotiations within IONs require the relaxing of stakeholder
organizational boundaries, as the power structures are more
democratic. Of the three types of networks (internal, stable,
and dynamic) identified by Miles and Snow [19], the institu-
tional arrangement among the stakeholders for sustainable de-
velopment is most like a dynamic network, i.e., an ad hoc
alliance among the strategic stakeholders. Each stakeholder or-
ganization is independent and collaborates on a specific project
or opportunity, based on its skills and expertise (Van Alstyne
[20]). While it exists, this network is a ‘‘highly decentralized
and densely integrated social system that maximizes mutual in-
fluence and communication’’ (Bovasso [21]). It may also act
like a matrix structure utilized in many research and develop-
ment settings, where resources are used as needs emerge, to-
ward the achievement of a common goal (Susskind [22]).
The inter-organizational arrangements required for NC’s
sustainable textile industry production shared the key princi-
ples of networked organizations (Lipnack and Stamps [23],
Surowiecki [24]).
3.1. Unifying purpose
The stakeholder organizations became networked when
there was a consensus about the value and goal of
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duction practices and pollution prevention.
3.2. Independent members
Each member of the network, whether an individual or
a stakeholder organization, could stand on its own while
benefiting from being part of the whole.
3.3. Voluntary links
The links that connected sustainable development stake-
holders in various combinations were far more profuse and
omni-directional than in other types of organizations. As com-
munication pathways increased, the links continued to grow
and develop.
3.4. Multiple leaders
The inter-organizational network tended to be leaderful,
rather than leaderless. Each person or group (stakeholder) in
the network had something unique to contribute. With more
than one leader, the network, as a whole, had great resilience.
3.5. Integrated levels
The NC textile industry sustainable development ION was
multileveled rather than flat. Hence, the network tended to be
lumpy with small groups and clustered with coalitions across
the various stakeholder organizations.
All stakeholders had crucial roles to play. Each was neces-
sary to provide the advocacy and skill set to solve the toxicity
problem, but these groups knew little about the intricacies of
each other’s operations and did not trust each other. These dy-
namics are explored in the following discussion of the inter-
organizational network as a ‘‘Virtual Web.’’ The analogy to
the World Wide Web (WWW) is intentional. When the
WWW is accessed, the user trusts that the connection will
be made to the information source. The source is used, the in-
formation retained or discarded, and the link saved or dis-
carded. A similar dynamic was developed in the North
Carolina situation: the network was developed, the links
were forged and data flow occurred. Thus, the network func-
tioned as intended.
4. The sustainable development network as a
‘‘Virtual Web’’
Since introduction of the term, ‘‘virtual organization’’
(Moshowitz [25]), there have been many definitions to de-
scribe this form of network organization (Goldman and Nagel
[26]; Hardwick et al. [27]; Upton and McAfee [28]). Trans-
lated in terms of an ION, ‘‘virtualness’’ (Venkatraman and
Henderson [29]) is the ability of the network to involve mul-
tiple stakeholders in value-adding shared learning processes,
in order to create integrated solutions to complex sustainable
industrial development and production issues.Franke’s concept of the ‘‘virtual Web’’ [30], developed in
the context of computer networks, has been borrowed and
adapted to further clarify the dimensions of a sustainable de-
velopment network. While not an actual organizational entity,
the virtual web is a dynamic sort of network among the stake-
holders. The virtual web is created when a pool of independent
stakeholders agrees in principle to form an alliance or partner-
ship to collaborate around effective sustainable industrial de-
velopment and production practices. This can be further
described as the development of domains in which a set of or-
ganized stakeholders act as ‘‘routers’’ forming network con-
nections. The three requirements for the success of a virtual
web were, similarly, prerequisites for the success of NC’s tex-
tile industry ION: (1) participation by all relevant stake-
holders, (2) sound decision-making processes based on clear
common objectives, and (3) strong legitimacy, derived from
the stakeholders (Franke [30]).
Two concepts from the computer science field: ‘‘multi-
plexing’’ and ‘‘virtual memory’’ explain the interrelation be-
tween the words virtual and organization (Savage [31]) and
illustrate the power of looking at a sustainable development
network as a virtual web. Multiplexing refers to the parallel
transmission of more than one message over a single line. In-
dividuals within various stakeholder organizations of the NC
textile industry ION learned to multiplex by simultaneously
and in parallel grasping their stakeholder-specific interests
and recognizing the larger, virtual web perspective. Further-
more, if any of the stakeholders decided not to participate or
communicate, the work of the network could continue as
only that one connection was severed. A decentralized
multi-stakeholder network, when combined with multiplexing
communication and a firm plan for data storage and external
communication (creation of loops), also offers a powerful
structure that can lend equity: the communication infrastruc-
ture is not owned by any one node but is dependent on all no-
des for value (Senge [32]).
The concept of virtual memory enables computer systems
to run much larger programs than their physical memory
would allow by swapping blocks of information into and out
of random access memory as needed. Similarly, by swapping
blocks of information among stakeholder organizations, the
NC textile industry ION was able to create a virtual memory
bank that could be retained and therefore operate a much
larger sustainable development program, i.e., comprehend
a systemic view of the issues and use retained learning. This
volume of shared learning, made possible through the virtual
web, created a ‘‘conceptual infrastructure’’ (Manring et al.
[33]) for addressing textile industry-related aquatic toxicity is-
sues, with built-in requirements for disclosure, accountability,
and reconciliation.
There are multiple links in the virtual web that connect the
stakeholder organizations in a sustainable development net-
work. These links continue to grow, develop, or dissolve and
produce value-added processes as communication pathways
increase and trust strengthens among the stakeholders. The
‘‘spiral of trust’’ (Franke [30]) that subsequently develops
within a network was a key property and sensibility developed
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The commitment to the partnership offered both a forum of
stability and a high level of motivation for all collaborating
organizations.
In the case of the NC textile industry ION, the NCDWQ
firmly believed in the positive nature of Pollution Prevention.
It had formed its own P-2 group, which was a separate entity
from its enforcement branch, and which acted as an indepen-
dent consultant to industry. Therefore, when this opportunity
to solve the aquatic toxicity problems presented itself, one
of the key stakeholders in the first ION was the NC P-2 group,
who acted as the feedback loop of the NCDWQ. This imme-
diately produced credibility for the effort. The NC P-2 docu-
mented and published the results of the toxicity reduction
evaluation (TRE), thereby making the information available
to the statewide network of consultants via the Internet. This
allowed the network to grow and spread information quickly,
which is another attribute of networks.
5. Leadership and learning in a sustainable
development network
Dynamic networks tend to be managed by what Miles and
Snow [19] called a ‘‘net-broker’’ and what the World Wide
Web calls ‘‘routers’’ (Surowiecki [24]). The function of the
broker, or router, of a dynamic network is not necessarily
part of a single organization. On the macro-organizational
level, the net-broker (router) manages the network and may
also serve as facilitator, coordinator, and moderator among
stakeholder members of the ION. In the case of the NC textile
industry ION, credible and transparent leadership was a key to
success. The duties of the net-broker, articulated by Franke
[30], have been adapted for the management of a sustainable
development network, with examples from the NC textile in-
dustry ION.
5.1. Initiation and preparation of the network
When the first NC textile industry ION was formed, it was
decided that a consultant would be hired by the POTW to lead
local efforts to organize the stakeholders. This was very im-
portant to the textile industries that discharged to the treatment
system, as they wanted an impartial ‘‘expert’’ to communicate
with NCDWQ and to act as a quality supervisor to the process.
In this preparation phase, a primary task of the consultant,
serving as the net-broker (router), was to create a common
bond and to promote mutual trust. The net-broker also became
a trust bridge: stakeholders trusted the consultant before they
really knew or trusted each other. By trusting the consultant,
the stakeholders allowed the formation of connections among
themselves, routed by the net-broker-consultant.
5.2. Maintaining and improving the network
collaboration
The consultant facilitated the processes that promoted ne-
gotiations of the problem definition, standardized practices,and sped up the partnering among network members. Since
the textile industry had been determined to be a primary cause
of the aquatic toxicity, it was felt that the consultant should un-
derstand textile operations, the bioassay testing, and be active
in the areas of aquatic toxicity identification and reduction
evaluation. The consultant would devise and supervise the pro-
ject design and implementation, run the stakeholder meetings,
and provide the progress reports to all stakeholders.
5.3. Promoting the partnership concept
This managerial function of promoting the partnership con-
cept has been described as ‘‘caretaker’’ (Snow et al. [34]).
Once the consultant was hired, all of the industries in the
town and any other interested stakeholders were invited to
a meeting hosted at the local municipal building. The
NCDWQ was present and endorsed the process. The process
that was to take place was made transparent, and every person
or group who wanted to speak was given the opportunity.
5.4. Monitoring and continuously improving network
performance
The NCDWQ accepted the ION’s proposal to identify and
then eliminate the toxic agents responsible for the aquatic tox-
icity. During the one year initial time period of toxicity reduc-
tion evaluation (TRE), no fines were assessed, but adherence
to action plans with timelines and progress reports were abso-
lutely necessary. NCDWQ made clear the penalties and fines
that would be levied against the POTW, if full cooperation
was not obtained from every stakeholder involved. The carrot
was the vast amount of potential savings to the POTW and in-
dustries by avoiding POTW construction. The stick was the
huge fines and increased costs to everyone if the problem
had to be resolved by building additional treatment facilities.
5.5. Responding to opportunities
As architect, the net-broker identifies individual activities
for stakeholders that respond to opportunities in the internal
and external environment of the network (Snow et al. [34]).
One such step the broker may take is to create a ‘‘virtual value
chain’’ Franke [30]. For instance, the net-broker in a sustain-
able development network knows the resources and competen-
cies of the stakeholders and designs a virtual value chain that
coordinates and integrates stakeholder contributions and re-
sponses to internal and external opportunities. Similar to
Franke’s description of an entrepreneur [30], the most valuable
asset of the net-broker in an ecosystem management network
is social capital, and the core competence is social contracting.
In the case of the NC textile industry ION, there was a com-
plex matrix of resources available for the consultant’s use (see
Fig. 2). The POTW provided sampling services and records of
treatment plant operations on an hourly basis. The textile
industry supplied chemical and production data with eco-
toxicity data on each chemical used in production, including
water treatment chemicals and janitorial chemicals (Ausley
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optimization and pollution prevention consulting services and
experts from North Carolina State University and other Uni-
versity of North Carolina system resources. The consultant’s
laboratories ran the necessary bioassays and flow studies to
measure the response from the process changes.
When the NC textile industry ION became more of an
intentional learning community, it began to create its own
culture Franke [30]. This phenomenon can be understood
more clearly by looking at the ION as a virtual learning
organization.
6. The sustainable development network as a virtual
learning organization
Sustainable development practices and organizational
learning theory have an important objective in common: to
achieve a state of generativeness of the system or organization,
as opposed to a mere survival of the system or organization.
Achieving this state of generative learning requires a new par-
adigm of consensus building through collaboration among
stakeholders. According to Senge, ‘‘In an increasingly
dynamic, interdependent, and unpredictable world, it is simply
no longer possible for anyone to ‘figure it all out at the top.’
The old model, ‘the top thinks and the local acts,’ must now
give way to integrating thinking and acting at all levels’’
(Senge [32]). The partnerships that form to address sustainable
industrial development and production cannot achieve their
goals by using mechanical, linear forms of thinking that as-
sume there is a convergent problem with a right answer. These
partnerships must intentionally become a learning organization
that effectively incorporates systems thinking, collaborative
learning, and consensus-based decision making in order to
deal with complex problems for which there are no simple
answers. Together the stakeholders in the sustainable develop-
ment network engage in a continuous learning process as they
create a virtual learning organization in a conceptual space
that did not exist until they joined to develop their collab-
















Fig. 2. North Carolina textile industry ION structure.Fifteen years ago, the learning organization was described
as a ‘‘consummately adaptive enterprise’’ (Damaine [35]). A
single organization might still be tempted to use adaptive,
‘‘single-loop’’ learning as a means of coping more effectively
with environmental change (Argyris and Schon [36]). How-
ever, by its essence, a sustainable development network of
stakeholder organizations provides the multiplicity of perspec-
tives necessary for divergent, generative learning, which is
about creating, rather than adapting. Generative learning is
a ‘‘double-loop,’’ self-questioning mode (Argyris and Schon
[36]). While the starting point for the stakeholders would be
their own organization’s norms, assumptions, perspectives,
and goals, the network’s collaborative, generative learning
processes would result in essentially new ways of looking at
sustainable development and production issues (triple-loop
learning) (Flood and Romm [37]). Ultimately, the network
would produce systemic solutions that transcend individual
stakeholder boundaries and views. This is the product of
network learning; the capacity to think together. The core
technologies of a sustainable development network are gener-
ative learning and consensus building through collaboration
(Manring et al. [33]).
In the case of the NC textile industry ION, the network
meetings from the outset were much more collaborative than
contentious. It became evident to everyone that all could coop-
erate and improve with a relatively small expense. Therefore,
the textile industry people immediately began to contact their
suppliers and add them as a resource to the network. They
made it clear that the chemical suppliers must become active
in the ION, and if the current products were not satisfactory,
cooperative vendors (competitors) would be given the opportu-
nity to supply biodegradable and less toxic alternatives. Once
the textile industry understood how the concentrations and the
toxicity of certain chemicals would affect the POTW
operations, market forces took over and a flood of ‘‘greener’’
chemistries began to appear. This market phenomenon was
also reported in the Danish textile industry (Sondergard [18]).
Monthly progress reports were sent to all parties. The ION
stakeholders agreed and approved the quarterly reports that
had to be sent to NCDWQ. As the process moved forward,
several industries had suppliers that did not have the resources
to provide the necessary data on their chemical products, so
other vendors were found. This provided an incentive for
a competitive market in greener chemistries. The longest de-
lays were caused by the lack of data and the time it took to
obtain the data on the various textile chemicals which had
not been tested in this fashion before (Ausley [17]).
The five essential disciplines for a learning organization
(Senge [38]) had direct relevance for the NC textile industry
ION.
6.1. Building a shared visiondthe practice of unearthing
shared pictures of the future that foster
genuine commitment
The purpose of the ION was to be generative, i.e., to be
creative in finding sustainable solutions that satisfied multiple
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the people who comprised the network to build commitment to
a shared vision that transcended their individual organizational
boundaries. The essential point here is what the vision did, not
what the vision was (Fulmer and Keys [39]). The ION had to
build the conceptual underpinnings and network infrastructure
that supported the systemic, sustainable perspective.
6.2. Personal masterydbecoming increasingly
self-aware and honing the skill of continually
clarifying and deepening one’s personal vision
The process of committing to the ‘‘green chemistry’’ vision
required transformation on the parts of the individual mem-
bers, whether they were individual persons or organizations.
While individuals joined the network to represent their organ-
ization’s interests, in order to be part of the generative process
of creating systemic solutions, these individuals had to share
their mental models and stretch to transcend their personal
and organizational worldviews.
6.3. Surfacing and testing mental modelsdthe ability to
unearth one’s internal pictures of the world, to scrutinize
them, and to make them open to the influence of others;
the willingness to discard old ways of thinking and
standard problem-solving routines
The stakeholders of the ION shared in creating a ‘‘commu-
nity of commitment,’’ to resolving the toxicity problem while
retaining the industry in North Carolina, which is at the heart
of an effective sustainable development network (Kofman and
Senge [40]). Over time, commitment became increasingly fo-
cused on generative learning about sustainable textile indus-
trial development and production methods, not on a specific
solution. The nature of the commitment required to build a sus-
tainable development network went beyond the stakeholders’
commitments to their own organizations. It encompassed
a commitment to the changes needed in managing sustainable
approaches to textile production and to seeing one’s organiza-
tion as one (but only one) of the essential vehicles for bringing
about such changes. Building the network and forging the
links between stakeholders became a large part of the ION’s
purpose.
6.4. Team learningdthe capacity to think together which
is gained by mastering the practice of dialogue and
discussion
As the ION stakeholders collaborated in creating a systemic,
sustainable perspective, they shifted their thinking from the
primacy of their individual stakeholder organization’s view,
to the primacy of the whole: from the absolute truths derived
from their individual stakeholder organization’s goals and
assumptions, to coherent interpretations based on new collab-
orative, transformational ways of looking at sustainable
development.This new conceptual perspective by the sustainable devel-
opment network is analogous to what Senge calls holographic
thinking [32]). He explains, ‘‘If you cut a photograph in half,
each half shows only part of the whole image. But if you
divide a hologram (a three-dimensional image created by in-
teracting light sources) each part, no matter how small, shows
the whole image intact. Likewise, when a group of people
comes to share a vision for an organization, each person sees
an individual picture of the organization at its best. Each shares
responsibility for the whole, not just for one piece. But the
component pieces of the hologram are not identical. Each
represents the whole image from a different point of view’’
(Senge [32]).
6.5. Systems thinkingdthe discipline that integrates
other perspectives, fusing them into a coherent
body of knowledge
When the pieces of a hologram are added up, something in-
teresting happens: ‘‘The image becomes more intense, more
lifelike. When more people come to share a vision, the vision
becomes more real in the sense of a mental reality that people
can truly imagine achieving. They now have partners, co-
creators’’ (Senge [32]). This is the product of network lear-
ningdthe capacity to think together. Hence, with its capacity
for multiplexing and virtual memory, a sustainable develop-
ment network can build consensus around a systemic view of
sustainable development that transcends individual stakeholder
organizations’ overemphasis on competition, and reactiveness
(the primacy of the pieces) and create a holographic image that
reflects the primacy of the whole.
7. Results of the North Carolina P-2 Project
In the case of the NC textile industry ION, the results were
better than expected. Within three months of beginning pro-
jects, significant improvements occurred from suggested pro-
cess changes and chemical substitutions. In some cases, poor
POTW operations were found. In others, the sporadic use of
a toxic chemical had to be uncovered. In still other cases, toxic
surfactants and textile products were discovered. Background
levels of pesticides, not from any specific industry, were also
found to be contributory factors. In every case, however, the
toxicants were identified and efficiencies were gained in waste
treatment and in textile mill operations, with the end result of
improved water quality and the ability to pass the bioassay
monitoring tests.
A side benefit to this process was that the POTW and indus-
try personnel learned more about each other’s challenges. Ef-
ficiencies resulted from new levels of cooperation. The textile
industry and the NCDWQ P-2 group published its findings.
Problem chemicals disappeared from the marketplace and
were replaced with the ‘‘greener’’ products and processes
that evolved from the experiences of these groups. Over 10
toxicity investigations and reduction efforts were performed
during the period of 1985e1995 in NC, and only one or two
remain unsatisfactorily resolved. Globalization unfortunately
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WTO and NAFTA, the textile industry has essentially left
NC, mirroring, in many ways, the Danish case. The industry
leaving North Carolina diminished the impact of the textile in-
dustry on the State’s surface waters, so long term records of
the ION’s operations and influence are not available.
The lasting legacies of this NC P-2 project are the demon-
stration that aquatic pollution prevention is possible and the
cleaner water that results from pollution prevention. Initially,
the USEPA had said that the P-2 process would not work.
At that time, the standard operating procedure of the USEPA
was to regulate through fines, based solely on numerical limits
to toxicity levels that might or might not relate to the biology
of the receiving waters. The state of NC proved that pollution
prevention and sustainable development was not so much
a matter of diagnostics and technology as it was using policy
management with performance-based standards and an inter-
organizational network of mutually committed stakeholders.
8. Discussion and conclusions
This paper contributes interdisciplinary perspectives of net-
works, virtual webs, and learning organizations to sustainable
industrial development and production. It is intended to
deepen understanding and appreciation of the superordinate
entity, the inter-organizational network that provides a context
for stakeholder collaboration. The model provides useful
knowledge and language for heightening awareness about
the structure and dynamics of the virtual entity created by
the processes of dialogue, exchanges of information, record
keeping, and learnings among multiple stakeholders. Once
the dimensions (activities) of this virtual network are actually
perceived and acknowledged, it can be more effectively
managed.
Large public challenges, such as environmental issues and
achieving the goals of sustainable development and produc-
tion, require increasingly efficient multi-stakeholder dialogues
(Weizse`acker [41]). It is the nature of IONs to come together
to solve problems and then disband. This is facilitated by the
existence of multiple communication lines and no physical
structures. Inter-organizational networks provide a very effi-
cient means of organizing and utilizing disparate resources,
without burdensome organizational structure (Capra [42]),
but their lack of physical structure also hurts their credibility
with enterprises seeking security in problem solving. These
concerns may disappear as more enterprises, based on inde-
pendent networks, develop credible economic success.
Sustainable development is redefining the purpose of busi-
ness enterprises to encompass a triple bottom line of People,
Planet and Profits; hence, the number of stakeholders impacted
by the growing global economy becomes almost universal.
Creating inter-organizational network structures that utilize
divergent resources toward achieving broad common goals is
becoming a necessity, as the number and diversity of stake-
holders increase. The NC textile industry case study demon-
strates how the use of a conceptual framework can serve as
an educational tool that guides the creation of institutionalarrangements, coordinates the intentional, systematic develop-
ment of all stakeholders in an inter-organizational network,
and integrates the ecological, economic, and social dimensions
of cleaner production.
The availability of cases illustrating the evolution of sus-
tainable enterprises through networking has deep ramifications
for business school pedagogy. The set of skills required by
business graduates who will be managing in a globalized mar-
ketplace that is increasingly influenced by civil society and the
push for sustainable enterprise, is much different than the skill
set required to operate within the corporate box where align-
ment is dictated by the organization itself. This need for
new and diverse skills is not going unnoticed by the market-
place or the media (Pink [43]; Nussbaum and Tiplady [44]).
Traditional MBA graduates have the skills to navigate within
a corporate structure and speak the language of strategy, fi-
nance and operations management, but today’s business
schools much ensure that graduates can effectively negotiate
outside the corporate box with diverse stakeholders that in-
creasingly hold sway over corporate strategy and profits.
The value of understanding networks and linking stake-
holders was recently demonstrated in an MBA experience.
Students who had been introduced previously to the concepts
of networking and sustainability, through analysis of this case
and other materials, took these new perspectives to traditional
business simulation exercises and offered completely different
viewpoints than had ever been presented before in an MBA
capstone class. Incorporating the dimensions of social and en-
vironmental responsibility changed the dynamics of the deci-
sions that the students made. As the groups with training in
sustainable enterprise examined the dimensions of the tradi-
tional business simulation exercise, they raised different kinds
of questions such as: How would our business decisions affect
the local environment and community? Will our decisions af-
fect relations with employees and suppliers? What do the local
distribution and supply channels offer local customers, vs.
a globalized supply chain?
Using cases such as this one as pedagogical tools can help
prepare students for the actual challenges facing managers in
the rapidly changing business environment, for example: (a)
developing inter-organizational dialogue skills; (b) utilizing
the efficiencies of network vs. traditional organizational struc-
tures; (c) valuing diversity in networks; and (d) forming links
among stakeholders to develop a network. These are key les-
sons and skills for future business leaders who must develop
new mental models for effective management in the 21st cen-
tury as globalization occurs and the small world phenomena
accelerate.
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